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THE
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ART. IA.—THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN TO THE
PRIESTHOOD.

It has been said by a bishop, and by a bishop speaking in Convocation, that there is one principle and one principle only that is relevant to the ministry of women in the church. The principle to which Dr. Swayne referred was that which St. Paul put forward in the third chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians: "There is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

It seems to the advocates of the ordination of women that the full realization of what is implicit in that principle carries with it a realization that the ordination of women is in accordance with the will of Christ. Would that discussion could end at this point! But it is obvious that to leave the question here is impossible. For nearly two thousand years the church has failed to interpret St. Paul's principle in this sense, and the grounds for the failure need to be examined. They need to be examined—in an article dealing with principles—primarily from a metaphysical and not from an historical point of view. History, psychology, expediency, are necessarily, in this article, secondary considerations.

It has been maintained by opponents to the ordination of women that St. Paul's principle applies only in the spiritual realm, and that since the church is a human organization functioning on a material plane the interpretation given to the principle by Dr. Swayne and others is not legitimate. But

under what circumstances would the principle ever apply were this contention valid? Was St. Paul addressing disembodied spirits functioning in an ethereal realm unbounded by human limitations, or was he addressing men and women whose flesh and blood was as human as our own? He was indubitably addressing men and women functioning in a physical world and in a visible church, as we are. He was, furthermore, addressing those men and women with a definite purpose in view, and that purpose one concerned with the religious status of people whose physical as well as whose social and spiritual attributes were in question. The epistle was written in the heat of the controversy over circumcision. Under the law the uncircumcised slave and the uncircumcisable woman were alike despicable. In Christ Jesus both were to be one with the Jewish man. Both were to be baptized and admitted to the duties, responsibilities, and the privileges of church membership. The old differences were to be swept away. "Before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed." "Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." That St. Paul could formulate this fundamental principle as he did has given him the position which he holds as the greatest of all Christian leaders; it would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of his achievement.

Why, then, it may be argued, did St. Paul himself not apply the principle as Dr. Swayne would apply it? If he who formulated the principle did not so apply it how can his followers?

The answer to this is twofold: considerations of principle must in passing lead us into history and into psychology. We must refer to the difference between social conditions in, for instance, Corinth in St. Paul's day and social conditions in a world which nineteen centuries of Christianity have, in a

measure, civilized; and we must refer to the psychology of St. Paul: we must attempt a psychological analysis of St. Paul's great mind.

It was a great mind; a tremendous mind; but it was essentially a mind darkened by shadows as deep as the illuminations which enlightened it were brilliant. St. Paul more than any other great Christian leader perceived the truth in flashes. He had amazing insight into God's purposes and amazing failures as well as amazing insight. He was suffered by God to persecute the early church and to look on unprotesting at the martyrdom of its saints. He tended to see one thing at a time and that with such overwhelming vehemence of conviction that for the time being he saw nothing else. He had this great flash of insight: he recognized the principle and he formulated it; and then, seeing only one of its three implications, he closed the valves of his attention to the other two, and threw himself heart and soul into working for that and that alone. He was supremely the apostle to the Gentiles; he was the greatest of all Christian missionaries: but he sent Onesimus back to Philemon, and he told the women to keep silence in the churches. How could it have been otherwise? No one man could have broken the threefold shackles in a single life-time. It took the church many centuries to see the application of the principle that "in Christ Jesus there is neither bond nor free," and it is taking her even longer to see the application of the principle that "in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female." The application of the first has involved the recognition within the state that no human being can own another; the application of the second will involve the recognition within the church that sex is no hindrance to a woman's dispensing the word and holy sacraments of God. It will never, obviously, mean that sex will be abolished, as among Christian people slavery has been abolished. Women priests will still be women: the point is that oneness in Christ means a right relation of his members to one another, and the removal of unchristian restrictions upon Christian activities. In the case of slavery bonds must be

done away with, in the case of women the old Jewish inhibitions must be outgrown. Not even twenty centuries of Christianity have been enough wholly to break down these inhibitions. Even now the attempt is often made to support them by squeezing a principle out of a mere fact of history. "There was no woman among the apostles . . ." "There was no Gentile among the apostles." How easily if St. Paul had been other than what he was might that statement of an historical fact have been twisted into the would-be enunciation of a principle!

The time has come to turn from St. Paul's formulation of Christian principle back to Christ himself. For a Christian in search of principle there is one supreme method, and one only: to look at Christ. Christ is revealed throughout the gospel records as making no differentiation between the sexes. He did not talk down to women; he did not shrink from them; he did not ignore them. It was through a woman that he gave the teaching: "God is a spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." It was to a woman that he first appeared after the resurrection. He let Mary learn from him, sitting at his feet as a disciple; he let Martha minister to him, and the woman who was a sinner anoint him for his burial. He let the woman with the issue of blood touch him and find healing of her plague. There is nothing in the gospels to suggest that he would be displeased at the sight of a woman kneeling to receive the grace of ordination at the bishop's hands to-day. "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not." Would he, at this juncture, be any less displeased at those who through loyalty to the principles of their adolescence—forty years, some have been known to boast, and not a tittle modified—would ban a woman's service?

The analogy must not, of course, be pressed in detail. Those who forbid a woman's ministry do not forbid her approach to Christ. The point is that there are some women who when they have come must needs fetch others. For some women as for some men the call is a call both to come

and to bring. "Tell it out among the heathen . . ." "Go into all the world . . ." "The fields are white unto harvest . . ." "Who will go for me? . . ." Women as well as men hear these commands and need to fulfil them. Women as well as men hear the church's call to care for—to "cure"—the souls whom Christ has saved. There are women—the bishops know that there are women—who believe that God is calling them to serve the church as ministers. What principle is there that prevents them? What is there in a woman's sex, *qua* sex, that hinders her to be ordained? And if it be objected that to be an evangelist a woman needs no ordination, why, it may be asked, is the man who believes himself called to be a fisher of men bidden to seek ordination? What need of priests at all? To administer the sacraments, it will be answered. Yes, but not, surely, as an act apart from pastoral activity. To divorce the two and to admit women to one and not to the other would inevitably tend to give a colouring of magic to the isolated sacramentalism, and of taboo to the sex restriction. What is there in the administration of the sacraments that is unsuitable to women?

Attempts are sometimes made to get out of the fact that the objections raised against the ordination of women are necessarily objections arising out of a preoccupation with sex. There is nothing, let it be remembered, that differentiates women from men except sex. Those who believe that God is calling women to the church's ministry do not believe that he is calling them as women but that he is calling them as human beings. They are not primarily interested in sex. They believe that God uses his human creatures, be they men or be they women, and that he would use them more freely but for his creatures' blundering inhibitions. But anyone who argues against women being ordained is either preoccupied with sex or prepared to let the church be dominated by those preoccupied with sex. To say this is not, of course, to impute to the opponents of the ministry of women the kind of sex-obsession that one attributes to the prurient-minded: that would be outrageous. The point which is being made

is that the advocates of women's ordination are emphasizing women's humanity; their opponents are emphasizing their sex. The advocates are by no means necessarily feminists; their opponents are necessarily anti-feminists. The latter have no argument on their side except argument which is based ultimately on sex. If they say: "Women should not be ordained because Christ did not choose a woman to be an apostle," they are saying: "Christ did not choose a woman to be an apostle because he rightly held that there is something in womanhood that makes a woman unfit to be an apostle." If they say: "Women should not be ordained because man is the natural ruler," they are saying: "Man rules over woman because there is something in woman that makes her suited to be dominated by man." If they say: "Women ought not to be ordained because one part of the church cannot act without another part," they are saying: "The objections of the part which does not ordain women because they are women deserve consideration." In other words, they are saying that someone's preoccupation with sex deserves consideration before someone else's sense of being called by God to serve the church. There is a real case for asserting that all arguments even those which would usually be regarded as frankly arguments of expediency are as a matter of fact arguments in which a principle is involved: a deleterious principle which puts sex before service, and the maleness of a man before the humanity of a woman.

To contend, in this connection, that differentiation of function does not imply inferiority of status is not helpful. There is little to choose between "inferiority" and "difference not implying inferiority" when both alike are bars to carrying out a line of action which seems urgent to the person who is debarred. The question at issue is not whether the admitted difference implies inferiority, but whether it is relevant. We should all be outraged at the suggestion that only people with brown eyes ought to be priests, and we should be outraged even if the possession of blue eyes was regarded as carrying with it no inferiority. The supporters

of women in the ministry believe that the question of sex is as irrelevant to ordination as is the possession of blue eyes. This is not, of course, to say that sex differences go no deeper than the colour of the eyes, or even to deny that motherhood might in individual cases be very much harder to reconcile with the priestly vocation than fatherhood; it is to assert that sex *qua* sex is not relevant to ordination. It is probable that there would always be some things which a man priest could do better than a woman priest and some things which a woman priest could do better than a man priest, but none the less priesthood is a human and not a sexual function. In the greater proportion of the priestly office it would be immaterial whether a priest were a woman or a man.

That is why, or rather partly why, the advocates of the ordination of women to the historic orders of the church's ministry are so much disturbed at the suggestion of the establishment of a "parallel order" of ministry for women. They do not want to stress the sex of the minister. To do so appears to them extremely undesirable.

Apart from the question of over-emphasizing sex, the suggestion seems to them one that would, when properly understood, please nobody. It is not a case of being offered half a loaf, but of asking for bread and being offered a cardboard imitation. They hope not for a newly invented and sex-labelled substitute but for the historic and apostolic order itself. The establishment of a parallel order for women would either involve a breach with tradition in comparison with which the ordination of women to the historic orders would be slight, or it would deny to women the privilege of administering the sacraments, in which case it would provide but a shadow of what is sought. If a woman-elder were suffered to administer the sacraments without being a priest, church-order would be revolutionized; if she were to be provided with some newly-invented function "parallel" to the administration of the sacraments, her sense of vocation, if not the sacraments themselves, would be mocked.

It is plain from what has been said that to the whole-hearted advocate of women's ordination the suggestion of a parallel order for women is irrational. It is a fantastic suggestion arising out of a natural but an unsatisfactory desire for compromise. There is no place for fantasy in a right treatment of this difficult question; a single eye is needed and the renunciation of fantasy's attempts to have a thing both ways. One of the principles relevant to the question of the ministry of women is the principle that the true servant of Christ is a rational being. Every time Christians go to Holy Communion they offer themselves to God as "a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice." It must be realized that to be holy men must be reasonable, that is, rational. To say: "I can see no reason why there should not be women clergy, but I don't like the idea," is not rational. To say: "The eternal beauty of the Incarnate Deity would be lost for me if women were to be ordained," is not rational; it is fantastic. But the fantasy which produced the saying is the fantasy of an intelligent and cultured woman doctor who has recently attempted to formulate the deep-rooted prejudices which she has mistaken for reasons. St. Paul told us that when he was a child he spake as a child, he thought as a child, he understood as a child, but that when he became a man he put away childish things. It is doubtful whether he did, completely, and it is more than doubtful whether the people who have "a feeling in their bones" or "an instinctive dislike of the idea" have put away childish things. On the contrary they seem to have maintained a characteristically infantile and irrational way of looking at womanhood: an attitude which they would be so much ashamed of knowing for what it is that they have to wrap it up in all kinds of sophistications in order to contemplate it without distress of mind. There seems little doubt but that some people who have matured physically but not

mentally still think of a woman not as a human being as complete in her way as a man in his, but as a maimed man, an unfinished man, in some way a man *manqué*: either as that or as an unclean person, incapacitated at times through her very constitution from serving at the altar and from administering the holy elements.

Among the readers of this article some will be indignant at this suggestion. It is not put forward without evidence. A serious-minded churchwoman asked a priest some years ago for an answer to the question: "May I serve at the altar?" The answer which he gave was this: "Yes, if you will undertake to stay away at certain times in the month." The attitude is distressing; it is unchristian. Unfortunately it is not uncommon.

The suggestion is not being made that all men who object to women priests object on these lines. Some men may unconsciously share the attitude indicated by the answer quoted above; others almost certainly do not share it. It seems plain that there are men who feel genuinely distressed, hurt, saddened, when they meet a woman who wants to do anything creative other than bear children and bring them up. Such men have, probably, much of the woman in them—there is more man in woman and more woman in man than people sometimes realize—and they have sublimated in their creative work their own desire to bear children. Whether they are priests, artists, engineers, or what not, it hurts them to see a woman throwing away, as it appears to them, the substance for the shadow. They find themselves in the position of a blind boy whose sister snatches wantonly at the Braille books that he has schooled himself to master. He is not angry, but he is wounded; he does not understand.

It is not only men who oppose the ordination of women;

there are women who feel even more strongly than men about the question. Such women may be of a conspicuously feminine type and may have reacted from an infantile desire to be a boy into an exaggerated hostility to "mannish" women. It would be possible to give many illustrations of opposition based on other forms of infantile fixation; but it must suffice to assert that all such manifestations of the irrational in full-grown men and women are clearly contrary to Christian principle. A reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice: let Christians offer that to their heavenly Father and not an irrational and unholy conglomeration of fantasies. The fantasy-life is not the Christian life. Christ is the way and the *truth*. It is a Christian principle that men should learn to see things not foreshortened as the infant sees them or distorted as the dreamer sees them, but as they are. When Christ told his hearers that they could not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven except they became as little children, he meant that they must learn to be humble and single-minded, not that they must retain in their maturity infantile modes of thought which when retained by people physically mature closely resemble the neuroses of the mentally unbalanced.

It will be well in conclusion to formulate what seem to the writer of this article the most important principles relevant to the question of the ordination of women. They are these:—

1. Christ, in taking upon him the flesh of his mother, manifested to men the holiness of womanhood as well as of manhood.
2. Christ by his growth in wisdom as in stature taught Christian people to put away childish things and learn to think maturely.
3. Christ alike in his life on earth and in his ascended life in heaven has called to his service women as well as men.

4. Christ bade his followers look for the coming of the Holy Spirit and set no time-limit to the Spirit's working.

5. The church as Christ's visible body here on earth must work out on a human plane the principles which Christ has given her.

6. No part of the church can perfectly serve Christ if it rejects principles which it sees to be implicit in his teaching.

7. If one part of the church sees before another what is implicit in his teaching, it is the duty of that part to put the principle in action and not to wait for a lead.

8. The Church of England is a part of the church catholic, but a part which is sufficiently a unit to be capable of independent action involving fresh interpretation of the holy scriptures and a breach with catholic tradition.¹

If to these principles be added the fundamental principle put forward by St. Paul, and if the fact be faced that a woman differs from a man in nothing but her womanhood, it is difficult to believe that the Archbishops' Commission now engaged in investigating the question will when it reports find itself able to enunciate any principle, theological or otherwise, of such a nature as to rule out for ever the ordination of women to the historic orders of the Church's ministry.

And yet though reason is on the side of the innovators, and though reason—rationality—is essential to the Christian, yet it will not be reason that will bring about the change. It will

¹ If it could be established that the ordination of women involved not only a fresh interpretation of holy scripture but the controverting of holy scripture, and not only a breach with catholic tradition but also a breach with catholic principle, then the Church of England would not be at liberty to ordain women while continuing to claim the right to call itself a part of the catholic church.

not be reason, not abstract reason, not ratiocination, but the will to serve. It is that which will ultimately triumph and prevail. Archbishops, bishops, archbishops' commissions, the general run of the clergy, the general run of the laity, none of them are exclusively rational, supremely rational. The change will come and it will only come when they have seen the will to serve, baulked and frustrated though it be, struggling through, breaking through, in spite of opposition, hostility, indifference.

The church has need of ministers; there are women whose need it is to serve the church, not primarily as a form of sublimation for their frustrated motherhood, not as a means of self-expression, not as a demonstration; but simply from a love of God, from a need in the deepest fountains of their being to share what they have received, to pass on what they have been given, to bring Christ's little ones to Christ. The need is not a trivial one: may those who do not share it come to respect it; and if that cannot be let them at least attempt to meet the need with arguments that are so far as possible worthy of its seriousness.

URSULA ROBERTS.

ART. IB.—THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN TO THE
PRIESTHOOD.

THE Christian ministry belongs to the whole catholic church. Like the creeds and the sacraments it is fundamental to the church's life and work. It is part of the divine revelation made through the Bible and the church. It is the gift of the Holy Spirit carrying out the ordinance of Christ when he called his apostles. In all essentials the ministry must be according to the order of the church; and no change can be made in the traditional order unless it seems certain that such a change is obedient to the will of the Holy Spirit. To determine whether women ought to be ordained to the priesthood we must enquire whether such ordination would be obedient to his will.

The divine will can only be learnt through the Bible and the church; nor is it always easy to determine all the questions which we may wish to ask about the divine will even with the help of the Bible and the church. But one thing does seem to be very clearly taught by the concurrent testimony of the Bible and the church, and that is that the ordination of women to the priesthood is against the will of God. In appealing to the authority of the Bible and the church, I do not ignore the truth which the investigations and discussions of the last hundred years have made familiar to most people; namely, that excepting in the words of Christ there is an element of human imperfection in the Bible and in the church which we must not mistake for the voice of the Holy Spirit. We must bear in mind that it is the general purport of the Bible rather than particular texts which unmistakably expresses the revelation of God; that the teaching of Christ strikes a note of perfection which should enable us to hear what is truly divine because in harmony with that teaching; that the guidance of the Spirit

may safely be looked for in the work of the apostles in founding and organizing the church; and that that guidance has not been withdrawn though constantly hindered by the sins and errors of mankind even unto our own time. If we wish then to decide any disputed question about our religion we must scrutinize the teaching of the Bible and the church so as to discern the divine mind which has given us his revelation, and when we have ascertained his will we must obey. The church is not infallible; even the Bible, except the words of Christ, is not infallible; but the Holy Spirit is infallible; and when through the Bible and the church we have learnt his will, controversy and doubt must be at an end.

Let us then examine the teaching of the Bible bearing on the question whether women should be ordained priests. First must be considered the teaching of Christ. He began the Christian ministry, or rather laid its foundation, by calling the apostles. He called no woman to be an apostle. At one point in his ministry he sent out for a particular purpose seventy disciples; but we may I think be sure that no woman was among them. This was not because he did not respect and honour women. Nor was it because women were not called to serve and help him or because their examples as narrated in the Gospels do not warrant the work of women for Christ in all ages. The example of the sisters of Bethany in particular has been received as sanctioning for women the life of devotion and the life of good works. Women were not ignored by Christ nor passed over nor treated as inferior; but they were not called to the vocation which began the Christian ministry. The example of Christ therefore, so far as it relates to the subject at all, is against the ordination of women.

Next we pass to the example and teaching of the apostles and here we have from St. Paul some express words of guidance. One saying of his is quoted in support of the ordination of women and is the more notable as being, I believe, the only quotation from the Bible or from any doctor of the

church which has ever been adduced on that side. It deserves therefore to be set out at length.

(Galatians iii, 28): But before faith came, we were kept in ward under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterward be revealed. So that the law hath been our tutor to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith is come, we are no longer under a tutor. For ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ. There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female: for ye are all one man in Christ Jesus. And if ye are Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, heirs according to promise.

It is of course the words "there can be no male and female" which are relied upon. But I find it difficult to understand how anyone reading these words with their context can suppose that they relate to any question of function or vocation. The governing words of the whole passage are clearly "for ye are all sons of God." St. Paul is teaching that all mankind of all races, of all classes, and of both sexes are children of one Father and therefore brethren. This is the great truth of the identity of status common to all human beings, through which Christianity has powerfully changed human society. But it does not relate to function or vocation. For example St. Paul did not treat slavery as wrong as a function, but he insisted that slave owners and slaves were brethren of the same status before God. Strictly respecting law and property, he did not emancipate Onesimus, but he taught Philemon that Onesimus was his brother beloved. According to tradition Philemon did thereupon emancipate Onesimus; and this is very probable, because a slave who was in truth regarded and treated as a brother beloved would be of little use as a slave. The evil of slavery and its attractiveness to those who owned slaves precisely depended on denying St. Paul's doctrine of identity of status. All the cruelties and corruptions of slavery spring from the evil root that a slave is

not thought a brother beloved but a chattel. It is worth noting that in the southern states of America the wicked soul of slavery has survived the destruction of its body. Great evils exist there at this moment precisely because the white race refuses to regard the black as beloved brethren. On the other hand Christian nations rightly still use compulsion on proper occasions in order to force men to obedience, without transgressing St. Paul's teaching, as in the instances of compulsory military service and penal servitude and some other cases of forced labour. The function of forced labour that belongs to slavery is not immoral but the status of slavery is. This is what St. Paul taught and what the church always accepted, but only gradually made operative upon the Christian conscience. It would be strange then to interpret St. Paul's teaching about male and female as implying that the function or vocation of men and women must in every respect be identical. It would be strange and even absurd, for nature makes the opposite quite plain. Mr. Chesterton expressed the truth very well when he said that to talk of the equality of men and women was like talking of the equality of a knife and a fork. Knives and forks are indeed equal in status as instruments for eating, but different in function.

Even then if St. Paul had said no more about the ministry of women it would have been rash to conclude from the passage in Galatians that St. Paul thought that women ought to be ordained. But in fact he has expressly said that women in church are not to teach but are to be subordinate. In order to understand and appreciate his teaching about women it is necessary to realize the distinction between subordination and inferiority. St. Paul would certainly have denied any inferiority of women; for that would be inconsistent with identity of status before God. But he did expressly teach that both in the family and in the church they are subordinate. This is part of his belief that both the church and the family are organisms not mere associations. He thinks of Christ as the head of the church which is his body; and that the husband is the head of the family. The life of both church and family

is organic; and men and women have their appointed membership within these organisms which determines their vocations and secures them indefeasibly in their proper rights and duties. And history shows that, gifted with this conception, Christianity has enormously raised the position of women from something which in the pagan world was half way to slavery up to the respect and honour which they hold among Christian peoples.

I emphasize that St. Paul's teaching about women in the church and the family is one coherent theory which consistently runs through all his utterances on the subject. This is important for our present purpose because, as I have said, it is not St. Paul who is infallible but the Holy Spirit who inspires him, if inspired he be. If we have to do not with a casual phrase here and there, but with a coherent scheme of teaching, steadily and consistently uttered, we must either accept it as inspired or deny St. Paul's inspiration altogether, attaching no more authority to him than to Plato or Aristotle. There has, to be sure, grown up a way of treating the authority of scripture which seems to allow one to pick and choose between statements, accepting those that are agreeable and rejecting those that are not. Mrs. Roberts in her article speaks of St. Paul's mind being sometimes illumined and sometimes darkened, but propounds no test to distinguish his illumination from his darkness, except that when she agrees with him he is illumined and when she disagrees he is darkened. Plainly authority so handled ceases to be of any use in ascertaining truth. St. Paul's teaching seems to me quite clear and quite acceptable; but my opinion decides nothing. If we find the meaning of scripture is controverted we must decide the controversy not by the opinion of this person or that but by the judgement of the church.

The distinction between inferiority and subordination which is the essence of St. Paul's teaching about women is corroborated by the example of the greatest of women, St. Mary the Virgin. She was the greatest of the human race except her divine Son and was superior in sanctity and in honour to the apostles themselves. But she had no share in

the ministry of the church and must have received all ministrations from others. St. John with whom we believe she dwelt may have consecrated and doubtless did consecrate the Eucharist, but she could not. Superior to St. John by the immeasurable honour of having been the mother of the incarnate God, she was subordinate to him in the order of the church. And in the Magnificat she connects the lowliness of humility with the supreme honour she had received. It is much to be regretted that in the protestant reaction against extravagant devotions offered to her in the Roman and Eastern Churches we have lost the habitual sense of veneration for her character and example. If it had been the custom in the Church of England to teach girls to try and form themselves according to the pattern of St. Mary, the elements of exaggeration and of aggressive self-assertion, which have partly spoilt what was good in the feminist movement, might have been eliminated.

The character and the greatness of St. Mary illustrate the lesson which is taught by the practice of Christ and the teaching of St. Paul. All together make the authority of the New Testament plainly hostile to the ordination of women to the priesthood. It is not disputed that the teaching of the Old Testament is to the same effect. But, as I conceive perversely, the circumstance that the Old Testament and the practice of the Jewish Church are against the priesthood of women, is treated as being of no importance for Christians and even as constituting a source of prejudice which derogates from the authority of St. Paul. "Of course St. Paul was a Jew and an oriental, and that accounts for his teaching about women": so it is said with complete indifference to the fact that the people of Israel are the chosen people of God, and not the English or any West European people. Doubtless in some important respects Christ and his apostles superseded the teaching of the Old Testament and the traditions of the Jewish Church; and St. Paul himself was the leader of innovation. But where Jewish teaching and tradition were not superseded they were adopted and developed. Christ indeed stated with

emphasis that he came not to destroy the Law but to fulfil it; that is I suppose to develop the Law so as to bring out and enlarge all that was good in it, while its rules in so far as they were ceremonial and not moral, were left behind. No mistake about the meaning of the Bible can be greater than to suppose that the New Testament should be interpreted without regard to the teaching and traditions of Israel and it does not diminish but rather strengthens the authority of St. Paul when, as in what concerns the ministry of women, he is interpreting and developing the lessons of the Old Testament. For as he himself says, it is the Jews who "were entrusted with the oracles of God" (Rom. iii, 2).

Next we proceed to enquire what can be learnt from the church about the ministry of women. Its testimony is clear and indisputable. There does not appear to be in ecclesiastical history a single exception to the rule that women were not admitted to the priesthood. The weight of this testimony cannot be diminished by the argument that it was due to some fashion of opinion, and that women were not ordained because such an idea occurred to no one. For women priestesses were well known in heathen religious rites, and there were some obscure and deeply discredited heretics who did have a ministry of women. Among these the best known are the Montanists. I venture to give a quotation from the pages of Bingham's *Antiquities* (Vol. I, p. 330, Book 2, Section VII), which I suppose to be very typical of the general attitude of the primitive church:

" . . . Some heretics, indeed, as Tertullian observes, allowed women to teach, and exorcise, and administer baptism; but all this, he says, was against the rule of the apostle. Epiphanius brings the charge particularly against the Pepuzians, which were a branch of the Montanists, that they made women-bishops and women-presbyters, abusing that passage of the apostle, 'In Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female,' to put some colour upon their practice. He charges it also upon the Colly-

ridians, that they did *ἱεουργεῖν διὰ γυναικῶν*, use women to sacrifice to the Virgin Mary. Where it is observed that the charge is double, 1. That they gave divine worship to the Holy Virgin; and 2. That they used women priests in their service. Against these he has a particular dissertation, wherein he shows at large, that no woman, from the foundation of the world, was ever ordained to offer sacrifice, or perform any solemn service of the church: which if it had been allowed to any would certainly have been granted to the Virgin Mary herself, who was so highly favoured of God. But neither she nor any other woman had ever the priest's office committed to them. There is, indeed, says he, an order of deaconesses in the church: but their business is not to sacrifice or perform any part of the sacerdotal office, or any of the sacred mysteries, but to be a decent help to the female sex in the time of their baptism, sickness, affliction, or the like: and therefore he denies that the church made them either presbyteresses or priestesses . . .”

It is interesting to notice from this quotation that the opinion that women may be ordained according to the teaching of St. Paul that there is neither male nor female in Christ Jesus was regarded as clearly heretical. This confirms what I have already said as to the interpretation of St. Paul's saying. Indeed the universality of the practice of the church in early ages is conclusive about the teaching both of St. Paul and of the apostles. The tradition of the apostles, like the words of St. Paul, clearly excluded women from the priesthood. And the tradition went on unbroken throughout all the ages of the church down to our own time. Though there were great differences of opinion among Christians, though the church spread the gospel far and wide over the whole world, though new races and nations shared in its light, though a vast development of the human mind took place and the habits of Christian thought and even of devotion were notably modified in different parts, yet women were always excluded from the priesthood and, with the rarest exceptions, even from

the Christian ministry altogether. Indeed the exceptions are insignificant. Strange and eccentric bodies like the Shakers have female ministers; and so have some bodies which can scarcely be reckoned Christian, like the Spiritualists and the Mormons. Such examples are arguments not for but against the priesthood of women. No Christian body which has a title to our esteem has assigned any priestly or liturgical function to women. For the Quakers and the Salvation Army among whom women do minister have no priesthood and no distinctive ministry. The verdict obtained by an appeal to the authority of the church is overwhelmingly hostile to the priesthood of women. It is in simple fact a verdict given everywhere, always, and by all Christian bodies. It may be truly said that if women may be priests, St. Paul is not inspired; and again that if women may be priests, the Spirit has not guided the church.

To such arguments as these there is only one answer which seems to deserve rejoinder. Some would say that it is no doubt true that the Holy Spirit at the beginning through the apostles and the church excluded women from the priesthood. But that does not necessarily prove that it is his will to exclude them now, when circumstances have so vastly changed. I agree that it is possible that God may permit in the twentieth century what he forbade in the first century. But obviously it can never be true that God changes his mind. If we are to conclude that a divine rule has been changed, we must be convinced that circumstances that are relevant to it have so changed that the same mind can come and has come to a different decision. But in respect to the priesthood of women I see no change in relevant circumstances. Many things have changed and very greatly since the first century; but none of those changes seem to bear upon the priesthood of women. Civilization and the progress of science have notably increased the security against violence and have improved in many ways the ease of travel. Accordingly women no longer need the protection of men in the same way as they formerly did; and this, together with the ease of

moving about, which both sexes now enjoy, makes it possible for women to do many things which formerly were impossible for them. Restrictions have become first conventional instead of reasonable, and then obsolete, and have lately been on a great scale swept away. But all this has nothing to do with the priesthood or with the exclusion of women from it; for women were never excluded from the priesthood because of insecurity or the need of the protection of men. It is not I think possible to name any reason which would justify the exclusion of women in the first century but which does not apply to the circumstances of the twentieth. Further just as there is no ground for supposing that God could have changed his rule since relevant circumstances are unchanged, so there is no ground for thinking that he has changed his rule. If he had, not English opinion only but Christian opinion in the Church of Rome and in the Eastern Churches would have been modified; but there is no sign of any such change. If it were possible now to assemble an œcumenical council of all the bishops of the catholic church, except among the English there would not, I suppose, be found one bishop who would so much as consider the ordination of women to the priesthood. It remains true that the judgement of the church in the twentieth century rejects the ordination of women to the priesthood as unmistakably as that judgement did in the first century.

It may be asked why are women excluded from the priesthood? Mrs. Roberts objects that they are only excluded because of their sex. But she seems to confuse two meanings of the word sex. That word may mean in a narrow sense only what relates to the sexual function and the passions connected with it; and it is so apparently that Mrs. Roberts uses it. But it may also be used in a far wider sense which does indeed include the narrower but has a larger significance. In this larger sense women differ in every activity from men; for though there are a vast number of things which both men and women can do, there are few or none which they do exactly in the same way. Even handwriting, remote as it is

from anything which would in the narrower sense be called sexual, yet commonly distinguishes women from men so that one can tell by which sex a writing has been penned. When therefore we say that women are excluded from the priesthood by their sex we mean by that which penetrates their whole nature, mental as well as physical. To be sure we do not know what sex is in its essential character. We observe that men and women are different from one another; but we cannot determine the essential principle of the difference. It is what theologians call a mystery—that is a truth which is only half disclosed, part being known and realized within the sphere of experience, and part being hidden beyond the reach of our scrutiny. And as sex is a mystery so also is the priesthood. We believe that a priest has certain gifts which he receives at his ordination when he is said to “receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest.” But what enables him to receive the gifts we do not know; nor can we say what is the essential principle which makes a priest different from men who are not priests. Here again is a mystery, part experienced, part hidden. It is not strange that in respect to the relation of two mysteries we should be obliged to walk according to authority and to accept the teaching of the Bible and the church.

We are told that some women are conscious of a vocation to become priests. I cannot believe in the reality of a vocation which is contrary to the teaching of the Bible and the church; but it seems probable that those who feel it have unconsciously perverted a true vocation to serve God in one of the ways in which holy women throughout the history of the church have served him. Beginning with the women who ministered to Christ in the gospel story but were not called to be apostles, down through the ages a long line of women saints richly adorned the church they served. Women had true, noble, and exalted vocations, and have in conformity with the rules of the church abundantly ministered to the glory of God. It is surely foolish and unreasonable if women to-day are unwilling to walk in the steps of their saintly predecessors.

Why should what was enough for those great and holy women not be enough for the women of to-day?

Upon the whole it seems very clear that women cannot be ordained to the priesthood of the catholic and apostolic church. I should myself feel that the Church of England or any other church which purported to give women priestly ordination had wandered so far from the revelation made in the Bible and the church that it could not any longer be reckoned as catholic or apostolic. I hope it is quite impossible that the Church of England should so forfeit its Catholic heritage. But there seems more danger of some of the non-episcopal churches opening their ministry to women. I hope this danger may be averted, for it would raise a new and most formidable obstacle to any plan of reunion. It would indeed prove that those among us had been in the right who denied that the Free Church ministry could properly be called a catholic and apostolic ministry. And it is not easy to see how the vast difference between the catholic apostolic ministry and a ministry which comprised women could ever be bridged. However that may be, I hope that in the Church of England we are safe, and that our rulers will resolutely turn away from that step towards apostasy which would leave to those who value the teaching of the Bible and the church no refuge or resting place within the fallen communion of England.

HUGH CECIL.

ART. II.—ARCHBISHOP WHITGIFT AND THE LAMBETH ARTICLES.

IN 1595, William Barret went to Lambeth, in company with his accusers, Whitaker and Tyndal, to answer for his opinions. The exact date of his appearance before the archbishop and the two former divines does not seem to be known, but it was presumably during October. Early in November, Whitaker, the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, after a vigorous sermon in which he declared himself the champion of orthodoxy against Popish innovations, went up to London once more,¹ (again in company with Tyndal) sent by the heads to the archbishop to consult with him and with other learned divines "for the pacification of these disputes and differences." The idea of framing some propositions to be used as a criterion of belief in case of emergency appears to have been in Whitgift's mind for some time, and to have been as much desired by him, as it was by the Cambridge authorities.² As early as July 11th,

¹ Strype, *Life of Whitgift* (1822), II, pp. 278-9. Strype's sequence of events being often far from chronological it is rather difficult to discover exactly in what order all the events at this very crowded time occurred. Presumably Whitaker preached the sermon in Cambridge on his return from London the first time, shortly before his second visit. He sent a copy of the sermon to Burghley from the house of his uncle Dean Nowell at St. Paul's on November 19th, on the eve of the conference, according to Strype, who says that the business in question was "done and finished" on November 20 (*S.W.* II, p. 279). Hardwick seems to imply that this was the correct sequence of events. (*History of the Articles*, 1895, p. 172). The date of the submission of the Lambeth propositions to the Archbishop is given by Heylin as November 10th.

² See W. D. Sargeaunt, *The Lambeth Articles*, (*J.T.S.* Vol. XII, No. 46, p. 352). Mr. Sargeaunt says that the general opinion seems to be that the Articles were drawn up at the suggestion of the Cambridge divines, but the only authority whom he gives

1595, he had written to the Vice-Chancellor and the Heads, asking them not to preach the controverted topics "until such time as you shall receive some resolutions from hence in these causes, which had been ere this, if your hasty proceedings had not ministered occasion to the contrary."¹ He gave a like injunction after their submission to him in a letter dated September 30th.²

We nowhere find a full list of those who were responsible for the framing of the Articles,³ but probably there were about nine or ten divines in all present. Strype does not give any names, beyond those of the archbishop, with Whitaker and Tyndal, but in the heading of the Articles, as given by him, we find included the name of Richard Fletcher, Bishop of Bristol, and in 1595, Bishop-elect of London.⁴ Heylin gives a fuller account of the personnel of the conclave. He adds to the names already given, that of Richard Vaughan, Bishop-

¹ *S.W.* II, p. 251.

² *ibid.*, p. 268.

³ Hardwick suggests that probably a series of preliminary meetings was held at which the extreme Calvinists prepared their manifesto, before they presented it to the Archbishop. This seems likely in the light of such historical evidence as we possess, and may account for the variation in the dates as given by Strype and Heylin respectively.

⁴ The heading is as follows: "Articuli approbati a Reverendissimis Dominis D.D. Joanne Archiepiscopo Cantuariensi, et Richardo Episcopo Londoniensi, et aliis Theologis, Lambethae, Novembris 20, anno 1575." Fuller, in his account, has evidently confused Fletcher with Bancroft who succeeded him as Bishop of London in 1597, and who had the same Christian name. Fuller, *Church History* 1857, III, 8. Bk. IX, cent. XVI. 8, 23-8).

is Hardwick (*op. cit.*, p. 172) whom, surely, he has misread in this context. Hardwick follows Strype in saying that Whitaker and Tyndal went up to London at the desire of the Heads of Houses, but he expressly says that they went to be present at a conference which had been called, not which they had called. The Archbishop was as anxious as they could be, to get the matter finally settled in official form.

Designate of Bangor,¹ and after mentioning Whitaker and Tyndal, goes on to speak of "the rest of the divines which came from Cambridge."² He describes the meeting as consisting of "the archbishop, two other bishops . . . one deane, and half-a-dozen doctors and other ministers."³ In the introduction to Matthew Hutton's notes on predestination, substantially the same information is given.⁴ Matthew Hutton, Archbishop of York, does not appear to have been actually present at the formulation of the articles, though his opinion was sought immediately and more than one writer speaks of him as equally responsible for them with those present at Lambeth.⁵ There is one curious fact with regard to the chronology of events at this time, which it is difficult to explain. The letter which Hutton wrote to Whitgift,⁶ in which he enclosed his brief comments on the articles, with the promise of a longer

¹ Vaughan was successively Bishop of Bangor, Chester and London. He was a decided enemy to Puritanism, but seems to have been moderate and just in his policy. His Cambridge tutor had been John Becon, and he was at one time chaplain to Bishop Aylmer of London. He died in 1607.

² Heylin, *Hist. Quinqu. Art.*, Part III, Ch. XX, p. 79.

³ Heylin, *Hist. Quinqu. Art.*, Part III, Ch. XX, p. 80.

⁴ The author of the introduction Thysius (Anton Thys (1565-1640) a strong Calvinist, Professor of theology at Harderwyk on the Zuider Zee) speaks of "D. Withakerus, cum gravissimo Decano Eliensi, Doctore Tindallo . . . coram Archiepiscopo Cantuarensi, Episcopii Richardo Londinensi, Richardo Bangoriensi designato, aliisque Episcopi et Theologie . . ."

⁵ Fuller [F.C.H. Bk. IX, Cent. XVI, 4 §23-28] mentions Hutton as approving the Articles. Prynne [*The Church of England's old Antithesis to new Arminianisme* (1629), p. 12] speaks of Hutton, in conjunction with Whitgift and the Bishops of London and Bangor, as having "composed and approved" the Articles. This does not, of course, necessarily infer that he was present at Lambeth, and nowhere in the general lists cited is more than one Archbishop ever mentioned. Neal says that they were also sent to Dr. Young Bishop of Rochester who subscribed to them.

⁶ F.C.H., Bk. IX, Cent. XVI, 4 §23-28.

exposition of his views on election and reprobation,¹ is dated "E musaeo meo apud Bishop Thorp. Calend. Octob. anno Domini, 1595." This date is at least a month before we gather that the articles were ready for presentation to the archbishop, and Hutton's comments were evidently upon the amended articles and not upon a rough advance draft of Whitaker's original series, as he wishes the words "si voluerint" (which appear in Whitaker's version as "si velint") in article 7 to be omitted. This is a curious discrepancy for which it is difficult to account.

The only other possible member of the conference to whom we have any clue is Lancelot Andrewes—though we may hazard a fairly safe guess that Saravia, always at Whitgift's right hand, was present. Though Andrewes' name is not mentioned by any historian in connexion with the divines at Lambeth, the heading to his judgement on the articles would seem to imply that he played some part in the deliberations.² From this somewhat incomplete list of names, it would therefore appear that the main body of opinion was not unduly biassed by ultra-Calvinism; Whitaker and Tyndal were obviously the supporters of the propositions in their original state, whereas the *Lambethani*, as we may conveniently call the rest of the assembled divines, represented a moderate Augustinian point of view. The attempts of the latter to divert Whitaker and Tyndal's original meaning into safer but considerably less definite channels will be seen from the detailed *critique* of the articles.

¹ "Legi articulos et relegi, et dum pararem aliquid de singulis dicere, visum est mihi multo potius de ipsâ electione et reprobatione, unde illa dissensio orta esse videtur, meam sententiam et opinionem paucis verbis explicare, quam singulis singillatam respondens fratrum forsitan quorundam animas, quos in veritate diligo, exacerbare."

² *Reverendissimi τῷ παντὶ doctissimique Patris Lanceloti Wintoniensis (qui ipse ejusdem pars magna fuit) de Synodo oblatis a D. Whitakero Articulis Judicium* [printed in *Articuli Lambethani*, p. 21].

The procedure seems to have been, probably, as follows. Certain propositions were drawn up by the Cambridge Calvinists—possibly at Cambridge, possibly by Whitaker and Tyndal in company with others in the series of preliminary meetings suggested by Hardwick—and then presented in Whitaker's name¹ to the assembled divines at Lambeth, who would appear to have been men of Augustinian views, sympathetic up to a point with the High Calvinist party, but unwilling to make concessions beyond that point. The work of the final meeting or meetings was therefore not to formulate articles, but to criticize and amend articles already formulated—a nice distinction which it is important to make, for the articles must be, of course, attributed to the authorship of Whitaker and not to that of Whitgift.

A complete bibliography of the Lambeth articles would not be difficult to compile. Strype gives us the articles in their finally amended form, from a MS. in the possession of Burghley.² For the articles as originally propounded by Whitaker, and for the comments made by the assembled divines at Lambeth upon them, we are indebted to a small book published in 1651, which was compiled by a certain "F. G."³

¹ See the heading to the original articles in *Articuli Lambethani* given on p. 214 below.

² *S.W.*, II, pp. 279-80.

³ *Articuli Lambethani F. G. Saneti Nicolai apud Trinobantes Ministri. Londoni Typis G.D. 1651.* I have made every effort to discover the identity of the compiler, but with no success. The Bodleian copy is bound up with a number of tracts dealing with Predestination by Franz Gomar, the Calvinist opponent of Arminius at Leiden, but the only reason for this identification appears to be the similarity of the initials and of the subjects treated. "Apud Trinobantes" might include any place in London or in the Eastern counties, but even allowing it its widest geographical significance, the churches with the dedication to St. Nicholas are few and their records for the first half of the sixteenth century either bear no mention of a name corresponding to the initials F.G. or else have disappeared for this period. The printer seems to have been William Dugard, who printed Milton's *Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio* also in 1651. A translation of *Articuli Lambethani* by the Rev. John Ellis appeared in 1694.

who appends to the original text of the articles a short history of the events which led up to them, the above-mentioned comments forming notes upon the text. Other comments, which will be referred to in due course, were furnished by Matthew Hutton, Archbishop of York, by Lancelot Andrewes, and by Peter Baro. For the sake of convenience the articles in their original and in their amended forms, the one according to *Articuli Lambethani*, the other according to Strype, may be arranged in parallel columns so that the slight verbal alterations may be readily seen.

Articuli Lambethani propositi prout a cl. v. D. Whitakero in ipsius autographo concepti. Episcopis aliisque Theologis Lambethae proponebantur.

I. Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam ad vitam, et quosdam ad mortem reprobavit.

II. Causa efficiens Praedestinationis non est praevisio fidei aut perseverantiae, aut bonorum operum, aut ullius rei quae insit personis praedestinatīs, sed sola et absoluta et simplex voluntas Dei.

III. Praedestinatorum praefinitus et certus est numerus, qui nec augeri nec minui potest.

IV. Qui non sunt praedestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condemnabuntur.

V. Vera, viva et justificans fides et spiritus Dei sanctificans non extinguitur, non excidit, non evanescit, in iis qui semel ejus participes fuereunt, aut, totaliter aut finaliter.

Articuli Lambethani propositi prout ab Episcopo reliquisque Theologis concepti sunt, et de sensu quo admissi sunt.

I. Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam ad vitam, et quosdam ad mortem reprobavit.

II. Causa movens aut efficiens praedestinationis ad vitam non est, praevisio fidei, aut perseverantiae aut bonorum operum, aut ullius rei, quae insit in personis praedestinatīs, sed sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei.

III. Praedestinatorum praefinitus et certus numerus est, qui nec augeri nec minui potest.

IV. Qui non sunt praedestinati ad salutem necessario propter peccata sua damnabuntur.

V. Vera, viva, justificans fides et Spiritus Dei sanctificans non extinguitur, non excedit, non evanescit in electis, aut totaliter, aut finaliter.

VI. Homo vere fidelis, id est, fide justificante praeditus, certus est, certitudine fidei, de remissione peccatorum suorum et salute sempiterna sua per Christum.

VII. Gratia sufficiens ad salutem non tribuitur, non communicatur, non conceditur universis hominibus, qua servari possint si velint.

VIII. Nemo potest venire ad Christum nisi datum ei fuerit, et nisi Pater eum traxerit: et omnes homines non trahuntur a Patre ut veniant ad filium.

IX. Non est positum in arbitrio aut potestate uniuscujusque hominis servari.

VI. Homo vere fidelis, id est, fide justificante praeditus, certus est plerophoriâ fidei, de remissione peccatorum suorum, et salute sempiterna sua per Christum.

VII. Gratia salutaris non tribuitur, non communicatur, non conceditur universis hominibus, qua servari possint, si voluerint.

VIII. Nemo potest venire ad Christum nisi datum ei fuerit, et nisi Pater eum traxerit. Et omnes homines non trahuntur a Patre, ut veniant ad Filium.

IX. Non est positum in arbitrio aut potestate uniuscujusque hominis servari.

It will be seen that the verbal alterations were but small, but that the result was to turn a definitely uncompromising document into one which might be capable of a more liberal interpretation. To make them anything but severe in tone is impossible even by means of the most searching exegesis. But it must always be remembered that the articles did not originate from Whitgift and that they were a purely *ad hoc* measure in no way binding upon the church. Though the archbishop must be absolved in part from the not very complimentary suggestion of the compiler of *Articuli Lambethani*,¹ that he was brought to sanction the articles, through fear of discord, yet I do not think that he can be wholly acquitted of this accusation. The truth must surely be that Whitgift, tired of the whole affair and anxious at the same time not to fall foul of a very

¹ "Et Whitgiftus, princeps ejus conventûs, etsi Whitakeri dogmata minime probabat, facilitate tamen et metu discordiae, cum suam probar aliis non posset, factus et ipse alienae sententiae accessio." [*Articuli Lambethani*, p. 4].

influential body of men in the church, sanctioned the articles as a matter of temporary expediency.

That the archbishop was not wholly satisfied with the articles even in their amended form seems probable from his action in sending them for criticism to Matthew Hutton, in whose judgement he placed implicit trust. Andrewes, too, was asked for his opinion and gave it.¹ Fuller's general comments on the division of feeling, raised by the articles, probably gives a fairly good idea of the differences of opinion which the transaction produced, though his accuracy in details at this period is not remarkable. People, he says, were divided into three parties—those who gave to the articles, the authority due to the acts of a synod, those who maintained the contrary, and said that the determinations at Lambeth had no binding authority, and lastly those who, "offended with the matter of the articles, thought that the two archbishops and the rest at the meeting, deserved censure for holding an unlawful conventicle."² The misunderstandings appear mainly to have arisen from the somewhat ambiguous nature of a measure, purporting to contain irrefutable truths, which being of a purely *ad hoc* nature, implies that such truths are not binding on the whole Church. Whitgift in his letter to the Heads of November 24, seems to speak the truth concerning the authority

¹ See p. 214.

² *F.C.H.*, Bk. IX, Cent. XVI, 4 §23-28. Heylin says that "as touching the authority by which <the Articles> were made, it was so far from being legal and binding that it was plainly none at all." (*Hist. Quinqu. Art.*, p. 80). His rather too violent Arminian sympathies must of course be taken into account, but there seems every reason to believe that the entire transaction was hushed up as much as possible, and that, as he says, "a copy of the articles was not to be found for a long time afterwards." We know that at the Hampton Court Conference, James I had to enquire what the Lambeth Articles were [Barlow, *The Summe and Substance of the Conference* . . . (1638) p. 40]. It was Whitaker's precipitate—though, doubtless, calculated—act in presenting Burghley with a copy of the propositions (*S.W.*, II, pp. 286-7) which gave occasion for more publicity to them than Whitgift probably intended them to have.

of the articles. His letter is indicative of the cautious spirit in which he regarded the affair.¹ He enjoins moderation in the exposition of the propositions and carefully defines the letter as "correspondent to the doctrine professed in the Church of England," evidently meaning that they can be held in harmony with that doctrine, even if they are not of fundamental importance themselves — an echo of Hooker's insistence upon the relative unimportance of non-essentials. The real import of the letter is the final injunction that the articles are not to be looked on as laws and decrees, and it is this judgement, pronounced by the man best fitted to give it, which must give us the right historical clue.

Systematic criticism of the Lambeth articles comes from four main sources. Besides the opinions of Hutton and Andrewes already mentioned, there is the attempt of Baro to explain the articles in a liberal sense, in order that he might prove to the archbishop that he, himself, had not contravened them in any of those opinions for which he had been taken to task.² Lastly, there are the comments of "F. G." who compiled his little anthology half a century after the articles had first been published, and followed Baro more or less in his non-fatalistic interpretation of them.

To the first article, Whitgift and his colleagues had nothing to say, and were probably glad to be able to give it their whole-hearted approbation. Hutton with emphasis passes it as "verissimum." It is Andrewes who really gets to the root of the matter in pointing out that this article is incomplete. It was only stressing the obvious, in the sixteenth century, to make the statement that some were predestined to life and others reprobated to death. The question which was troubling men's minds, and which was the stumbling-block over which both Baro and Barret had fallen, was *why* some were reprobate. The point of the article as it stands, Andrewes says he

¹ S.W.II, p. 282.

² Baro's explanations are given by Strype (S.W. III. Appendix).

considers "extra controversiam esse." He adds that the causes of predestination and reprobation are not the same, and unless this is taken for granted, he would have added to the articles "aliter predestinatos illos, nempe per Christum, aliter hoc reprobos, nempe propter peccatum." The distinction is that made by St. Augustine: "Praedestinationis causa quaeritur et non invenitur; reprobationis vero causa quaeritur et invenitur." But this is to trespass on the ground covered by the next article, which treats of causes. "F. G." does not make this distinction clear in his comments on the first article. He says that he can find no fault with it, provided that for the first "quosdam," "credentes" is understood, and for the second "increduli." By this reservation, he just saves the article from fatalism, for he gives some cause other than, though subordinate to, the arbitrary will of God. His reasoning, however, is superficial, for he does not make clear the fundamental truth that must somewhere appear in any theory of election, i.e. that the merits of Christ can alone be responsible for predestination to life. For those who could not accept the arbitrary will of God as the sole cause of reprobation, a nicer distinction was needed than that between "credentes" and "increduli." Faith is the result of the merits of Christ's death; the cause of unbelief cannot be postulated on the same basis. "F. G.'s" additions do not, therefore, make this article much more complete, though they are doubtless an echo of Baro's additions. He is anxious to answer the question as to why some men are reprobate, just as Andrewes is, but he is either too timid or not subtle enough, to answer it clearly. Baro, in his orthodox explanation of the first Lambeth article, though he is careful not to use language which may give rise to offence, adds to the "increduli" the "continuaces in peccatis." Thus, while keeping the idea of belief and non-belief firmly to the fore, he insists upon mentioning sin in connexion with reprobation. He is content to leave predestination to life as absolute, but he will not be content with the mere fact of unbelief as the cause of reprobation. The first article as it stands, is therefore incomplete and redundant. Whitaker would doubtless have liked to express his opinion

in less equivocal terms, but he must have realised that if he were to express his own convictions on the arbitrary will of God as the cause of reprobation at the outset, he might be rewarded by having the propositions turned down in their entirety. He had therefore to be content with a statement which might, if desired, be capable of the construction which he wished to be put upon it. He knew that Whitgift could not object to an article which verbally was in agreement with the 17th Anglican article—a statement of doctrine, which in its exemplary caution with regard to the whole subject of reprobation, cannot be said actually to contradict any particular teaching on the point.

By the second article as presented by Whitaker to the *Lambethani* there can be little doubt that a great deal more was intended than actually would seem to appear. The term “*praedestinatio*” was used in the hope that it might be taken to cover reprobation and election alike. The archbishop had already given his opinion “that in the execution of God’s decree there is always respect to sin,”¹ and would not be likely to go back upon that opinion. On the other hand, there was the chance that the term “*predestination*” might be allowed to pass, the Lambeth authorities taking it as synonymous with election, while Whitaker and Tyndal, of course, intended it to be used in its general—and correct—sense, to cover the reprobate as well.² As it actually happened, the latter were not allowed to interpret their article in their own way. The article was so altered by the insertion of words and repairing of clauses

¹ S.W. II, p. 248.

² See Fox, *Acts and Monuments*, fol. 1505. “*Predestination* is as well to the Reprobate as to the Elect, Election pertaineth only to them that be saved.” That this was not the invariable distinction, however, may be seen from the antithesis made by Andrewes between *predestination* and *reprobation*, in his comments on the first article. This antithesis tends to obscurity of thought and Whitaker would naturally echo Andrew Willet’s definition “. . . *praedestinationem esse tum electorum ad salutem tum reproborum ad damnationem.*” [*De Praedestinatione (Brevie et dilucida explicatio . . . etc.*, p. 119)]

that it could only be taken to treat of predestination to life. The harsh phrasing of the final clause—"... sola et absoluta et simplex voluntas Dei"—was considerably softened by the substitution of the phrase "... sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei" for the original wording. "F. G." explains this substitution by quoting the distinction made by St. Augustine between the cause of election and that of reprobation referred to in the preceding paragraph, and by pointing out that there can be no cause of predestination to life except "voluntas beneplaciti Dei." He there puts his finger on the real significance of this article—the insistence on the conditional qualification of the will of God by the fact of the death of Christ. The *Lambethani* could not allow the stark omnipotence of the Divine will to stand without an explanation of God's self-imposed dependence on Christ's merits, before he will allow men to be drawn to him. Baro is quite satisfied with the amended article, and though he is careful to point out that salvation cannot be attained without faith, perseverance and good works, he makes it clear that these are the means, and not the cause of predestination *ad vitam*.¹ Andrewes too, has no comment of any value to make in this connexion.² He expands the general sense of the article by quoting from St. Augustine, that predestination to a certain extent includes prevision of good works,³ these of course being medial, and not causal. Hutton satisfied himself with the brief comment "non minus verum."

There can be little doubt that the second article raised the most controversial question of the whole series, and that the Cambridge theologians must have been sorely disappointed at the decided rebuff which they received in the amended form presented to them. Whitgift and his friends had scored a

¹ "... Et tamen sine fide, perseverantia, bonis operibus, nullus ad coelum aditus. Quae licet causa non sint praedestinatione, media tamen sunt, quibus divinae hujus ac beatae praedestinationis participes reddimur."

² Mr. Sargeaunt (*op. cit.*, p. 430) points out that Andrewes adds an unnecessary gloss to the article.

³ *De Praed. Sanct.* c. 10.

triumph, for they had produced a statement which from any point of view was quite unassailable, though at the same time as a piece of theological definition it is totally redundant. Mr. Sargeaunt rightly sees that here if anywhere, the cause of reprobation should have been stated. It was all in keeping with the moderate tone of the Thirty-Nine Articles that no explicit mention of the cause of reprobation is made here or anywhere in the Lambeth series. The second article, which must have cost Whitaker hours of careful work in its original form, should have been the battle-ground upon which the "horrible decree" met its doom. The archbishop and his friends, afraid to mention sin as a cause, afraid even to refer to the former's original findings on the point, found it safer to say nothing and to leave the question unsolved as the English Church, partly out of wisdom, partly out of caution, had tacitly agreed to leave it.

The third article was allowed to stand without any mitigation of its original meaning. Actually to the mind steeped in Augustinian traditions, it is merely a statement of unanswerable fact. The number of the reprobate is of course automatically fixed in the mind of God, by the positive knowledge of the number of the elect. The tacit implication is that the number of the former is fixed in a negative sense—they are "passed by," while the elect are specifically chosen from the *massa perditionis*. Whitaker spared the opening of a controversy by allowing this obvious implication to speak for itself. It is fairly certain that the Cambridge theologians intended the necessity of God's decree to be understood by this article, but the *Lambethani* and the various commentators did not think that this was the only possible interpretation. Prevision is as sure a limit to the number of those who shall be saved as is unalterable necessity, and the force of "nec . . . potest" can be softened by the former interpretation. It is very obvious that a thing which is foreseen cannot be altered in nature or content, for if it is altered, it cannot be foreseen as it actually is. We must here distinguish between the common use of the word "foresee" and its absolute or proper use. We talk about

foreseen dangers, and how they might have been averted, but we forget that our foresight is only conditional, and that because we foresee a thing, it is not necessarily bound to happen. What we mean by human foresight, is that by the use of our *own* experience or that of others, we are able to predict that in the natural course of events, such and such an act, or such and such a series of acts, will almost certainly occur. God's foresight, however, being unlimited by human inability to see with any certainty into the future, is absolute, and whatever he foresees is, therefore, bound to happen. As he can foresee everything if he wills so to do, it is obvious that if he chooses to foresee the number of the Elect, that number is necessarily limited by his foresight. Thus the arbitrary theory of necessity need not be the only interpretation of this article, for the means may be foreseen equally with the ends. None of the critics have anything of real importance to say concerning this article. Hutton merely refers to St. Augustine in corroboration of it. Andrewes makes a like reference, but with Baro would like "Deo" to be inserted after the phrase "praefinitus et certus" to insure, presumably, against the danger of human presumption, though it is really a redundant interpolation. "F. G." is careful to lay stress on the idea of foreknowledge as against necessity. He says: "Verissimus est si de praescientia Dei intelligatur quae numquam fallitur. Non enim plures vel pauciores servantur quam Deus praesciverit." The article is really an echo of St. Augustine who in *De Corr. et Grat.* uses almost similar words,¹ and in various other of his writings bears

¹ "Haec de iis loquor, qui praedestinati sunt in regnum Dei, quorum ita certus est numerus, ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuat ex iis" (*De Corr. et Grat.* §39). Notice also the typically Augustinian way in which the reprobate are dealt with as the negative corollary of the elect, in the following passage. "Hi vero qui non pertinent ad hunc praedestinatorum numerum . . . hi ergo qui non pertinent ad istum certissimum et felicissimum numerum, pro merito justissime judicantur." (*Ibid.* §42). The same idea is expressed in his writings of ten years earlier, where he follows closely the wording of Romans viii, 28 and 29 (See *Ep. ad Paulinum*, clxxvi §§25, 26. c. A.D. 417). Hilary of Marseilles reported in A.D. 429 to Augustine that the

on the same theme. The phrase was already in use in the English Prayer Book in the Burial service where we pray that God will shortly accomplish the number of his elect—an indirect and uncertain reference to the Augustinian statements,¹ but none the less, the same in general idea, and, as such, familiar already to all. There was therefore nothing in this article which could offend, and though its sense might be twisted to suit the necessitarian point of view, verbally it is common ground.

The fourth article was left much as it was presented for judgement. Two slight verbal changes, only, were made, i.e. "sua" was inserted after "peccata" probably to safeguard the idea of personal guilt, and "damnabuntur" was substituted for "condemnabuntur" possibly as being more patristic in sound. This article, like the second one, really does not open up any very controversial subject. The extreme predestinarian party did not deny that man was condemned on account of his sins; their peculiar dogma was that sin was not a *cause* of reprobation.² No one has ever hinted that the innocent man, or the converted, could possibly suffer the pain of eternal punishment, for that would be contrary to the laws of justice.

¹ This prayer was composed in 1552 and cannot be traced further back than this date. It has been pointed out to me by the Warden of Keble that it is probably a reminiscence of the Augustinian phrases, and if so, is highly characteristic of what the late Dr. Brightman has called Cranmer's "absorbent mind."

² Compare Calvin's *Articuli de Praedestinatione* [Reprinted in Schaff's *Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches* Vol. III (1877) pp. 524-5] where with reference to the cause of reprobation, the following words occur: "Tametsi justae Dei vindictae vasa sunt reprobi, rursum electi vasa misericordiae causa tamen discrimine non alia in Deo quaerenda est quam mera ejus voluntas, quae summa est justitiae regula."

Massillians objected to the statement "Inde est quod et illud pariter non accipiunt, ut eligendorum rejiciendorumque esse definitum numerum nolint." (*Ep.* ccxxvi, §7). Augustine reaffirms his contention, though he does not repeat the phrase in *De Dono Pers.* §21 (A.D. 428).

Condemnation, therefore, is generally agreed to be *propter peccata*. The distinction between reprobation and condemnation, however, does not seem to have been as generally understood. Andrewes, for example, writes: "Qui non est inventus scriptus in libro vitae, missus est in lacum ignis . . . id est, damnatus est; damnatus autem proculdubio propter peccata sua; quis enim hoc negabit?" He thus confuses the two processes, and is evidently delighted that the article is capable of so liberal an interpretation. The skilful wording of this article must surely be put down to Whitaker. He knew that he must insert "*peccata*" as a cause of damnation, in order for the article to pass, but he carefully did not give sin as a cause of reprobation. The safest plan, therefore, from his point of view was to frame this comparatively non-committal article, hoping that his assessors would not be verbally skilful enough to substitute reprobation for condemnation. As it happened they either did not see the distinction, like Andrewes, or they decided to leave the vexed question in abeyance. Hutton dislikes the word "*necessario*" in this context, and refers to St. Augustine. Andrewes prefers "*certo*" or "*sine dubio*" as being more patristic in sound. He says that "*necessario*" must be used advisedly as "*necessitate ex hypothesis non absoluta*." Baro also says it must not be understood in an absolute sense.¹ "F. G." points out that "*necessario*" seems to imply a causal connexion between sin, damnation, and the divine decree. In this way he says, you make God the author of sin, whereas a milder term such as those suggested by Andrewes would save the relentless immutability implied by "*necessario*."² All the commentators, therefore, concentrated

¹ "Sed haec necessitas non est simplex et absoluta; verum ex ista tantum hypothesi, quod peccatis addicti, Evangelium non recipient aut vel receptum rejicient."

² "F. G.'s" main comment is: "Si hanc thesin et priorem interpreteris, ut et peccata et damnationem necessitate quadam ex ipsa praedestinatione deducas atque ex ea fluere existimas, aperte Augustino, Prospero, Fulgentio, *etc.*, contradices, et cum Manichaeis Deum peccati auctorem necesse est facias." The extreme predestinarians, of course, managed to evade this charge by juggling with the understanding. Perkins in speaking of

upon the implications of necessity, but none seemed to see that the cause of reprobation is totally ignored here as elsewhere. Andrewes and "F. G." both evidently are afraid of the content of this proposition—they are very chary about allowing its correctness and will only do so in a negative sense, i.e. some are condemned, because God has only undertaken to remit the sins of believers. They neither of them note the subtle but all-important distinction which should be made between *reprobatio* and *condemnatio* and which Whitaker must surely have realized was the vulnerable point in this article, and the point upon which had the archbishop chosen, he could utterly have been confounded.

The first four articles are therefore not theologically of great importance. We have so far had four statements, to which neither Calvinist, Augustinian or indeed "Arminian" could really object. We have learned firstly that God has predestined some to life and others he has reprobated to death, without any hint as to possible causes; secondly that the good pleasure of God is the efficient cause of predestination to life—a truism to all Christians to whom God's mercy through Christ can be the only means of grace—thirdly, that the number of the elect is fixed, which, God's prevision being taken for granted, is again obvious; and fourthly that those who are not predestined to life, are condemned *on account of their sin*. The only strictly Calvinistic phrase in the whole series so far is the word "necessario" in the last sentence, which though, as we have seen, it can be explained away, conveys nevertheless a definitely dangerous interpretation. It is impossible to deny that the articles bear even in their amended form unmistakable signs of their Calvinistic origin, but by the skilful emendations of the *Lambethani*, they are converted into but half-statements,

absolute reprobation says: "It is objected that this doctrine makes God the author of sin, for he who ordains to the end, ordains to the means of the end, but this reasoning is false, and also the supreme end of man is the just destruction of the creation, and not what is generally understood by damnation." [*An exposition of the creeds* (*Works*, p. 344)]—a paragraph the philosophical and theological content of which is singularly irrational.

and their sting has been so judiciously extracted, as to render them capable of the most careful theological analysis. In fact, when picked to pieces the first four articles really do not mean very much. With article 5, a clean break is made, and this article with the four succeeding it deal with the much-vexed questions of the indefectibility of faith, irresistible grace and free-will.

The point of the fifth article has been discussed in the preceding chapter. By the substitution of "in electis" instead of the phrase "in iis qui semel ejus participes fuerunt," the article, again, has been rendered impotent from the strictly Calvinistic view-point. As "F. G." points out, it is changed from the Calvinistic to the Augustinian sense at once.¹ We have seen that Barret in his original propositions, avoided mentioning justifying faith when talking of the faith which can be lost, and we have seen that Saravia maintained against the stricter view that some temporary faiths are indistinguishable from real faith, that they can only be tested in the light of final perseverance. This view the *Lambethani* evidently meant to support. To be elect, involves of necessity—using this word advisedly—final perseverance, therefore it is very obvious that a true, lively and justifying faith cannot be lost in the elect. To say, as Whitaker would have maintained, that it cannot be lost, in those who have once participated in it, is to overlook the sincerity and depth of certain temporary faiths, which psychologically cannot be denied. "F. G.'s" comments are meant to show the Augustinian turn which the *Lambethani* gave to this article. Hutton has no comment to make beyond general approbation. Andrewes allows that faith in the elect cannot be lost "totaliter" and we must understand him to mean by the adverb in this connexion, that which the *Lambethani* evidently meant by it, i.e. that faith cannot be so far lost, that

¹ "F.G." says: "Augustinus enim opinatus est, veram fidem quae per dilectionem operatur, per quam contingit adoptio, justificatio et sanctificatio, posse et intercedi et amitti; fidem vero esse commune donum electis et reprobis, esse perseverantiam electis propriam. Calvinus autem veram et justificantem fidem solis salvandis et electis contingere."

it is impossible for it ever to be reinstated. In other words "totaliter" is really synonymous with "finaliter" in the particular context. We know that Andrewes and his school would be quite willing to use the word "totaliter" to describe temporary lapses from faith if they were perfectly certain that the quality only of the loss was to be implied, and not its duration. Mr. Sargeaunt suggests that Whitgift had the different senses of the word "totaliter" in mind when he asks the heads of houses: "To say that *electorum fides potest deficere totaliter*, against what article of religion established in their Church, is it? That is a matter disputable, and wherein learned men do and may dissent without impiety."¹ Baro's explanation is to much the same effect as that of Andrewes. He allows "finaliter" to pass, but he is anxious that "totaliter" shall be explained at greater length. Justifying faith cannot be lost "in electis, quin per poenitentiam postea restauretur." Its loss is "non totaliter" in that sense only—the obvious implication is that in all other respects the elect may lose their faith for a time entirely.²

The sixth article retraces well-known ground. The only alteration made in it was the substitution of the less emphatic word "plerophoria" for "certitudo."³ "F. G." adds an interesting historical note to the effect that certain theologians wished "spei" to be substituted for "fidei,"⁴ but that they were

¹ W. D. Sargeaunt, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

² Baro gives a quotation from St. Jerome. "Si peccaverimus, et per peccati januam ingressus fuerit Diabolus, protinus Christus recedit. Unde David post peccatum, Redde mihi, ait, laetitiam salutaris tui, scil. quam peccando amiserit, inquit Hieronymus."

³ The word *πληροφορία* denotes fullness of assurance or certainty, and appears to be found only in the New Testament. "F.G." says it is used "quia non designat plenam et absolutam certitudinem . . . sed minorem quandam certitudinem gradum, quippe cum etiam in judiciariis et forensibus probationibus usurpetur." It was probably preferred to certitudo in the main because of its use in the Pauline and other Epistles (See 1 Thess. i, 5; Col. ii, 2; Hebrews vi, 11, etc.). Hutton uses the term "plerophoria spei" in his treatise on Predestination.

⁴ Possibly he had Hebrews vi, 11 in mind.

absent when this article was under discussion — a statement which seems to imply that the articles were drawn up in a possibly disjointed series of meetings, and that there was little of the formality of a synod about the whole transaction. We know the distinction which the archbishop had made between “securus” and “certus.” Baro comments briefly on the article and says that man can be certain, “non quidem absolute, sed per Christum; ut dicitur in Articulo i.e. Si Christo ad finem usque adhaeserit.” “F. G.” is very firm in insisting that “certitudo” must be understood conditionally. “Verissimum est hic articulus,” he says, “si de certitudine praesentis status intelligatur, aut etiam futuri sed conditionata. Credit enim fidelis se credere, et credit credentem servatum iri; credit etiam perseveraturum . . .” He ends with a warning that the Anglican church has decided with St. Augustine that the decrees of predestination are hidden. Andrewes had already insisted on the conditional nature of our certainty. We can be sure, provided that we make our certainty sure.¹ The certainty of salvation cannot be made into a categorical statement, as for example can the existence of God, or the righteousness of Christ. It is dependent upon a condition. Having heard Whitgift’s views already on the point, there can be little doubt that the article was admitted in the conditional sense of “certitudo,” which theologically, had come to be its familiar sense.

The last three articles deal with grace. Article 7 is not very skilfully worded, and is perhaps the most difficult of the whole series. The implications of the change made by the *Lambethani* from “gratia sufficiens ad salutem” to “gratia salutaris” are not at first apparent. “F. G.’s” reasons for the change are not wholly satisfactory. He says that “gratia salutaris” obviously means “ea gratia, quae est actu ultimo salutaris sive actu efficax, seu quae per se, non addita nova gratia, salutem operatur.” The word “sufficiens,” he says,

¹ Compare St. Paul’s conviction, that though, without doubt, he had received the Holy Ghost, his position was never secure, apart from his own moral effort. (1 Cor. ix, 27 ; Phil. iii, 12.)

connotes "non quod sit efficax, vel per se actu operetur salutem, sed quod sufficiens sit ad salutem ducere, modo homo non ponat obicem." He would, thus, appear to give a certain final or consummating interpretation to "gratia salutaris," which, though the interpretation is tempting, would not seem allowable in the light of the final clause "qua servari possint, si velint." The "gratia" of which Whitgift and his colleague speak is still the means rather than the end—the assistance to the final state, rather than that state itself. The true significance of "gratia sufficiens" must be sought in the writings of St. Augustine. To the more liberal-minded among the sixteenth-century theologians, grace was held to be given in proportion to the effort made by the human will, allowing, of course, for that prevenient grace which rendered the latter capable of effort. This is strictly according to the Augustinian doctrine that we are some of us predestined to grace, and are therefore given the opportunities for making use of it. "Ipse igitur facit oves . . . Quid mihi obtendis liberum arbitrium, quod ad faciendam justitiam liberum non erit, nisi ovis fueris? Qui facit igitur oves homines, ipse ad obedientiam pietatis humanas liberat voluntates."¹ We therefore, following this theory, work out the amount of grace sufficient for our salvation, by the kind of response we give to it when it is offered to us. Calvinist teaching would not, however, allow even the small amount of co-operation between man and the Almighty, which St. Augustine indicates. Sufficient grace is given according to Calvin to some; grace, different in quality as well as in quantity may be given to others, but there can be no question of co-operation—God either gives a sufficient amount of grace for salvation, or he does not, and no effort on the part of man, even in the rigidly predestined Augustinian sense, can augment or detract from that measure upon which God from eternity has determined. The "Arminian" party in England, on the other hand, could not allow that "gratia sufficiens" was given only to the elect. They believed that the practical results of the death of Christ were sufficient for the salvation of all men,

¹ *Contra Duas Ep. Pel.* Lib. iv, c. 6.

and in order to fit in this doctrine with the obvious failure of some to benefit by Christ's merits, and so in order to avoid falling into the Pelagian pitfall, they were forced to invent a rather involved system. They, in fact, believed that a common and sufficient grace was given to all believers (thus everyone was potentially a recipient of sufficient grace) and so that the salvation of some might be more certain, a special grace, more efficacious and abundant, was added which compelled some to believe, to obey and to persevere. This view was maintained by Bishop Overall,¹ and though it attempts to refute the inhumane Calvinist conception of irresistible grace, it is too involved to be really a sound theory. Whitgift, it seems to the present writer, refused to enter into the subtleties of either position. He appears unwilling to say that sufficient grace was *given* to "universis hominibus" and even more unwilling to deny that it was *offered* to the elect only. He therefore, it would appear, slurs over the question by omitting the word "sufficient" altogether, and by using a phrase which can really be interpreted in a variety of ways. He is careful not to commit himself to the causes of non-election, or to the exact definition of those to whom saving grace was denied. All parties were agreed, in that they considered saving grace not to be a universal gift, and Whitgift himself was Calvinist enough to believe that faith—in itself of course the result of grace—must be the foundation of grace sufficient to salvation, and also to contradict Hooker in refusing to allow Papists to have saving grace, seeing that they "overcome the foundation both by their doctrine of merit and otherwise many ways."² What never appears in the amended article is the point as to whether

¹ The passage from Overall in which this doctrine is scientifically propounded is quoted by Mozley in *The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (p. 178). Mozley shows the artificiality and weakness of this position on pp. 177-8.

² This is in accordance with views expressed in Articles X and XVIII of the Anglican confession. See Walton's *Life of Hooker* [Works, ed. Keble, I, p. 64]. Hooker maintained that "Papists hold the foundation of faith so that they may be saved, notwithstanding their opinion of merit."

saving grace had been *offered* to Papists and the rest, who overthrow the foundation, and surely Whitgift must have used an equivocal term in order to avoid going into the question. The last clause of the article—"qui servari possint, si velint"—seems to contain a dubious sentiment for a thorough-going Calvinist like Whitaker to have formulated. Whitgift, of course, could accept it in the Augustinian sense without any misgivings.

Baro interprets this article in its most liberal sense—saving grace, he takes it to mean, is offered to each man severally, but is not communicated to all. He says that "*quisque servari potest, si voluerit*," signifies, "*Si ei ad finem auscultaverit*," in the Augustinian sense of final perseverance as the only means of sufficient grace. Hutton would like "*si voluerit*" deleted so that it may give less offence—a precaution which is hardly to be wondered at. Andrewes takes "*gratia salutaris*" as signifying the grace received in baptism, or the Holy Spirit.¹ This grace, he says, is offered to all, though there are some who do not will to receive it. His theory is not quite that of "F. G." who as we have seen would appear to take "*gratia salutaris*" as the consummation not the beginning of the process of salvation. He also notes, which Andrewes does not, that grace cannot actually be said to be offered to all, since there are many who have never had the chance of receiving it, e.g. heathens.

The eighth article is, as Hutton pointed out, really redundant, as being at the best a corollary to the one preceding it. Andrewes, Baro and "F. G." have all tried to purge it of Calvinism, but it is doubtful whether this can be honestly accomplished. They none of them touch on the point which in this article, as in the seventh, is left severely unexplained, i.e. whether "*universi homines*" and "*omnes homines*" include the heathen or not. From the Calvinist point of view it does not seem to matter very much whether the heathen are

¹ He identifies it with the grace of the Elizabethan formularies as expressed in Articles IX, X, XVI and XVII.

included or no, for mankind, anyhow, is divided into the elect and the reprobate, and those who belong to the latter category of persons may superficially appear to be among the chosen, even though their eternal lot is cast with that of the heathen. We have already gone into the distinction between the "called" and the "elect." Obviously God does not draw those who are merely called (for "traho" has a final or consummating sense here) to Christ, any more than he draws the heathen.¹ The *Lambethani*, however, may have admitted the article in the wider sense of "omnes homines." If it is thus accepted, there is plenty of scope here for the Augustinian version of free-will. Mr. Sargeaunt suggests that they meant to say that "pagani, etc., . . . non trahuntur, i.e. non convertuntur ad fidem et invocationem Dei." It is possible to argue, according to this interpretation, that the first part of the article deals with prevenient grace only. This is surely the only ground upon which it can be given what Baro would call an "explicatio orthodoxa." Baro says that it can be explained by saying that some resist the Holy Spirit,² and therefore will not allow themselves to be drawn, thus introducing as much human freedom as he thinks is possible in this context. "F. G." tries to modify the severity of the article by explaining the use of the word "traho" as implying a certain amount of co-operation and not necessity only.³ Andrewes and Baro both try to soften

¹ Compare Acts vii, 51.

² Calvin's explanation of such texts as Ezekiel xviii, 23 and I Tim. ii, 4 is that God's promises are void only if they are taken in faith, by those who desire and implore his mercy, and none desire this mercy save those whom he has enlightened (*Institutio*, III, xxiv, §17). For the two species of calling—the universal call by which God, through the eternal preaching of the word, invites all men alike, even those for whom it is to be the ground of future condemnation: and the special call, which God, for the most part, bestows on believers only—see *Institutio*, III, xxiv, §8.

³ "Tractum autem Theologi Lambethani non intellexerunt cum Whitakero determinationem physicam irresistibilem sed Divinam operationem (prout communiter in conversione hominis operatur) quae naturum voluntatis liberam non tollit, sed ad bonum spirituale idoneam primo facit, deinde et ipsam bonum facit."

“ut veniant” by substituting for it “ita ut veniant.” All these attempted alterations and glosses, however, do not really meet the case, and unless the article is explained by a full definition of “omnes homines,” it is very difficult to read anything into it but that which it actually says. The *Lambethani*, whose instincts were after all grounded in moderate Calvinism, may have thought that there was nothing objectionable in a statement which after all says nothing of those whom God does *not* draw. So far as the elect are concerned, the *Lambethani* could meet Whitaker and his friends on common ground.

In the ninth article, again, “uniuscujus que hominis” refers to the baptized only, without a doubt, and there seems to be no reason here, as in the two articles preceding, why, if Whitgift had meant to make the distinction between the baptized and the heathen, instead of the obvious distinction implied between the “called” and the “elect,” he should not have made it. “F. G.” explains away the necessity contained in the article, by means of the useful doctrine of prevenient grace. Baro and Andrewes both explain it, by saying that we have no power of ourselves (Baro adds “of nature”) to save ourselves, but through the merits of Christ only. Hutton approves of the article, which he says only Pelagians and semi-Pelagians can deny. Whitgift can quite well have allowed this article to pass, seeing that it in no way contravenes Article X of the Prayer-Book series. Its wording is, however, obviously Calvinistic and not Augustinian.¹ Though neither “prevenient” nor “irresistible” grace is explicitly mentioned, the

¹ The ninth article is really one of the many implications of Calvin’s teaching. Obviously if God’s will is responsible directly, without any regard to contingency, for everything that we do, say, or think, it is impossible that we should, simply by willing it, gain salvation. The real point of the article is, therefore, that man has no will at all. The Calvinistic doctrine of irresistible grace is thus, in reality, as faulty psychologically as the diametrically opposite Pelagian idea of a will that is always free and unfettered by habit. (cf. N. P. Williams, *Ideas of the Fall, and of original sin* (1927) pp. 355-7).

obvious implication by the omission of mention of the former, is to stress the idea of the latter.¹ Though it is hard to say exactly where this article is unorthodox (for no one can call in question the omnipotence of God) it may be criticized either on the grounds of incompleteness, or of the hosts of doubtful corollaries which it suggests. To say that it is merely a safeguard against the doctrine of free-will is not enough. It is the more dangerous for its omissions—again, the question of reprobation appears, below the surface it is true, but so near that it would emerge when submitted to that logical exposition with which we may be sure that Whitaker and the heads were determined that the Lambeth Articles should be enforced.

It will be seen that upon a careful analysis, while the first five of the Lambeth Articles are little more than rather general and incomplete statements, the last three definitely contain dangerous doctrines which can be argued away only by very special pleading. We must also bear in mind that even the articles which seem to be on neutral ground, can only be held as such, if we take them as they stand without their implications. Though by a certain amount of mental and verbal jugglery they can be brought practically into harmony with the Articles of the Anglican Confession, they can by far less begging of the question be used as a firm basis for the proving of certain very doubtful and controversial points. It is impossible to call them wholly Calvinist, when it can be seen that by slight but important alterations in words or phrases their sting was removed and their content rendered for the most part of purely negative value. They have only to be compared whether in the original or the amended form, with Calvin's own articles on predestination,² for their omissions and lack of

¹ "Prevenient" and "irresistible" grace, should not of course, properly speaking, be used as antitheses for prevenient grace is obviously irresistible. I am using the terms loosely, however, so that "irresistible" may imply total passivity on the part of man, and "prevenient," a certain amount of co-operation following upon it.

² See Schaff, *Creeds*, III, pp. 524-5.

definitions to be at once apparent. At the same time, it is equally impossible to deny their Calvinist sound, and it is, indeed, purely futile to suppose that had Whitgift and the more moderate Augustinian school chosen, they would have formulated articles the real significance of which can only be realized after they have been submitted to the most searching exegesis and criticism. To the ordinary lay mind, unused to wrestling with theological subtleties, their whole treatment of predestination must have appeared as it appeared to Burghley, who inferred from the propositions "that they charged God with cruelty and might cause men to be desperate in their wickedness."¹ The Lambeth Articles are, in fact, a singularly useless and inartistic piece of work. Neither side can have been satisfied with the result, and it seems to be obvious that they were little used even for the somewhat restricted purpose for which they were fitted. Their historical importance lies in the fact that by the rejection of the articles in their original form, Calvinism proper was officially discountenanced. They must not be regarded as a piece of constructive work on the part of Whitgift and his friends, but rather as a successful attempt to neutralize that which was fast becoming a very real menace to the purity of doctrine professed by the Anglican Church.

BEATRICE M. HAMILTON THOMPSON.

¹ S.W. II, p. 287.

ART. III.—GRACE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE following expositions deal with the problem of grace from the œcumenical standpoint.¹

He who approaches this problem in the œcumenical spirit, seems to be at once directed in the way of a comparison of confessions. The task then would be to discover the different conceptions of grace in the most important Christian confessions and denominations; and œcumenical thought seemingly must preserve itself in the attempt, to bring these different types to a common denominator and to confine their respective elements of truth into a rounded synthesis.

It is true that against such a proceeding the strongest distrust is justified. For therewith the temptation lies too near, to wish to establish the œcumenical unity by overlooking the differences in the conceptions of grace in the opposed camps, and uniting upon a colourless remnant of generalities. One has only to remember rationalism, which by a false method of subtraction issued in natural religion as the universal religion of mankind and *Vestigia terrent*. Even if as the result of such an œcumenicity it is not exactly necessary that religion should be confined within the bounds of humanism, still it is always a

¹ The following expositions were presented to the third Conference for study of the German Committee of Faith and Order (Lausanne), which met from the 26th-30th September, 1932 in Königsfeld in the Black Forest. On the previous days R. Homann of Düsseldorf had dealt with 'Grace in the (synoptic) Preaching of Jesus from the standpoint of Lutheranism', A. Lang, Halle, with 'Grace in the Johannine Writings from the standpoint of the Reformed Churches, Th. Jensen, Königsfeld, with 'Grace in the Pauline Epistles from the standpoint of the Moravian Brethren,' and E. Sommer, Frankfurt-a-M, with 'Grace in the Catholic Epistles, especially the Petrine, from the Methodist standpoint.'

compromise which remains, as a result from such a proceeding, and indeed a compromise in the mirror of which none of those taking part therein recognizes his image.

But œcumenical thought can proceed also in another way. Even as the œcumenical movement has doubtless had a share in giving the thought of the churches another impulse, so it has more strongly brought to the consciousness of theology its inward dependence on the holy scriptures, and especially on the New Testament. In the œcumenical discussions it again and again becomes immediately obvious, that in fact the appeal to the scriptures is the *ultima ratio* of evangelical theology. Thus an œcumenical treatment of the problem of grace can set the task to explain the fundamental decisions in the history of dogma on the question of grace by the New Testament. The first task then is to determine the New Testament findings. In what sense does the New Testament speak of grace? What does the New Testament mean when it speaks of grace?

These findings of the New Testament will only disclose themselves if one does not confine oneself only, as the religious historical school has done in a neutral, indifferent attitude, to the outward forms of representation, in which the conception of grace in the New Testament clothes itself, but only when one endeavours to apprehend the ultimate significance, which discloses itself first of all to an attitude, which recognizes as essential the obligation of a decision of faith at the present time.

For the exposition of these findings it is not finally decisive what the Synoptic Jesus, John, Paul and the other letter writers in the New Testament have to say, each for himself, on grace. Much more rather there comes into consideration the common witness of the New Testament. No attempt will be made in the following to exhibit the meaning of the word grace by a harmonizing of the Synoptic, Johannine and Pauline conception of grace; much rather a uniformity in the New Testament conception will be assumed, an assumption which must justify itself in the exposition itself. It is true that one can speak of

a uniformity in the New Testament conception of grace only in view of the ultimate meaning of grace, but not in view of the changing forms of representation in which this meaning clothes itself. One may not set the latter over against one another on account of their lack of uniformity, as little as Jesus against Paul, because of what is surely true—that they did not speak the same religious dialect.

If in this exposition of the New Testament findings the wealth of its content comes to view, then it lies to our hand to turn these findings into œcumenical current coin. If the New Testament viewpoint draws special attention to the elasticity, with which in the New Testament conception of grace the most varied conceptions are held together, which in the later historical development of dogma were severed from one another in hostility, then a dogmatic valuation will be just to these findings only if it follows in an œcumenical sense. Our exposition accordingly attempts, with scientific obedience to the findings of the New Testament, by a return to the New Testament, mutually to supplement and enrich the one-sided differences which have emerged in the dogmatic use of it in the historical development of dogma.

The starting-point will be such a one-sided view in the interpretation of the New Testament conception of grace. The decisive result will be reached by one correction after another, on which a comprehensive decision of faith in this question can base itself.

I.

The one-sided view from which we should start, is the exposition which the New Testament grace found in the doctrine of justification in the Lutheran orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. It interprets *χάρις* as God's *disposition* of grace, God's will of grace, which does not wish to take account of the sin of man. When God is gracious then accordingly something occurs on the side of God, but nothing on the side of man. The efficacy of grace does not extend to

man. The divine showing of grace is an *actus sanctae trinitatis*,¹ but it does not establish any *realis et intrinseca hominis mutatio*.² The divine act of grace which justifies is for this reason described as an *actus forensis*. The man whom it concerns is only by it *declared* to be righteous. Righteousness is only imputed to him in a *decretum forense*,³ it is only declared, but it does not become by this act of grace a part of his life, it does not become his aliveness. It remains *extra nos*.⁴

We ask: 1. By this conception of orthodoxy is the intention of the Lutheran reformation, to which the former appeals for its interpretation, rightly met? and 2, Is the meaning of the New Testament *χάρις* brought rightly and exhaustively to expression in the orthodox interpretation?

As regards the first question, orthodoxy can in fact appeal to the first evangelical book of dogmatics. In it Melanchthon complains that the Greek *χάρις* has been translated *gratia*. It should have been less ambiguously translated *favor*, and would thus have given less occasion to the sophistical perversions of the scholastics, for the term *favor* points unambiguously to this, that *χάρις* solely means the *voluntas seu benevolentia Dei erga nos*, that is the disposition which God cherishes towards the sinner, and not a *qualitas quae sit in animis sanctorum*.⁵

But orthodoxy seems to be able to appeal also to the New Testament for its purely declaratory conception of grace. First of all to Jesus himself.

According to the Synoptists, Jesus regards the grace of God as being this, that he forgives men their sins. In the place of

¹ Quenstedt, *Theologia didacticopolemica*, 3rd. vol., p. 526.

² Baier, *Compendium theologiae positivae*, 1686, p. 577.

³ Quenstedt, *op. cit.*, 3rd. vol., p. 525; Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, ed. Leyser 1591, 2nd vol., p. 294.

⁴ Hollaz, *Examen theologiae acroamaticae* ed. Teller 1750, p. 928, Chemnitz *op. cit.* p. 294.

⁵ *Loci communes* ed. Kolde 1925, p. 161f.

the Pauline χάρις there stands in the Synoptists ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν.¹ If one relies on the meaning of the word forgiveness, then one has a right to say: to forgive sins is not to take them away, or set them aside. Even he whose sin is forgiven remains a sinner. Yes, the forgiveness depends on the sinner's recognition of his sinfulness. Thus accordingly, even under grace the sinner remains what he was before, nothing is changed in his *habitus*, in his state. One must require him, where sin is forgiven, to sin no more, as Jesus does several times (John v, 14; viii, 11). By the bestowal of grace the sin is not taken away from the sinner, only the power is taken away from it, to come as dividing between him who forgives and him who is forgiven. Only something on the side of him who forgives has been altered. The message of the forgiveness of sin is accordingly only the tidings of a change of will in God, and not the indication of a change in the spiritual condition of man. But that is exactly the conviction which is expressed in the formulæ of the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century.

Paul also cannot be cited as a contrary witness. In connection with the righteousness bestowed by grace he uses the expression λογίζεσθαι (Rom. iv, 3-6; Gal. iii, 6). From these passages the content of the act of grace the δικαιῶσθαι of Paul must be regarded as meaning not "making righteous," but "declaring righteous," that is the act of grace operative in δικαιῶσθαι is to be understood in a declaratory sense. At least the declaratory view cannot be excluded.

Besides also in the New Testament in many places the translation of χάρις as gracious disposition of God lies at hand.

¹ Of the few places in which in the Synoptists the term χάρις occurs, these fall out Luke vi, 32 and ff.: ποία ὑμιν χάρις ἐστίν; and Luke xvii, 9: μὴ ἔχει χάριν τῷ δούλῳ ὅτι . . . as here doubtless the word has a secular meaning, and is to be translated by "thanks." Of the other χάρις passages in Luke i, 30; ii, 40-52; iv, 22; Lk. iv, 22 will be treated later. The corresponding verb χάριζεσθαι Lk. vii, 21 and 42, can also have a merely secular meaning. It is otherwise indeed with the verb derived from χάρις χαριτοῦν, the content of which will be intelligible only from later considerations.

When e.g. Paul in the beginning of his letters wishes his congregations "the grace of God" no subtle exegesis indeed can deny that at least the idea is present that God's favourable disposition may be directed to the congregation. On the basis of the observations hitherto made, *χάρις* should be understood as an attribute of God, regarding which nothing could be said from the Christian's experience of faith. Nothing would remain but in undiscerning obedience to believe in this grace of God.

On the soil of such a conception of grace there must spring up a theology which as far as possible looks away from man and the experiences he has. For nothing is to occur in man in the bestowal of grace, as in regard to all the doing and dealing of God. Reflection on himself and what happens to him can in the best case then express something which lies beyond the bounds of human existence, but cannot afford any kind of points of contact for thought about God. For his theological thought man is made to understand that the decisive word will be said from outside of him, but by no means of his own experience—for that would mean that indeed something had occurred to, or in, him, and that word, as for the *epigonoi* it is fixed in the Bible, he can "only" believe. He cannot assume that the message of grace will prove itself so effective in him that grace can be unambiguously determined on account of its working in man, and in reference to the experience by faith.

He who cannot find satisfaction in such a theology will look about him in the New Testament to discover whether the conception of grace which involves such a theology takes into account all that the New Testament means by *χάρις*. And in fact an impartial examination brings more to light than has as yet been mentioned. In many passages the interpretation *χάρις* = *favor Dei* does not suffice. This expansion of the word *χάρις* beyond its meaning, "God's disposition of grace" will now in the following be presented step by step.

- I. The word grace often occurs in the combination *χάριν*

διδόναι (Rom. xii, 3, xv, 15; Gal. ii, 9; I Cor. i, 4; II Cor. viii, 1; Ep. iv, 7; I Pet. v, 5; Jas. iv, 6). What is said is that grace is *given* or *imparted* to man. In secular Greek this use should be translated "to please somebody." If we can transfer this use of speech to the New Testament then it will at once be clear, that χάρις does not mean only the attitude of the benefactor, but also the benefaction itself.

But we cannot dismiss the possibility that χάριν διδόναι should be better translated "to let grace be experienced." We should then indeed remain in the framework of the previous interpretation of χάρις as the disposition of God. In that case Paul had in these passages wished to say that the gracious disposition of God, his gracious will, had turned favourably to the Corinthians, the Macedonians.

But in this rendering something more at once suggests itself. Who speaks of χάριν διδόναι means the grace of God not only as such, in its latent existence, in its state of rest, but in its living function. The διδόναι indicates that by the word χάριν here the activity of this disposition is also intended.

Accordingly grace is not only the will of God to condescend to man, but also this condescension itself in accordance with the etymology of the German word grace.

2. Still more distinctly does the word χάρις expand beyond the meaning hitherto fixed, when the reception of grace is spoken of (χάριν λαμβάνειν, Rom. v, 17; John i, 16). In the context of these renderings χάρις does not allow us in the first place to think at all of the disposition of God. One cannot surely receive the disposition of God. χάρις here refers to the graciously imparted *gift*. χάρις acquires the concrete, tangible meaning of the gracious *present*. When Paul in Rom. i, 5, speaks of grace and the apostolate, which he has received from Jesus Christ, then the word χάρις receives from the word ἀποστολή obviously the meaning *gift* of grace. A similar indication is given in the statement that Christians participate in grace (συγκοινωνούς μου τῆς χάριτος, Phil. i, 7) in the same sense as

they participate in the Spirit in Heb. vi, 4. According to I Peter iii, 7, Christians are joint heirs of grace. συγκληρονόμοις χάριτος ζωῆς. Even if χάρις is here used eschatologically, it is to be understood in the context of this application not only as a resolve of God which leaves the Christian state unaffected, but as something which the Christian himself will receive.

Now it certainly appears that a counter-argument to this interpretation of grace can be won from the passage Rom. v, 15, b; εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσεισεν. Here the gift of grace which man has in possession is consciously marked off from the disposition of grace, in which it is guaranteed. In this case one must not include in the meaning of χάρις the gift guaranteed in the gracious disposition. But in verse 15a it is said Ἄλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, οὕτως τὸ χάρισμα. In view of this statement the most obvious interpretation is that the change: ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι of verse 15b has again taken up the word τὸ χάρισμα out of 15a. Then it is to be understood as a hendiadys, and confirms the more the interpretation of χάρις as a gift of grace. When on the mention of χάρις attention is specially called to the disposition of God with which it is imparted (Eph. ii, 7, God will in goodness show the riches of his grace); then also the interpretation is unavoidable that χάρις in the first place refers to the gift.

As a look into our German literature shows, one also finds the change of meaning in our German word grace from the description of the disposition of the giver to the indication of the gift imparted. One may only think of phrases such as: to ask a grace, or grant a grace.

3. The tendency to the meaning of gift of grace becomes the more explicit as χάρις assumes a more concrete sense. With the Synoptists χάρις appears as forgiveness of sin. But this forgiveness is in the sense of the Synoptists a signal of the approaching time of salvation. Not only will God no

longer regard the sin, but in the "acceptable year" of the Lord, in this time of grace, a counter force against sin has become active. Not only has the disposition of God been altered there, but here also the situation has been altered as Paul experienced it in himself and was the first to formulate it theologically. The lame man, whose sins are forgiven, takes up his bed and goes healed to his house (Mk. ii, 12). The lost son who is forgiven can again be at home in the father's house (Lk. xv, 22). Thus is grace visible in its efficacy. One can see it in the man who has experienced grace. In Acts xi, 23, it is said of Barnabas, the delegate to Antioch, who was to inspect the newly-formed Christian congregation there: "When he saw the grace of God . . ." Grace is conceived here accordingly as a *something*, which fills the Christian, and makes itself visible in his action and bearing. Thus one can *see* it.

On account of such a conception one can say of somebody: He is full of grace, *πλήρης τῆς χάριτος*, as does the New Testament regarding the first martyr Stephen (Acts vi, 8). Here we are told about Stephen who already in v. 5 has been described as a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit, that he wrought miracles and great signs among the people. In the context of this statement the apposition: *πλήρης τῆς χάριτος καὶ δυνάμεως* can only be intended to indicate the source of power for these miracles and signs. It is intended to explain how he could work such signs. And when at v. 15 it is further reported that his countenance was like the countenance of an angel, then the careful reader will find the reason in the above. In Stephen also one can see grace exactly as in the Christians in Antioch. The word *χάρις* therefore does not lead us to think in the first place in the context of such passages of a disposition of God proclaimed outside of the reach of human existence, but rather of a power operative within the scope of human existence. The combination of *χάρις* and *δύναμις* can without any violence of the text

be understood as a hendiadys. Thus Wetter, in his writing on grace of the New Testament.¹

The passage Acts iv, 33, χάρις τε μεγάλη ἦν ἐπὶ πάντας αὐτούς (the Christians of Jerusalem) is interpreted in the most varied ways. Is χάρις to be understood here in the secular sense, so that it would be said of the Christians that great joy reigned among them? Thus Knopf. Or is it reported, also in the secular sense, that the Christians enjoyed popular favour? Thus Holtzmann and Wendt. Taken along with the passage about Stephen the exposition is imperative, that to the Christian a power is ascribed to which must be traced all that is afterwards reported. Also for this reason there is the connective γὰρ that combines the summary statement, iv, 33, with the following detailed accounts. The summary statement gives the explanation; it is the power of grace which supports the primitive Christian communism of love (vv. 34, 35) and it is just the same power, the release of which brings about the death of Ananias and Sapphira when they sin against the spirit of this communism of love (v, 1 ff.).

In the mouth of the same author it is not necessary then to understand in the secular sense of gracious words, as in

¹ G. R. Wetter. *Charis. A contribution to the history of the eldest Christianity* (in the "Investigations in the New Testament" issued by H. Windisch) 1913, p. 138. This investigation into the New Testament conception of grace in its relations to the linguistic usage of the environment of the New Testament is by far the best and most conclusive, which up to the present we possess on this subject. Regarding this book from the religious-historical school, one can also offer this judgment, who is of the opinion that the religious historical method of study can never do full justice to the problems of the New Testament scholar. In what follows I often use the exegesis and the conclusions of this work. That the author is stronger in analysis than in synthesis prevents his seeing the inferences which could be drawn from the individual observations for a final issue. That is just what will here be attempted. And above all, from this final issue will be drawn the dogmatic consequences, a matter which on the line of the religious historical thinking, certainly cannot come into the line of vision.

Luther's translation, the words *λόγοι τῆς χάριτος* which Jesus, according to Luke iv, 22, speaks in Nazareth; the probability is much greater that Luke wishes to characterise the speech of Jesus, as Mat. vii, 29, does in connection with the Sermon on the Mount, as a speech full of power, as a powerful speech that presses into the hearts of the hearers as living and mighty, and sharper than a two-edged sword (Heb. iv, 12).

4. Without exegetical violence we may read out of the *χάρις* passages in Paul also such representations. Indeed many only yield the full content of their meaning when one applies these representations to them. By God's grace I am what I am (I Cor. xv, 10) cannot mean anything else than this: the power of God working in me has made me what I am. When he says in the same verse that not he, but the grace of God wrought in him, one cannot properly think as the subject of this working anything else than a power. Also the way of speaking of grace as not found in vain, or of receiving grace in vain, assumes the conception of grace as an active energy in or on man, as *δύναμις*. When Paul, in I Cor. xv, 10, II Cor. vi, 1, opposes grace to carnal wisdom, then it is again clear that the sense is, that it is to be opposed as power to something powerless. This parallelism of *χάρις* and *δύναμις* finally appears with Paul in II Cor. xii, 9. Here God answers his petition to be freed from his sickness: *ἀρκεῖ σοι ἡ χάρις μου ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ πελεῖται*. The *γὰρ* yields the best sense when the term *δύναμις* is regarded as a continuation of the word *χάρις*: let it suffice thee, that my divine power and energy works in thee. In the reason given the word *δύναμις* is used instead of *χάρις* to secure the contrast to the word *ἀσθενεία*, which is not especially expressed in *χάρις*. Grace is here understood as the continuous working of the power of the exalted Lord.

Everywhere with Paul in such passages, in which he speaks of grace, there is implied the thought of a power which rules the whole Christian life, and becomes manifest visibly in all its expressions. Paul traces back to grace his whole new existence with all the results of its activity.

With *χάρις* accordingly in the New Testament there is indicated the possession of the power which the Christian has won in becoming a Christian. In Heb. xii, 28, grace is named as the means, i.e. surely also as the power, which makes it possible for us to be acceptable to God. In any case this thought is implied.

Wetter brings from the magical papyri proofs that this usage of *χάρις* is also to be observed outside of the New Testament. In the great Parisian magical text there is found the oath: *δός δόξαν καὶ χάριν τῷ φυλακτηρίῳ τούτῳ*. The disciple of magic prays that his amulet should receive *χάρις*, that, using the religious-historical phraseology, it should possess *mana*, that it should be endowed with a mysterious power which he can use in the service of his wishes. A few lines later *χάρις* is placed along with *νίκη*, *δύναμις* and *πνεῦμα*¹. In the liturgical structure of such a magical formula the conjoined words can scarcely be otherwise understood than as synonyms, which bring out in each case a *nuance* of what is meant. Thus *χάρις* is also to be understood as *δύναμις*. Then also the Biblical writer, when he took up the word *χάρις* from his religious environment had at once on hearing it to think of a power.

The letters of Paul show beyond contradiction that their author thought of this grace as a power working out in the Christian life. This dynamic understanding of the conception of grace which first of all directs our attention to human existence, in which it operates, will be supported by several more observations.

5. The conjunction of *χάρις* and *πνεῦμα* in the above quoted magical papyri is also found in the New Testament. In Heb. x, 29, *χάρις* stands as an explanatory genitive beside *πνεῦμα* (*τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος*): the spirit in possession of which grace consists. The bestowal of grace is the being filled with

¹ P.Par. 3, 3. 1650 and 1653 ; quoted by Wetter *op. cit.* p. 130 f.

the Spirit. The meaning of grace and Spirit completely blends. One can often in Paul replace χάρις by πνεῦμα without altering the sense at all. Once he says: By God's grace I am what I am (I Cor. xv, 15). Another time: The Spirit helps our weakness (Rom. viii, 26). Also with this equivalence the dynamic character of grace is emphasised, and attention is directed away from the disposition of the giver to the possession of the gift.

Thus, lastly, in I Peter iii, 7, χάρις is made equivalent to ζωή in that the latter as the genitive of apposition is joined to the former; Christians are fellow-heirs of the grace, which consists in life. It is true that ζωή is here meant eschatologically. But Paul knows that the ζωή as the δικαιοσύνη τοῦ θεοῦ has an active present power.

6. When Paul wishes to express the content of χάρις most concretely, then he speaks of it as δικαιοσύνη. But it is to be understood as the righteousness of God even without the express genitive τοῦ θεοῦ (as it is e.g. added in Rom. i, 17, and II Cor. v, 21). In Rom. v, 17, the superabundant grace and the gift of righteousness are synonyms. Grace is righteousness. In both the same entity is dealt with, which is defined in the one case as formally abstract and the other as concrete content. Under this righteousness in Paul, despite the added genitive, τοῦ θεοῦ, we are not to understand the *disposition* of God. How otherwise could it be described as God's gift and present. The closer definition ἐκ θεοῦ, which is added in Phil. iii, 9, is just as unsuitable for the χάρις which is thought of as attribute and disposition of God. It can be much more easily combined with the other conceptions of χάρις, namely, that it is a power issuing from God and imparting itself to men. It appears everywhere in Paul as the new life principle of the Christian which supersedes the Jewish system of righteousness by works.

Thus the equivalence of χάρις - δικαιοσύνη directs attention to the dynamic character of the New Testament conception of grace. It would lose its meaning were one to apply it to the

corresponding attributes or dispositions of God. For what can it mean, that the grace of God consists in this righteousness? Yet if one refers χάρις and δικαιοσύνη to the divine powers filling the Christians, then the equation $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma = \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ gains the good, for all Christianity fundamental, sense that man's being righteous cannot spring out of his own activity, but is only grace, i.e. is God's deed solely and alone.

The exegetist is compelled by this equation to interpret χάρις in the dynamic sense, i.e. to think of χάρις not first of all as an attribute of God but as a power of God in man. We are in Christ to become the righteousness of God (II Cor. v, 21).

In accordance with our results up to this point, even where Paul describes being under grace in the verbal form δικαιοῦσθαι one must not think of the proclamation of a divine disposition, but of a mighty cosmic occurrence within the expulsive range of which the Christian comes in his Christian state. One must not, therefore, understand by δικαιοῦσθαι *only declaring* righteous, but also think of a *making* righteous. If the δικαιοῦσθαι refers to a transaction within the Trinity Paul could not describe it as he does, in Rom. ix, 30, by δικαιοσύνην καταλαμβάνειν. The Pauline turn of speech λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην it is true, as has already been mentioned, allows a declaratory interpretation. But it can be explained by an echo of the Jewish mentality in the formulation of his consciousness of salvation, in its deepest content non-Jewish. As in the framework of the Jewish religious system, the righteous God makes entry in his heavenly ledger of all the dealings of men, always according to their moral quality, on the credit or debit side, so in the new era God writes this action on man to his advantage. The meaning of such a declaration of righteousness is in no contradiction to making righteous. For Paul this alternative of the later development in the history of dogma does not as yet exist.

Thus the dynamic character of grace is also emphasised when Paul describes the bestowal of grace as δικαιοῦσθαι.

7. On the basis of numerous individual observations χάρις is to be thought of as a power bearing the whole Christian life as its motive centre. Now this result must be guaranteed against a misconception. On the ground of this result one might feel oneself tempted to think of the potency of grace as an energy of the soul, as an endowment of human nature. One might wish to think of it with the help of psychological categories. Thereby one would not do justice to the distinctiveness of the ancient thought in the forms of which Christian convictions even in regard to grace express themselves. The Hellenic and still more Hellenistic mind do not think psychologically, but ontologically. Accordingly, if one wants to do justice to the distinctiveness of ancient thought, then one must not think of grace-energy as a power attached to the mechanism of the soul.

The New Testament also forbids this psychological interpretation, when it thinks of grace under spatial images: we have access to grace (Rom. v, 2); we stand *in* grace (*ibidem*); you are *under* grace (Rom. vi, 14); you have fallen *from* grace (Gal. v, 4). Under the impression of such passages one must represent grace as a dynamic sphere, into the operative field of which human existence can come. In these modes of speech grace appears as a kind of liquid in reach of which the natural man gains his Christian nature. The Christian as such is ἐν χάριτι; it is possible to be a Christian only as being in grace, just as to be truly Christian can be only as being ἐν πνεύματι as being ἐν Χριστῷ (Gal. i, 6; II Thes. ii, 16). Perhaps Col. iii, 16, in which ἐν χάριτι, which is generally translated in the secular sense by charm, amiability (Luther) or by gratitude (M. Debelius), is also a passage to be thus interpreted: Only because Christians are in *grace*, find themselves in the influential sphere of grace, can they in *spiritual* songs praise God in their hearts. In this case again χάρις and πνεῦμα would correspond.

8. The transference of the meaning of the word χάρις from its predicative significance, indicating the disposition of God,

to its dynamic, indicating the divine power in man, holds good most strongly in *the* places of the New Testament where the inclination is present to hypostatize χάρις, to regard it as an independent power detached from God. That is the case where χάρις is found without a genitive. Then certainly there is no question of its pointing to the disposition of God. There it is intended to indicate, in an extreme contrast to its declaratory sense from which we started, the reality of a spiritual mode of existence. In the context of a passage such as Gal. v, 4 (ye are fallen from grace) grace is thought of as the religious atmosphere in which alone the Christian state can maintain itself alive.

Thus in view of this inclination to hypostatizing the New Testament findings we are left with no escape from thinking grace otherwise than quite quantitatively under the image of a reservoir of Christian substance, from which the Christian receives his share of the Christian state, which state in turn should be thought of as quite concretely quantitative. The act of grace should be thought of not as an *actus forensis*, but as an *actus physicus*; in short, grace should be conceived as a substance which is poured into human nature. The New Testament findings so far as they are up to this point made available seem to demand the Catholic interpretation of grace as *gratia infusa*.

The consequence of the declaratory conception of grace seems to transfer it to a beyond-the-range of human existence from which it also can no more reach man. The proofs under 1 to 8 from the New Testament witness with increasing clearness unanimously to this, that the New Testament *pathos* is different from what it should be according to the declaratory conception. Are we thereby compelled to stand for the substantial apprehension of the conception of grace to escape the unbiblical, purely declaratory meaning, to preserve the sense of χάρις as it has disclosed itself to us?

As a consequence of the dynamic conception of grace, which an impartial exegesis of the New Testament must

prescribe, there seems to stand unchallengable the substantial apprehension of the conception of grace, that is, the Catholic *gratia infusa*.

If it should be possible to ward off the substantial interpretation of the conception by the Catholic Church, grace as a *qualitas in animis sanctorum*, which comes into them by an *infusio*, then there must be still more about grace to be read in the New Testament than has to this point been mentioned. And in fact this picture, as it has till now been drawn, is not yet at all complete. There are still lacking exactly the features which make the Catholic substantial interpretation of χάρις as the pretended consequence of the dynamic impossible.

II.

There are essentially three observations in regard to the New Testament which forbid us to think of the δύναμις of grace as substance.

1. The substantial interpretation of grace has as a sequence its quantifying conception. With the Catholic interpretation of grace as a substantial potent matter is bound up its division into single graces. To the original possession of grace something more can come. One may as proof of this advance passages such as II Peter iii, 18, which speaks of a growth in grace and the knowledge of Jesus Christ. Also II Tim. ii, 1, speaks of being strengthened in grace. But therewith surely there need be no indication that grace is at the same time transferred to the control of man. Passages such as those mentioned only give the admonition to become more and more at home in the atmosphere of grace. The word χάρις does not occur in the New Testament in the plural. For Paul especially there exist no *graces*. Grace is for Paul always one and undivided. Thus the mere absence of the plural form of χάρις must make us distrustful of the substantial apprehension of the conception of grace by the Catholic Church, with which is bound up the quantifying conception.

2. Another consequence of the substantial apprehension of the conception of grace is that it is thereby made a *factor*, which not by itself alone, but only along with another brings about the Christian state. According to the Catholic apprehension the Christian state is brought about by the alliance of the natural man with the grace imparted to him. Grace only helps in the Christian state. It is a *donum superadditum* which is added to the condition of the natural man. It does not revolutionise; it only reforms. Under its auspices and under its influence there is completed not a new creation of human nature, but a transformation. But grace is the devaluation of all previous values. In Paul especially it becomes manifest how he, possessed by grace, regarded his previous highest values as dung (Phil. iii, 7).

The Catholic Church does not allow grace to be the whole of the Christian life—and that refusal depends on the substantial apprehension of the conception of grace. It is therefore quite intelligible that the typical Catholic philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, opposes the equivalence of spirit and grace, as he found it in the Lombard;¹ for by this equivalence grace becomes the sole regulative principle of Christianity. In the other case it only helps. But grace cannot be a help for the Christian state, because it is itself the essence of that state.

That it is really this comes everywhere to expression in the New Testament. Attention has already been called to the possibility of an exchange of χάρις and πνεῦμα in many passages. In attachment to this Lutheran orthodoxy also carried out the equivalence of χάρις and πνεῦμα which Thomas Aquinas contested. The title to the third main section of its dogmatics runs: *De gratia spiritus sancti applicatrice*. That grace according to the New Testament is the whole of Christianity follows also from this, that “to receive the grace of God” and “to become a Christian” is the same. When Paul in II Cor. vi, 1, entreats the Corinthians that they should not have received the grace of God in vain, then he wants

¹ Sent., I, Dist., 17, 2.

simply to express the hope, that they might not have become Christians in vain. The exhortation to hold fast to Christianity, is in Acts xiii, 43, expressed in the words: Stand fast in grace. The gospel is in Acts xx, 24, the gospel of the grace of God. The whole of the Christian proclamation is, according to Acts xiv, 3, included in the word of his grace. "How do I gain a gracious God?" also stands at the commencement of all evangelical enquiry.

With Paul *χάρις* is the whole of Christianity, because as a new order of life it completely dissolves another. The new order of life of *χάρις* is set against the old of *νόμος*. "Ye are no more under law, but under grace" (Rom. vi, 14). The two oppose one another in such exclusive contrast that he who places himself under law has fallen from grace (Gal. v, 4). Between law and grace there is only an either-or. In St. John's Gospel Moses and Christ are opposed to one another as representatives of these orders (John i, 17). In an eschatological application—only in more general apprehension—the same thought is found in the Didaché. May grace come, may the world perish (x, 6). Grace excludes therefore every principle in competition with it. It reigns alone, or it does not reign.

This explains the harsh contradiction of Paul to the work which wishes to earn grace. Paul lets Christianity circle only around *one* centre, grace. Therefore he must give to the theological foundations of his new consciousness polemical point against Judaism, which with a one-sided interpretation of the Old Testament circles round two foci: grace *and* work. There God is pleased with the zeal of the pious man who is proud of his moral heroism. Along with this he may also overlook graciously gaps in this zeal.

This being gracious of God is certainly to be understood as purely declaratory as an expression of will, which leaves man alone with his own power, not dynamic as an effective counter-power against sin. In the Old Testament the law is written on the stone tables in the ark of the covenant, and not

on the fleshly tables in the heart of man. It is only a demand on man, but not at the same time a power of fulfilment. The being gracious of the Old Testament is accordingly not χάρις, but only ἔλεος, which allows itself to be moved by the pity-awakening condition of man vainly struggling to be free. This way of looking at the relation of God and man is at bottom in the intention of the Catholic Church according to which God meets man half-way. The New Testament grace is in contrast to that of the Old Testament, altogether free of the pity which allows itself to be affected, free, sovereign, glorious, alone. Eph. i, 6, speaks of the glory of grace (δόξα τῆς χάριτος). The Old Testament can also say: To whom I am gracious to him I am gracious (Exodus xxxiii, 13); a thought which Paul in Rom. ix-xi has worked out close up to a predestinarian theory. This grace comes to meet the sinner all the way; it has the whole initiative.

If grace has to share its sovereignty with work, then one robs it of its *religious* character along with its sovereignty and its exclusive validity. It then becomes, as in Roman Catholicism, a moral factor. But according to the New Testament grace is through and through religiously conditioned. That is already to be seen from the fact that Paul for the new order of life in grace has coined the pass-word δικαιοσύνη τοῦ θεοῦ; But its religious character stands or falls with this, that it excludes a co-operation of man as a partner of equal value. Grace cannot endure legality as a principle, similar to, and co-ordinate with itself. He who places himself under law has fallen from grace. Grace which half-shares with work gives up its religious character, and is not really any more grace.

By the substantival apprehension grace is in Catholicism displaced from the centre of Christian life and is made *one* of two foci, the other of which is the work of the natural man. This grace is no longer the whole of the Christian life, but only a factor, auxiliary to being a Christian, and indeed as it co-operates with work a moral factor. As the New Testa-

ment does not compromise the dominant position of grace, and in the strongest way emphasises the religious character of grace in contrast to all righteousness by works, the Catholic interpretation of grace as *gratia infusa*, as bound up with the moralisation of grace, the interpretation of grace as substance, cannot be made to correspond with the New Testament. The New Testament regards grace as a *δύναμις*, but does not on that account make it a substance. Accordingly one can hold to the dynamic apprehension of grace, without being driven further by the New Testament to the substantival apprehension. The basis of the substantival apprehension of the conception of grace does not lie in the New Testament, but depends on the fact that, contrary to the New Testament, the conception of grace is expelled from its dominating position at the centre of the Christian system. It has become a doctrine of dogmatics along with many others, instead of providing the decisive standpoint for all utterances and operations of faith.

3. If the reference to the indivisibility of grace and to its pure religious character already excludes the Catholic interpretation of grace as *gratia infusa*, then the resistance to this substantialising of grace is most of all offered by the unanimous witness of the New Testament that grace is *historically* manifest in Jesus Christ. That Jesus, according to the Synoptists, effectively realised the message of grace in the forgiveness of man is the basis for the article of faith that in him the grace of God has appeared unto all men unto salvation (Tit. ii, 11). Therefore this grace is in many places the grace of Christ. According to II Cor. xii, 9, it is the continued power of the exalted Lord.

In that case grace must in no wise be thought of as an impersonal metaphysical power, as a kind of force-stuff, as a potentiation of the natural powers. It is not to be detached from the person and work of Jesus Christ. In the New Testament it is always bound up with the thought of his historical work of redemption, his cross and his resurrection (Rom. iii, 24 f.). Thus grace can be recognised only in the

work of redemption. Apart from the historically manifested act of redemption it would remain a *gratia abscondita*, and as such doubtful.¹

If the Catholic interpretation of χάρις as *gratia infusa* has the dangerous inclination to regard grace by itself apart, and so to let the giver disappear behind the gift, the New Testament on the contrary demands that there shall be no separation of grace as that occurrence which is wrought out in the Christian from him who works it. One cannot keep in view what occurs in us, without looking up to him who works it. That is also the legitimate motive why the Lutheran orthodoxy so strongly emphasises the *extra nos* of the justifying act of grace. For a religious occurrence loses its quality as χάρις when it is conceived as the activity of psychical inwardness. Therefore the *imputatio* of justification has its *fundamentum*, *non in homine, qui justificatur, sed extra eum*.²

Accordingly grace also is to be conceived as declaratory. But if one identifies the occurrence of grace in justification only with a "declaration" as orthodoxy did, then that is a one-sidedness, which needs correction. One cannot, to justify orthodoxy, refer to its doctrine of *gratia applicatrix*. That along with the declaratory grace of justification it speaks also of the *gratia applicatrix* cannot preserve it from the reproach of one-sidedness. It should have already spoken of this where—in justification—it treats of the issue of grace out of the divine life. Here, however, not a word is said that grace strikes similarly its roots into the soul of man. The declaratory character of grace is exaggerated in a way which really no more leaves any place for a *gratia applicatrix*, which is brought forward only later. The purely forensic interpretation of justification cuts away the ground from the *gratia applicatrix*. The transcendence of grace is so spoken of that the possibility for the immanence of a *gratia applicatrix*

¹ I F. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 2nd ed. §166, 2.

² Quenstedt, *Theologia didacticopolemica* 169I, 3rd vol., p. 525.

exists no more. But exactly in the contemporary situation of theology one ought to consider really seriously whether there is any sense in affirming transcendence of a reality, which cannot be made tangible in any way by immanence. One has said nothing when one has asserted transcendence for a reality unless one also admits its immanence.

The orthodox theory of justifying grace has in view only the giver; the theory of *gratia applicatrix* is the first to think of the gift in the possession of which grace consists. In view of the result hitherto it is the case that giver and gift cannot be isolated from one another without the consequence that the occurrence, which is brought about by grace, is in its meaning misunderstood. With this insight we are in a position to disclose the fundamental structure of the New Testament conception of grace for a dogmatic and œcumenical valuation.

III.

Grace is in the New Testament conception both the gift and the disposition in which it is imparted. Not the one in one place and the other in another place so that one might affirm two different New Testament conceptions of grace, but in each occurrence of the word both meanings exist together, only that now the one, then the other is the leading one.

It belongs to the deepest essence of grace, that its meaning in the New Testament wavers between the interpretation "God's favour" and the other "God's gift." Exactly in this wavering of its meaning—a finding which New Testament exegesis will not escape—its distinctive essence appears.

In Paul this wavering of the meaning of the word grace comes to its most eloquent expression. If the ancient thought of the New Testament often came very near to the substantial material apprehension of the conception, nevertheless Paul especially, probably under the influence of the ethical monotheism of the Old Testament, even though in his terminology

bound to the modes of representation of Hellenism, knew how to guard the specifically Christian element in the thought of grace just in this respect, that for him the giver of grace did not disappear behind the gift of grace, and that he saw in that *δύναμις* of grace the *δύναμις* of the exalted Lord operative in history, and did not conceive it as a potentiation of natural forces. Thus his dynamic conception of grace due to his tendency to Hellenistic thought avoided the danger, which became acute in Catholicism, of substantialising it, because he could not represent the gift at all without him who imparts it. The result of this is the wavering of the meaning of the word grace. Similarly it has a Janus head. The meaning of the word *δικαιοσύνη* which characterises grace by its concrete content for this reason still lies beyond the alternatives in translation, "making righteous" or "declaring righteous." In the translation "making righteous" the eye remains fixed on the condition of men, in the translation "declaring righteous" on the act of God. In the word grace one must think of both. One must keep in view God and the human heart together, if one wants quite to grasp the meaning of the word grace.

Even our earliest evangelical dogmatics, the *Loci* of Melancthon, which otherwise has pushed to the forefront as much as can be the significance of *gratia* as *favor Dei*, had to acknowledge: *Deinde quia favet non potest Deus non effundere dona sua in eos quorum misertus est*. Justification is for this *Dogmatik* forgiveness of sin and gift of the Spirit in one. It could not also, as it does, speak of a beginning and a completion of justification: *nam justificari hic coepimus, nondum obsovimus justificationem* if it were to understand the operation of grace as purely declaratory.

The expositions, which attempt to interpret away the *wavering* of the sense of grace in the New Testament for their dogmatic decisions, lead to the one-sidedness of contrasted doctrines of grace, such as are the Reformed and the Anglican. If there is in the domain of *Faith and Order* a result from the

œcumenical movement then it is guaranteed only by the wealth of the beginning, in comparison with which the varied one-sided views in the later doctrines of grace appear an impoverishment of the originally richer conception. In the sign of the primitive conception of grace they can again come together.

He who in his dogmatic thought does not want to lose the New Testament ground from under his feet must not, in accord with the dual result of our exegesis, resolve grace into disposition. That is the danger to which the Reformed attitude is exposed. It must allow grace to become life. But—and here a danger threatens the Anglican position—a life of personal nature, which only by the mediation of history flows towards us, and meets us in the life, cross and resurrection of the historical Christ so that we can contemplate it.

On the one side, the Reformed, there exists the danger that, from fear of making a thing of grace as a grace—substance, the dynamic character of grace is dispersed in abstractions and so is surrendered. The doctrine of the sacraments thus loses its foundations. One cannot then speak of a real presence of the divine in the sign of grace. They are only symbols, i.e., they point to the grace, which exists over there, outside the range of the earthly. They *indicate* this, are *significant*; but are *not* it. For *finitum non capax infiniti*. Thus one has left the track of the New Testament thought of grace, for according to its unanimous witness χάρις is a δύναμις operative in the finite.

On the other side, the Anglican, there exists the danger that one apprehends grace as a mass, a thing, because of the fear of giving up its dynamic character and of spiritualising it. Thus it becomes a force-stuff, which man can control according to his good will. The priest can similarly tap the reservoir of grace. In this apprehension the giver of grace who imparts grace according to his free measure as it pleases him is forgotten. A grace, which has been made a controllable magnitude, has been deprived of its character as grace.

One side rests its apprehension on the pretended finding according to which the New Testament by χάρις means the disposition of God, the other on the finding, according to which χάρις means a δύναμις. The picture which one makes for oneself from what is in the New Testament representation of grace has in both cases passed through the censorship of a pre-conceived dogmatic meaning. The *est*, on which Luther in the controversy about the doctrine of the Supper laid so great stress, is equally distant from a quantitative substantialising of grace as from a spiritualising dispersion, and thus gives again an uncensored picture of the grace of the New Testament. *So far as Lutheranism can do justice to both sides, it holds the key position in all efforts at an œcumenical harmonising of the different doctrines of grace. Only from its position can both the Reformed and also the Anglican position be held.*

Summarising, we again affirm: one has not in view the meaning of grace in its full New Testament content if one only regards the giver. But also one has not got it in view if one looks only at the gift and its recipients. Grace has reference, according to our finding of its wavering meaning, to the fact of the interweaving of divine activity and human existence. One has not always in view by itself either what occurs on the side of God, or on the side of man. The term grace seeks to describe a *relation*, the relation between God and man. Of what kind that relation is the term grace is intended to describe more concretely. In the sense of the New Testament as a result of our investigations, this relation is a *mutual* one. While we endeavour to unfold the meaning of this mutuality, we make clear to ourselves, what even to-day we mean, when, attaching ourselves to the New Testament, we speak of grace.

IV.

It is true that grace is self-sufficient. It does not need man. The potter can do with his clay what he will (Rom.

ix, 21, following Isaiah xlv, 9). Grace means the sovereignty of the Divine will. In χάρις also a reference to the δόξα θεοῦ¹ is contained. It is only a fuller indication of the omnipotence of God, with whom all things are possible. He who holds to this state of matters alone, will build up upon it a predestinarian theory of the sole activity and the irresistibility of grace. In consequence before grace all independent volition of man must cease. In view of it man is compelled to make confession of his absolute lack of freedom.

Against this, no contrary philosophical representations can help. For instance, that one should appeal to the well-known Kantian conclusion: "Thou can'st because thou oughtest." The "thou oughtest" would lose all meaning if man were not free, and so able to fulfil it. From the form of command, with which the ethical requirement appeals to man, the freedom of man is inferred.

¹ Cf. the placing together of χάρις and δόξα in Eph. i, 6. If δόξα presents grace under the special aspect of its exaltation, yet the fundamental nature of δόξα must correspond to that of χάρις. It would therefore, be a confirmation of the correctness of our findings regarding χάρις in the New Testament, if we could make out corresponding statements for this conception on account of the δόξα passages. But that is the case, as is shown by the study of *J. Schneider, Doxa*, which has just appeared, but which is not here further used. δόξα is also to be understood, according to the New Testament usage of language as δύναμις, and indeed quite concretely as the radiant and potent glory of God, which diffuses its radiance also into the Christian life; δόξα is also a reality filling the Christian life. Objectively it is the δόξα of God, subjectively the δόξα of man. But that is exactly our conclusion about grace.

The aim of Schneider in his Study is to explain how the word δόξα came to this fuller significance from its abstract significance in the use of literary Greek, according to which it means *meaning, opinion*, etc. He makes it probable, that it did not receive this content from its Hebrew original *Kabod* in the Septuagint. The Septuagint translators would not have given it a new meaning. Much rather it had already in the spoken language this fuller sense, although we cannot now prove it. Out of the obscurity of the spoken language, it was then brought back by the Septuagint into the written language.

But one can infer in the contrary way; if man were really free, then a "thou oughtest" would be unnecessary. That the moral content clothes itself in the form of the imperative, shows that a mighty resistance to its realisation is to be overcome. Accordingly: Thou oughtest because thou canst not without something more. Thou art not free. The antinomy, into which one comes by the attempt of a philosophical decision of the question of the freedom or unfreedom of the will, indicates that philosophy is not at all competent for the decision of this question. Against the theological affirmation that grace deprives the will of man of its power, there is no philosophical counter-appeal.

But with the affirmation of the unfreedom of the will all is not said. With it one has not yet exhausted the meaning of the word grace. One has only thought of its power and sovereignty. Naturally only he can exercise grace who has power. But in the word grace more lies. In it also lies the indication that the Almighty does not want to be sufficient unto himself. Grace wants to help, and he who wants to help must reckon with him whom he wants to help. Thus grace binds its exercise to man's making room for it. If it were otherwise, then it would not be help but magic. The physician cannot wish to help with his medicine contrary to the nature of the sick person. Otherwise it would not be a medicine, but a magic draught. Thus also grace is no magic draught, which works *ex opere operato*.

Grace is the expression for the mutuality, with which God resorts to man. This entry into mutuality, because it is sovereign, takes all activity from man. Only he "who does not work" (Rom. iv, 5) can stand before God. In a religious matter man must renounce all initiative of his own. He must "become empty of all his own work" and "endure and suffer in himself God's work which comes as an annihilation of his being for himself."¹

¹ *Loci*, ed. Kolbe, 1925, p. 119: *ut vacemus ex nostris operibus, hoc est, ut patiamur ac toleremus opus dei, mortificationem nostri.*

And yet grace, because it wants to help, does not exclude man. Grace does not break the wings of the will of man. It first of all vivifies him. It is a terminological accident that John viii, 32, does not run: grace shall make you free, since in John i, 14 (a glory full of grace and truth) *χάρις* and *ἀλήθεια* appear to stand as synonyms.

The sovereignty of God and the freedom of man can and must on the basis of the New Testament be affirmed together. Jesus spoke the parable of the seed which grew of itself (Mk. iv, 26 ff.), and in the same sense is the command: "Go and teach all nations." So also with the word in the parable of the Good Samaritan: go thou and do likewise (Luke x, 37). Jesus certainly did not bring the scribe on to a false trail, in order to bring him by the failure of his effort to the consciousness that he could not do this. He called him really, without reservation, to doing. And yet his gospel refers men exclusively to grace. Paul also appeals to the will of man; work out your salvation with fear and trembling. And yet in the same breath he points to this, that it is God who works in you both the will and the deed according to his good will (Phil. ii, 12 f.).

Grace and freedom! Only he will feel this as a contradiction who does not see the ambiguity which we have demonstrated in the New Testament conception of grace. Because grace is both the grace of God as also the grace imparted to man, God can preserve his sovereignty and man his moral freedom, without the one excluding the other. The freedom of man does not need to surrender before the grace of God. For grace *is* moral freedom, and to obey God is the freedom of man (Seneca).

Thought comes into difficulties only when it seeks to assert, contrary to the findings of the New Testament, the grace of God and the freedom of man as two ever existing complexes independent of each other. Then the grace of God and the freedom of man compete. What one gives to the freedom of man, that one takes from the grace of God. So in every case grace can correspond only to man's unfreedom. Thus

there results the alternative, as e.g. Hinduism posits it, and as in other formulations it emerges in all redemptive religions: "Is man saved by God as the kitten which is seized by the mother and is carried away from the place of danger in her mouth, or like the young ape which also clings to the mother." Can man do nothing at all, or just a little to his salvation? Predestination or synergism? Augustine or Pelagius?

The putting of such a question is dictated to religious thought by a rationalistic philosophy, which attempts to draw the bounds of the divine and the human factors over against one another, and to place the God-man relation with the help of clever calculations on a rationally intelligible basis. With this one has forsaken the soil of the New Testament. One has removed the paradox, affirmed by the New Testament, of the interdependence of divine activity and human action even as, e.g., the later Melanchthon in his *Loci* of 1555 addresses man: "Thou canst not, sayest thou. Yet thou canst in some measure." He wants to save a minimum of freedom for man. Therein he betrays this, that contrary to the New Testament he opposes to God the will of man in itself. Thus again God on the one hand or man on the other is taken into reckoning. But this reckoning is false. For according to the New Testament findings grace is the grace of God and grace imparted to man, *God and man are in grace locked together.*

In so far as grace is to be understood both in the objective sense as the grace of God and in the subjective sense as grace imparted to man, one can, in an expression of Kierkegaard, speak of the *sub-objectivity* of grace. This character of grace is to be more closely described in what follows.

Grace means in the sense of our New Testament findings the intention of God, i.e., the *favor dei* (the objective in it), and its assumption into the intention of man, i.e., the realisation of the *favor dei* in the gift of grace (the subjective in it). But grace realises itself according to the New Testament in faith. In faith it similarly strikes spiritual roots. According to Acts xviii, 27, faith is strengthened by grace. According to Rom.

iv, 16, righteousness must come through faith, that it may be of grace. Even as in Eph. ii, 8 (by grace have ye been saved through faith) faith and grace are used as synonymous, only that grace especially directs attention to the objective character of its contents, faith to its subjective application and its taking root in the soul. Grace realises itself first of all in *faith*. But *faith* is a religious concern only when it knows itself as a gift of grace.

Such New Testament passages afford the foundation for the central affirmation of the Reformation; *Promissio* (i.e., the promise of grace) *et fides sunt correlativa*. The act of grace in justification consists according to Luther in the *donatio fidei*, and the *fides* is according to the *Loci* of Melanchthon the *justitia dei*, which is equivalent to the $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$. Accordingly faith is nothing else but the grace which has become alive in the heart. Grace has an objective side in so far as it is a disposition of God. It has also a subjective side in so far as this disposition communicates itself to the human heart. It is the staff, the upper end of which God holds, and the lower end of which lies in human hands. Thus it corresponds with the New Testament findings. If one forgets one side because of the other, then there result one-sided apprehensions of grace. Grace is first of all quite what it is when it sounds together with its echo—faith. If one overlooks the subjective reference of grace, then it recedes into a transcendent distance from which it can no longer take possession of man.

If one overlooks the objective character of grace, then one makes its realisation in faith a mere concern of man. That God is gracious is then only a fiction. One may so regard it *as if* God were gracious. In the sense of such a subjectivism of the conception of grace the Catholic priest and philosopher, B. Balzano, explains—and that in the pulpit—"our Catholic Christianity contains only such views, which also, were they false, nevertheless to our greatest advantage would be believed by us." That means, however, the laity only must believe, the augurs laugh among themselves.

If one interprets grace merely subjectively, then indeed we

must say, if I believe God, then there is one; if I do not believe in him, then there is none. If I believe that God is gracious, then he is also gracious; if I do not believe it, then also he is not. Now in Luther the saying is found, "*Sicut cogitas, ita fit, Si credis deum iratum, est. Si potes credere, quod ei beneplacitum etc. tum habes . . . Sicut de deo cogito, ita fit mihi.*" But this faith, which according to Luther the Godhead creates in man, is not understood by him subjectively as a purely human emotion. In it according to Luther Christ, i.e. the historical representation of grace, is himself present. "Grace which otherwise were of no use to anybody, when it remained hidden so secretly," comes to us in faith.

In Luther's sense accordingly the reality of grace is not dependent on the existence of faith. The latter is itself, the reality of grace. When faith is apprehended as the activity of grace, then one finds oneself beyond the objectivising or subjectivising conception of grace. One is equally just to its objective and subjective sense, when one leaves the source of grace in God and its place in man. It is a *justitia aliena*, which is mediated to us in grace (objective side). But this *justitia* becomes *our* righteousness in the operation of grace (subjective side). By this it is not necessary to mean that the *justitia propria* is an aliveness which springs from our own activity.

K. Barth defines grace as "the subjective possibility of revelation."¹ According to the New Testament findings, however, it is just as correct or one-sided to say: "grace is the objective condition of revelation." It is rather both in one; hence the way of speaking of its sub-objective character. It should have been shown how, by exactly following the New Testament apprehension of grace, one can get beyond the alternative of objectivism and subjectivism.

At the Königsfeld Conference of the German Committee of Faith and Order (Lausanne) there was read a speech of the

¹ K. Barth, *Dogmatik*, I, 1927, p. 285.

Anglican Archbishop of York in which he posits the Catholic formula *ex opere operato*, which in the strongest way emphasises the objective character of grace and the evangelical correlative affirmation of *sola gratia—sola fide*, for which the activity of grace and the reality of faith go together, as two expressions corresponding to different representations of one fundamental truth. That they mutually contend is to be traced only to this, that they do not rightly understand one another. The *ex opere operato* is objected to by Evangelicals, because according to their opinion it leaves out of account that the grace offered in a sacrament can only be received in faith. What is meant to be said is only this, that the reality of grace is available independent of faith. On the contrary, the evangelical formula: *sola gratia—sola fide* is suspected by the Catholic because it seems to say, that faith is *creatrix gratiae*. The evangelical wished with it only to point to this, that grace is visible and tangible to faith. Accordingly the Catholic with his formula wished to deny this subjective reference of faith just as little as the Evangelical with his the objectivity of grace. The Catholic formula was against a one-sidedly subjective, the Evangelical against a one-sidedly objective conception of grace. The one preserves the other from exaggeration; and, therefore, Catholic and Evangelical must go together in order to bring to expression the full content of Christian conviction.

One can fully agree with the tendency of this document on the question. For the Evangelical Christian, especially of the Lutheran type, it has always been one of his most urgent concerns to formulate the convictions of his faith that there may not exist any doubt as to their objective content. But this agreement in substance is for the Evangelical bound up with misgivings about the terminology.

Is the formula *ex opere operato* really the most appropriate expression for the conviction, which the Evangelical also cannot give up, regarding grace as an objective reality, which exists independently of the spiritual condition of the believer? If

the formula *ex opere operato* directed the gaze from the spiritual condition of man to a reality outside of his spirit, then the Evangelical could also with this formula express his conviction. But the formula directs the gaze not so much on a trans-subjective reality as to the ritual action of the priest who administers the sacrament, and so approximates to the apprehension of grace as a substance, which man in his sacramental actions can dispose of according to his pleasure. That is not intended. But the Archbishop himself indicates that the history richly justifies the concern which the Evangelical experiences at this point. Is not this a confession that the logic immanent in the formula is stronger than the intention with which one makes use of it.

The evangelical formula: *sola gratia—sola fide* has as its basis the conviction, that faith is the energising of grace in the man who thereby becomes believing. Here on the path lies the danger of subjectivism. Processes, which rest, as the Evangelical affirms in accordance with his correlation of *gratia* and *fides*, in the energising of grace, on a relation between God and man, can always also be interpreted as within the soul, pure subjective phenomena. No logical method of argument can exclude the possibility that the believer has succumbed to a self-deception when he refers his religious experiences to a working of God in grace. The possibility of an illusion remains.

All the more must the evangelical conviction be fully concerned to oppose the misunderstanding that grace is only the waking of powers which rise up out of the subconscious depth of his own soul, and thus bring into man's consciousness in his experience of grace only his own self. Are there not against the danger of such a subjective interpretation of the *sola gratia—sola fide* doctrine other safeguards than the *ex opere operato*?

The Lutheran orthodoxy of the sixteenth and seventeenth century guarded itself against a subjectivising misunderstanding of the doctrine of grace by this, that it sought in attaching itself to the New Testament to understand the act of grace

in justification as declaratory. In all religious occurrences the initiative lies with God. Human activity always comes afterwards. So far the Anglican with his reference to the *ex opere operato* wishes to say the same as the Lutheran with his apprehension of grace as declaratory. In both formulæ one means the trans-subjectivity of grace, its transcendence defying every subjectivising morselling of it. When the Evangelical finally prefers by means of the formula of the declaratory character of grace to serve the objectivity of grace, then he is thereto determined by two considerations. *Firstly* the relevant passages of the New Testament lie, as we have seen, more in the line of the declaratory than of the *ex opere operato*. *Secondly*: the formula *ex opere operato* endangers the sub-objective character of grace. For taken strictly at its word it speaks—disregarding altogether the materialising lapse only all too easily connected with it—only of the transcendent objectivity of grace, whereas the declaratory apprehension of grace sees the meaning of justification realised only if the human being refers the divine word to its subjectivity. Hence with the *ex opere operato* one falls back again on the alternative of subjectivism and objectivism, which the conception of grace, guided by the New Testament, transcends.

The New Testament conception of grace helps as well to bridge other alternatives of contemporary theology. Two of them will be briefly referred to. On the one side one thinks of religious realities as *things*, which faith has to grasp, as solid as possible, grace perhaps as a stream of life into which faith dips. The source in which I bathe is tradition, is grace, the realistic ontological attitude. On the other side one is scornful because Goethe in a less happy moment has made "grace" rhyme with "bathe."¹ The meaning here is: God does not stand *before* faith as its object, God constantly remains at the *back* of faith—the idealistic—transcendental attitude. To that we on the ground of our New Testament findings say: grace is not only God's disposi-

¹ K. Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

tion, but grace is also an aliveness in man, *vita experimentalis* (Luther). We combine the element of truth in both attitudes.

With this conception of grace finally one stands above the contradiction of the final historical and the evolutionary eschatology, which will always play a part in theology. On one side, the final historical eschatology only knows how to speak of hope. Christians are those who wait. It *was* once, and it *will* be. The *Now* is empty. *Χάρις* becomes reality at the end of days after the destruction of the world.

On the other side: the progressive optimism of the evolutionary eschatology has all its expectations already in this world. For the complete realisation of *χάρις* this aeon does not need first of all to perish. On the basis of the duality of our conception of grace one is just both to the "not-having" on the one side and the "having" on the other. The "having" follows from the subjective character of grace, that it is granted to man. The "not-having" follows from its objective character, that it is "only" God's disposition.

We draw attention to both sides, which have met us by this time in so varied forms, when we call it "being grounded in the truth." Grace is first of all being grounded in the truth. We cannot ground ourselves in the truth. We cannot—according to a saying of Kierkegaard—"bring ourselves back to the place in which the soul stands in undisturbed connection with eternity." We have sunk into a state of being lost from which we cannot ourselves again recover ourselves: that is the objective side of grace. But grace is indeed also to be really grounded *in* the truth. We are seized in our own aliveness by it. It has in the form of faith become our own life.

Thus *gratia* and *fides* are not to be divided as the two poles of a relation, grace on the divine side and faith on the human side. One can say with Brunner: "*Faith* does not grasp grace, but *it is grace*." *Gratia* and *fides* are the descriptions of a relation, and indeed both one and the same relation. The Reformation means the same thing whether it says *sola*

gratia, or *sola fide*. In both cases one is thinking of the same movement, which according to Evangelical convictions is for Christianity the decisive movement. Only that with *sola gratia* one thinks of this, that it flows in the direction from God to man, and with *sola fide* on this, that it floods back in the direction from man to God. The Greek sense for language mirrors this double sense of *gratia* very well again, when it can understand by *χάρις* as well the benefit as the thanks returned for it.

This movement oscillating between God and man is the original phenomenon of the Christian religion. All theological reflection must attach itself to it, and so far know itself as a theology of grace, i.e., that is as a meditation on this, that God in the historical appearance of our Redeemer has entered into a mutual relation over against man and has thereby made faith possible. It has not to posit speculations about or prescribe recipes for the way in which man could come into this mutual relation. For that theology always comes too late. It has only to attach itself to this mutual relation as an accomplished fact, in order on the basis of the New Testament to meditate upon it.

ROBERT WINKLER.

(Translated from the German by the Rev. Dr. Garvie.)

ART. IV.—COLLEGE CHAPELS.

(The following article, based on a University Sermon recently preached at Oxford, discusses the matter mainly with reference to Oxford, but the situation at Cambridge is similar, and the questions it raises seem to be of general interest in connection with university education.)

THE state of the college chapels in a university organised on collegiate lines is a matter on which many are compelled to-day to think carefully. And it may not be altogether unprofitable to put down some thoughts about, or, perhaps more exactly, some material for thinking about, the system as it already exists in Oxford where it has had so long a trial; not only because the question must always be arising as to what we ought to do with the chapels we have, but also because modern universities show a tendency to organise themselves on a collegiate basis, and may find light from the past, when they come to settle whether newly-founded colleges should or should not aim at having a chapel of their own.

I.

But although the main interest is naturally with the present and future, we can only see clearly what the college chapels are or are likely to be in the life of the university, if we know something of their history.¹ People often seem to assume that they are some sort of monastic survival from the middle ages maintained by academic inertia. But it can be clearly shown by detailing one or two stages in

¹ It is best read in Willis and Clark's *Architectural History of the University of Cambridge*, to which I am greatly indebted. It is a reproach to Oxford that it has produced nothing so excellent of its kind.

the progress towards the existing system that, though they had their origin in the mediæval period, they are no more a mere survival from it than the colleges themselves, and belong in fact to every century from the thirteenth down to ours.

The earliest colleges had actually no chapels. But they were, both at Oxford and Cambridge, normally founded in close association with a parish church, which provided them with a place of worship and generally with the greater part of their endowment. Thus it is well known that Oriel College was founded in connection with the Church of Saint Mary the Virgin, now, as then, the University Church at Oxford. And it was only after fifty years of its existence that the college obtained leave to have a chapel within its own precinct, because, if tradition is to be believed, the daily and even hourly transaction of university business in the University Church made devotion there impossible.

The Queen's College was the first (in 1340) to have a chapel proposed for it in its original Statutes. But even so, the founder spoke of "the chapel within the House" as alternative to "the parish church, if it should happen that one be annexed and appropriated to the college," casting his eyes, it may be supposed, upon St. Peter-in-the-East, already an old church, but in actual fact already appropriated to Merton College. The first chapel at Queen's was not, as it turned out, completed till 1382.

New College chapel, consecrated in or shortly before 1400, was the first to be entirely freed from parochial ties. The founder took care, by obtaining a long series of Papal Bulls, to secure its independence. And most of the colleges subsequently founded followed the example of New College in this respect. Yet in the year 1427 Lincoln College was founded, not only in connection with, but, as its foundation deed states, actually "in the Church of All Saints." At Cambridge a similar appropriation took place as late as 1446.

In the seventeenth century a new stage was reached, and the college chapels assumed a somewhat altered aspect owing

to two tendencies calculated to promote one and the same effect. In the first place the Acts of Uniformity and the growing importance of town parishes as administrative units must have made the students feel that in the parish churches their room rather than their company was desired. At the same time the suppression of unattached or non-collegiate students stimulated the colleges to enlarge their buildings and accommodation. The seventeenth century is in consequence the great chapel-building era, and in it was brought almost to completion the system as we know it, whereby a place of worship is a separate and conspicuous part of every college. Thus Brasenose College shortly after 1660 completed its present interesting chapel to replace a room over the buttery which had till then served the purpose.

Yet the system was not quite complete; for it is to be noted that Pembroke College, founded in 1624, had no chapel but worshipped in its own aisle of St. Aldate's church hard-by until 1728, when the agreeable chapel that we see was erected.

With the main stages of development thus briefly sketched, we may pass on to note in what order the chapels now existing in Oxford were built. Altogether outside the system stands Christ Church which is, of course, under the name of St. Frideswide, much older than the present House. But no one who knows it can be surprised that, when Wolsey's scheme for a great chapel failed, the Society contented itself with what is now the cathedral church of the diocese.

Of the college chapels one belongs substantially to the thirteenth century. This is God's holy and beautiful house in Merton College, unique not only for its early date and for a peculiar beauty after its own kind, but also because it alone is properly entitled to the name of church; for it never was, what a chapel necessarily must be, either the supplement to or the substitute for, a parish church. In the late fourteenth century one of the chapels was built (New College), in the fifteenth century two (All Souls and Magdalen), in the sixteenth century two (Corpus Christi College and St. John's); in the seventeenth

century eight of the existing chapels were built (Wadham, Jesus, Lincoln, University, Oriel, Brasenose, St. Edmund Hall, and Trinity), in the eighteenth century three (Queen's, Pembroke, Worcester), and in the nineteenth century three; which are Balliol, where the old chapel was replaced by a larger one; Exeter, where, as at St. John's College, Cambridge, an uncommonly interesting building was replaced by an important monument of the Gothic revival; and Keble College chapel, new and notable from many points of view. In this century already Hertford College has built a fine chapel, and this concludes the enumeration of the men's colleges. It is worth observing however that the infant Hall of St. Peter, cradled in a parish church, precisely revived (in 1928) the mediæval practice. St. Peter-le-Bailey Church has provided the ground for this new Hall as well as its place of worship; and has contributed something to its endowment without sacrificing its parochial status and activities. Nor does the Hall presumably feel at present any wish for a chapel exclusively its own.

In all this nothing has been said of the women's colleges, an omission the more notable seeing that only last January the members of Lady Margaret Hall opened and dedicated a most striking chapel for their own use. And certainly the women's colleges are by no means unimportant for my topic. On the contrary they have, unless I am mistaken, introduced into the college system for the first, and so far for the only time, an instance of societies not definitely committed to a connection with some organised branch of the Christian Church. Furthermore they raise in various ways one very large question about Holy Orders. But their early history is their present history. And to include them in this review of the college chapels would too often compel the introduction of some special qualification to meet their case. It seems more economical to confine my generalisations to the men, and leave them to be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the women's colleges.

All things considered, we might be inclined to infer that

the notion that a chapel is an essential and important part of the provision made by a college for its members has been familiar in Oxford for some 500 years and undisputed there for 300 years. Nor can it be said with truth that modern times show any diminution of the interest, effort, and expense that such a notion demands for its continuous realisation. And things outside the University point to the same conclusion. The vast efforts made in our great boarding schools to augment the fabric and improve the services of their chapels are based on a similar conviction. A demand for organised religion has also been voiced and is being met in modern secular universities such as Bristol and Reading.

II.

On turning to consider the present, what perhaps strikes one most is the absence of any attack upon the system, side by side with what certainly seems a rather fashionable feeling that a chapel is now somehow irrelevant to the normal life of a college. Such a feeling is of course difficult to define and therefore does not easily find expression, but that makes it all the more surprising that it has not expressed itself in a way which would have been easy, namely in an attack on the chapels for being so extravagant in the employment of clergy. For this is a point at which they have in recent years become particularly vulnerable in view of the prevailing shortage of clergy. It might have been asked, and perhaps ought to have been asked, whether some economy in the system would not be acceptable to all concerned. For consider what the situation is.

There are twenty-one colleges and one public hall in the University of Oxford, each provided with a chapel, and each requiring the services of at least one chaplain. These twenty-two societies can be enclosed in a quadrilateral just about one-third of a square mile in area—say 220 acres at most. The academic population in this area amounts to about 5,000 persons. Now a parish of 220 acres with a population of

about 5,000 can very frequently be paralleled in any ordinary town. Yet one would be surprised to hear that such a parish was run by a vicar and 21 assistant priests, even more surprised if it were run by 22 assistant priests without any vicar at all. Both those who care for the Church and those who do not might very well ask whether some reduction could not be made in our chapels and their staff, the more so, if (as I have once or twice been told in the friendliest fashion) the colleges have had great difficulty recently in filling their clerical fellowships. And reduction should not be difficult. Anyone who knows Oxford will be able to think of three colleges and one public hall which might have a common place of worship within two minutes' walk of all four of them; and if it were invidious to prefer one of their chapels to another, they might have cast their eyes on an old church, if it happened that one could be annexed or appropriated; and that was not impossible. And other similar economies suggest themselves. But actually there has been no demand, and apparently no wish on the part of the University or on the part of the Church at large to effect such economies. In other places, like the City of London, or some of our old cathedral towns, where churches were as thick and even thicker on the ground than the college chapels, demolition, closing, unification have all been asked for and effected. But in respect of the University a public opinion, the stronger for being unspoken, seems to desire to maintain the existing system. An intelligent foreigner made aware of the situation would perhaps declare that in England the connection between university education and religion is at once inexplicable and incurable.

III.

It must however be admitted that some of the elements in the situation have changed rather noticeably in recent times. Of these changes I shall remark on three, all rather closely connected with one another. The first is the great reduction of the number of Fellows in Holy Orders. From the

University Calendar for 1833 I make out that 100 years ago there were 379 Fellows of Colleges Masters of Arts or of a similar or superior standing, and that of these 288, or rather more than three in four, were in Orders. I omit those Fellows who were Bachelors of Arts or Students of Civil Law (S.C.L.), for they were mostly too young for Orders, and, if they remained Fellows, did in actual fact mostly take Orders, as subsequent issues of the Calendar show. In the same year, 1833, all the Heads of Houses except the Warden of Merton were clergymen, and there were besides 33 Chaplains of Colleges, not being Fellows. In the Calendar for 1933 I find 333 Fellows of Colleges of the same standing, of whom only 30 are in Holy Orders. Six of the Heads are in Orders, and there are eleven Chaplains not Fellows of Colleges.

The contrast is striking. It is true however that 1833, that *annus mirabilis*, may show rather a high tide of clerical dominance. The historians could probably point to a definite tendency in the seventeenth century towards the laicising of the Fellowships. But after the Revolution, and when the University had settled down to what it looked on as "our glorious Establishment in Church and State" it gradually allowed itself throughout the eighteenth century to be captured by the Church, and at last it was only in some of the older colleges with their traditional provision for the study of law and medicine that any considerable group of lay Fellows remained. In 1833 Jesus and Wadham colleges had only one lay Fellow each, Pembroke and Worcester none. These were the four junior colleges. It is curious to reflect that the custom, still faintly lingering in Oxford and Cambridge, of sending fashionable young men to the University to kick their heels rose out of the notion that it would be good for them to spend some time in company with a Body of Divinity.

A second remarkable change is the rise of religious activities directed towards the members of the University, but independent of the University and the colleges. These are very numerous, as a glance at any general notice-board in

college shows. One or two examples must suffice. And first I should group together, as having something in common, the Pusey House, which maintains in a developed form the teaching of the Tractarians, and what is called the Oxford Pastorate, an evangelical ministry, exercised in the University by clergymen of the Church of England, and identified to some extent with St. Aldate's Church. Both organisations mainly supply the needs of those whom the Church of England includes within her comprehensive embrace only at its full extent. Although individuals will perhaps care for one of these ministries more than the other, both are valuable as supplying what the colleges do not and perhaps ought not to supply.

But more important, because wider, are the activities connected with the University Church under the direction of recent vicars. Apart from the meetings there, daily and almost hourly, of various associations such as the Student Christian Movement, a most effective ministry of preachers, not unheralded by the precursive poster, commends the Gospel to a very large circle. Such a flocking to the central sanctuary makes a poor chaplain of a college seem little better than the hired priestling of some local shrine! Yet he cannot be anything but grateful for it all.

But all this and much other good work can only be appraised in connection with a third and very noticeable change, namely that religious activities seem now to be very largely directed towards the undergraduate. This may be due to two tendencies which converge from opposite directions. In old days the senior members of the University went to chapel, one gathers, because they thought it suitable to their profession; the junior members went under compulsion, and any other religious meetings were thought odd. In the course of two generations we have changed all that. The undergraduates are invited to all sorts of religious assemblies, and they go surprisingly often; the senior members have to a very noticeable extent abandoned such things. Why is this?

Because in the first place the undergraduates now enjoy, not a greater freedom, but a different freedom, when compared with their predecessors. Thomas Arnold would no doubt be very much surprised, but perhaps very glad, if he could see that strange mixture of inexperience and idealism which is the present-day product of our great boarding schools. He would be equally surprised, perhaps less well pleased, to find coming to Oxford also a certain number of men who have never been in contact with organised religion at all and fancy they have no use for it. When he got to know all these young men, he would be likely to fall in with the opinion that seems about to prevail, that they cannot be constrained in spiritual things, but that they can and will discern them for themselves.

The last few years have seen the gradual decline of all attempts to make attendance at chapel either compulsory or alternative to other forms of compulsion such as roll-call in the morning. In many colleges there is no more obligation to attend chapel than there is to attend church in the vacation. This is surely right. It is true that the undergraduate is often disappointing when he is treated as a man, possibly because his school has not prepared him for it; but to treat him as a man is the best way to make him one. Yet even men will not always come to church without some looking after. And if the college chapel is to have a congregation not brought together by compulsion, the college needs a chaplain who is able to effect the business of visiting without being allowed to visit save under exceptional circumstances. It is no wonder that chaplains are not easy to come by, when they must be as assiduous as ants, as wise as serpents, and not necessarily as innocent as doves.

But it does seem worth doing. At any rate it seems worth asking whether the college chapels are not after all the best instrument for ministering to most of these young men; whether there is anything better for the ordinary student than the liturgy and the daily office of the Book of Common Prayer duly performed and recited in college, where those who already share the common life of the college can share the common

worship. I ask myself whether this is not the best prescription for that healthful spirit which safely steers between the enthusiasm and the ecclesiasticism which are both so liable to beset these rather tender souls.

For those who naturally care for the Church in faith and practice, is anything more calculated than the college chapels to make them, in von Hügel's phrase, "lovers of the Church who work their loves into a large thoughtfulness," surely the properest objective so long as they are being educated? But of course there are others not apparently capable of this. We ought neither to expect or even to wish that all the students of a University, being as they are at a stage of life which is naturally delicate and agnostic, should be vigorously attached to any place of worship. But to those who are not the college chapel at least offers an obvious challenge, and, if there is a chaplain in college, at any rate they are in somebody's mind, who hopes and endures all things for a flock so hopeful and at times so trying.

IV.

The college chapels fell into discredit when they were tyrannical. But now let them not cease to claim to be of the greatest importance. Yet there is one great obstacle to their making such a claim effectively. It is what was just touched upon above, the defection of the seniors. To say this is not of course to utter any reproach. A sufficient, if not the whole explanation, is to be found in the various aspects which knowledge and ascertained truth have seemed to wear in the last hundred years. But those of us who profess and call ourselves Christians cannot allow that much learning is inconsistent with, or should be indifferent to Christ and the church. Things past and present may be made to show that learning and religion go together. Yet we do little to commend this truth.

And no wonder, for how difficult a task it is. Just at the moment perhaps an impossible one. But not impossible if

certain conditions should come to prevail among us, of which the first might be that the clergy as a whole should drop many of their fancies and become sincerely devoted to sound learning, and the second that a spiritual genius should appear in one of our English universities, a thing surely not impossible. And after that will be required much patience in a day of small things. And through all a resolution not to think, no, not for an instant, that the present indifference is inevitable.

No one of course wants a return to the old unhealthy clericalism, when a Fellowship was in itself a title to Holy Orders, and when the chief topic of interest in common room (as old college betting books will show) was the prospective vacancies in college livings. But at least it is fair to expect that men who rightly count themselves highly educated will not reckon the Christian church a subject which they can wholly neglect, or, worse still, can safely discuss without a measure of authentic information.

ADAM FOX.

ART. V.—SMALL BEER OF HISTORY.

Drawn from the Order Book of the Dean and Chapter of Ely, 1660-1693. By REGINALD GIBBON, Librarian to the Dean and Chapter.

THE first entry in the book is dated the 5th day of November, 1660. King Charles II had returned on the 29th day of May. His Restoration had awakened the Cathedral Church of Ely to life from the frozen years of the Cromwellian usurpation. The choir service "so unedifying and offensive" had been silent since the day when Cromwell came stamping in with his hat on, calling in hoarse barrack tones to the Precentor, Mr. Hitch, "Leave off your fooling and come down, sir." The ensuing silence had lasted for nearly seventeen years. It was now at an end.

The cathedral had been sadly robbed and spoiled during the years of desolation. The records of the Chapter were in confusion. A new book in which to inscribe their Orders was one of the things which the Dean and Chapter had early to provide. Dean Richard Love signed the first entry. His decanate lasted only a few months. After him came in quick succession Dean Ferne and Dean Martin. Neither of them appears to have presided over a meeting of the Chapter. Then came Dean Wilford, appointed in 1662. Henceforward the meetings held and business done were regularly recorded. Mr. Thomas Towle was the Registrar. He wrote a dainty finicky hand copiously flourished. Dean Wilford's firm and beautiful copy-book signature attested the minutes.

Francis Wilford, who was master of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge as well as Dean of Ely, was a man of high principle and of stately presence. He saw right courses of action, but often he was left to pursue them alone. His

hot temper, politely described by the Ely historian, James Bentham, as "arbitrary," cost him the loss of other men's warm co-operation. Nevertheless, in his five years as dean, he did much to bring back his cathedral into good order.

The first chapter-meeting over which the new dean presided had some trouble with the choir. The choral services had been restored; but the choir had lost its tradition and much of its discipline. Two minor canons out of five, and three lay clerks out of eight, had survived the interregnum. The rest were new hands. The cost of living had gone up, and an agitation for an increase of stipends was seething. To allay this discontent the Dean and Chapter agreed to give the minor canons an addition to their stipends of three pounds apiece per annum. The lay clerks were granted two pounds apiece, and the choristers each received thirteen shillings and fourpence. On the whole this was a generous settlement. The Dean and Chapter further agreed that "every Prebendary allow his ancient Residence money to the Choir, viz. forty shillings at his month of preaching." There were eight prebendaries, each of whom had a period of residence every year. Therefore Residence money at forty shillings a Resident was an important item in the choir budget. It did not go wholly to the lay clerks. Their share was twenty-four shillings. The remaining sixteen shillings went to the minor canons. The choristers were financially uninterested in Residence money.

The attention of the Chapter was also given to the library of music. It had suffered severely during the seventeen years of silence. A few new singing books had recently been written out by members of the choir. Now they were asking to be paid for their labours. One of the prebendaries, Dr. Holder, was appointed to settle the amount with them. As if by the happy thought of some wide-awake member of the Chapter, the order adds, "and they," i.e. the books, "to remain in the church." Later, a little more work was done by various lay clerks, "pricking books for the choir," and when the new organist, Mr. Ferabosco, arrived, he was very diligent in the matter. A completer reorganization of the music library was

undertaken in the time of Mr. Ferabosco's successor, that diligent and scholarly musician Mr. James Hawkins. But Mr. Ferabosco's earlier efforts were appreciated by the Dean and Chapter. They marked their approval by a grant of ten pounds, "to provide his chamber of necessaries."

The mention of Mr. Ferabosco's chamber may imply that the organist's official house had become untenable through neglect, or that, if tenable, it was being occupied by his predecessor, an old and apoplectic gentleman named Claxton. But the organist was not the only one to experience a housing difficulty. Some of the prebendal houses had fallen into disrepair. Others were occupied by interlopers who could not be easily evicted. Perhaps the minor canons were in worst case as regards residence. The ancient building called "the Knight's Lodging" had been assigned to them at the dissolution of the monastery as their dwelling place. Probably it was already ruinous in 1662, though it remained standing until 1694, when the Chapter ordered its demolition. A Mr. Cadman and a Mr. Standish, both minor canons, are mentioned as being in receipt of grants from the Dean and Chapter to defray the hire of their chambers. Nor were the prebendaries exempt from trouble. They had to spend freely upon the repairs of their dilapidated houses. No prebendary was eligible for a grant from Chapter funds until he had spent twenty pounds from his own resources.

Attention was also given to the services in the cathedral. Morning Prayer was ordered to be performed at half-past ten and Evening Prayer at half-past four. The bells were to be rung for half-an-hour before each service. Members of the choir were to attend regularly. The Precentor was to note and report those who were absent. Each prebendary was expected to preach thrice in his period of residence. Other sermons were delivered by an appointed Lecturer, who in 1662-3 was Dr. Holder, himself one of the prebendaries. He was allotted four-score pounds a year "to supply the courses."

The strain upon the financial resources of the Dean and

Chapter in the decade 1660-1670 was severe. When they resumed control after the King's Restoration, they found their vast church in need of external repair and internal decoration. Previously to the Rebellion their yearly expenditure had rarely reached £900. In 1662 it amounted to £1,682, rose to £1,933 in 1664, and touched its highest point in 1669 when the total was £2,928. Internally, the choir was refurnished, a new organ acquired, and plate and candlesticks provided for the communion table. The beautiful candlesticks remain to show the good taste and lavish spirit of their purchasers. Externally, repairs were done upon the east front. Refacing was carried out upon the north side of the nave in 1662. Then the western tower was found to be in danger, and a costly work of reparation had to be undertaken. Money was borrowed, not without difficulty. The Dean and Prebendaries as individuals lent to the Dean and Chapter as a corporate body the sum of £860. A sum of £400 was borrowed in 1664. In 1665 a further sum of £400 had to be found. From lenders of smaller sums the Dean and Chapter received £200.

The provision of such large sums was made the more difficult by the fact that the affairs of the Dean and Chapter were in great disorder. They had lost many of their legal documents. Consequently they could not readily re-establish their title to their estates. Unauthorised people had seized upon lands and houses, and the process of their eviction was troublesome and tardy. Two unwanted tenants—the name of the one was Bell, of the other Gotobed—had to be removed from houses in the College itself; and the Chapter bailiff was ordered to comb out “the tenements in the Churchyard” and to report “how many there be of them, who now are tenants in them, and upon what terms.” Meanwhile appeals were being made for the return of documents belonging to the Dean and Chapter. A Mr. Philip Wade behaved very properly in the matter and helped in the discovery of some lost grounds and quitt-rents. He was rewarded with a gratuity of three guineas. Little by little good and sufficient terriers of all lands and tenements belonging to the church were drawn up. But the

work took time. Even so late as 1683 legal papers were being welcomed back to the Chapter Clerk's office from which they had been a long time absent.

Financial embarrassments notwithstanding, the Dean and Chapter met the claims of charity. In July, 1662, they voted £150 towards the release of captives in Algiers. The next year brought a time of social distress. It was agreed that "ten shillings a week be given to the poor in bread upon our particular charges, and this to continue so long as we think fitting, and that no beggars be suffered to come into the College." The same year the Dean was allowing £6, and each Prebendary £3, to distribute bread to the poor of Ely.

Dean Wilford died in 1667. He had struggled bravely in bad times. His decanate saw much good work accomplished. He began the repair of the western tower and left it to be completed in the days of his successor, Dean Mapletoft. The great sums expended did not very effectually cure the structural faults of the tower, but it gained from Wilford's restoration a new lease of life. Over the Dean's grave in his college chapel at Cambridge no memorial was erected. But the western steeple at Ely still stands to recall his share in its preservation.

Robert Mapletoft came in place of Francis Wilford. The reign of severe rectitude was exchanged for one of mildness and benevolence. The new dean found the reparations far from completion and the financial stringency more than ever oppressive. Once more the dean and prebendaries raised money from their private resources to finance their corporate need. The more they spent upon the western tower, the more weaknesses it seemed to disclose. Fortunately for them their new bishop, Benjamin Laney, turned out to be a man of wealth and generous spirit. Though faced with costly repairs to be done upon his episcopal residence, he found the means to send a timely gift of £100 to the embarrassed Dean and Chapter. Doubtless the bishop's generosity was the mainspring of his action. But he may have been moved a little by consideration of the peril which the tottering tower threatened to his own

safety. His palace stood within its shadow and would probably have been involved in its downfall. The letter of thanks which he received from the Chapter alluded rather tactlessly to such a possibility. The letter, written in Latin and inscribed at length in the Order Book, recalls how they had found their cathedral church, as vast as it was mutilated, almost an utter ruin, and how they strained their resources to bring it into order. In the climax of their difficulties, they had been suddenly confronted with a fresh task, that of making good unsuspected defects in the western tower. But the bishop had come to their help. The spontaneity and timeliness of his generous donation would not soon be forgotten by the recipients.

The letter to the bishop was written in April, 1669. The reparations went forward to completion. The 29th of November saw Robert Minchin, the contractor, being paid. He gave his acquittance for eleven hundred and twenty-one pounds fourteen shillings as payment in full "for all materials by me bought, and for all work done by me, and those whom I employed, for and about repairs of the Cathedral Church of Ely, from my first undertaking thereof to the present day."

This year 1669 was that in which expenditure attained its peak. The amount was swollen somewhat by a royal visit. King Charles II came "to take a sight of the Cathedrall." The Dean and Chapter spent £96 on his reception and entertainment. But their season of stress was now over. Henceforth they were to enjoy easier circumstances and to see expenditure kept down to a reasonable figure.

In their financial year November was the most important month. Then it was that they held their yearly rent audit. It was pleasant to receive money; but the receiving of it was a costly business. Entertainment had to be provided for all the tenantry. This free hospitality was practised usually for five days. The Chapter strove desperately to reduce the number to four, but found the tenantry singularly intransigent.

In the past there had been years in which eight or ten free days had been permitted.

Audit days were apt to be tumultuous. On one occasion the Deputy-Receiver, Mr. Dowsing, found himself £5 to the bad at the end of the day, and he recorded an explanatory note of the matter in the Order Book:—

“’Twas indeed stolen away by ye persons who had made payment upon ye Receivers turning his back to give an Acquittance.”

The Dean and Chapter consented to repay Mr. Dowsing “the £5 which was casually lost.” He was a minor canon. It was his duty to be ready to preach whenever the Dean or a Prebendary failed to fulfil a preaching turn in the cathedral. Doubtless a tiresome responsibility for Mr. Dowsing, but an allowance of fifteen shillings for each sermon helped him to endure it.

The tenantry was up to all sorts of tricks. A farmer had a right to cut down one tree in each year. It was his plow bote, and he used the timber to mend his implements. But to cut down half a wood and burn it was a different matter. Some tenants had a reprehensible practice of turfing their lands, skimming off the top surface. Then they used the turf for fuel. Others pulled down farm buildings and diverted the materials to recondite purposes of their own. Bailiffs had to be constantly on the alert. But not all bailiffs were so trustworthy as John Adams and Thomas Bullis, who:—

“Having well deserved of the church by some services extraordinary it is agreed that Mr. Receiver be allowed and desired to give Thomas Bullis £5 and to gratifie John Adams so as he may content him.”

Dean Mapletoft’s health failed him in his latter years. More than once he had to execute formal proxies when unable to be present in person at the Chapter meetings. But he managed to attend the June Chapter in 1677, two months before

his death. At this meeting everybody was in good spirits. Some long-lost Salt Rents had been recovered. A certain Mr. Say had rendered himself very serviceable in the matter. The Chapter felt impelled to gratify him with an assignment of the arrears of these Salt Rents such as should be recoverable, and with an offer of a salary for their collection in future. Dr. Holder was given charge of the negotiation with Mr. Say. This prebendary, a man of affairs, had a reputation for skill in getting round awkward corners and awkward people. He had been for some time an eminent figure in the Chapter. But now the days of his supremacy were ending, and Dr. Womack's star was on the rise. Laurence Womack was somewhat junior to Holder in years, and rather more so in prebendal status. A tall figure of a man, with a serious expressionless face, he can be pictured sitting at the long oak table, unsmiling, listening rather contemptuously to the talk of lesser men, sometimes puncturing their loquacity with a piercing shaft of his own logic. He served his turns as Vice-dean and Receiver. More than once he was selected to handle intricate and important business connected with finance. If the Chapter revenues were managed less wastefully as the years went on, the improvement was partly traceable to the better methods introduced by Dr. Womack.

In August, 1677, kind Dean Mapletoft died. He left books for the beginning of a cathedral library and £100 to fit up the room which should contain them.

In his successor, John Spencer, Ely obtained as dean one who was already an eminent scholar, and who turned out to be a wise administrator. From the coming in of Dean Spencer the chapter meetings begin to be recorded with particularity and completeness. Happy-go-lucky methods had been laid aside. The reign of order now supervened.

The Chapter suffered intestinal trouble during this decanate owing to the undigested presence within it of Henry Brunsell, prebendary of the fourth stall. This Dr. Brunsell would seem to have been a cantankerous person imbued with a

strong tincture of self-importance. His rectory at Stretham was only four miles distant from Ely. This proximity tended to increase his influence, for it enabled him to give closer attention to the business of the Chapter than could be given by prebendaries who lived at a far distance. Consequently, Dr. Brunsell came to take a rather large share in affairs. Inferior to Dr. Holder or Dr. Womack in ability, he was nevertheless far from being a fool in matters of business, while his abundant arrogance and self-sufficiency lent him a confidence unwarranted by his talents. Doubtless there was a pleasanter side to his character. It was seen perhaps by those with whom he walked beneath the fine cedars of his Stretham garden. Exhibitions founded by him at Magdalen College, Oxford, and Jesus College, Cambridge, proclaimed his care to promote sound learning.

However, Dr. Brunsell had a great gift of wrong-headedness. This was evidenced in a dispute about Residence Money. The minor canons—vicars as they were then styled—and lay clerks came before the Dean and Chapter in November, 1677. They complained that two prebendaries were withholding the Residence Money which by custom and order should have been paid to the Choir. One of the defaulters was Dr. Brunsell. For twelve years he had declined to pay.

The Dean and Chapter forthwith made an order that if Dr. Brunsell and his fellow defaulter failed to satisfy the choir, the Receiver should have authority to deduct the sum in question from their next prebendal dividends. This order brought Dr. Wren to heel; but Dr. Brunsell—no doubt with many unrecorded verbal fulminations—remained obdurate. Finally the Dean and Chapter went to extremes, deducted the arrears of Residence Money from his stipend, and gave the long-suffering choir satisfaction. The amount of the debt was £17 19s. 6d. Out of this dispute came good for the choir. Residence Money, which had been hitherto a personal obligation of each prebendary, was now undertaken by the Dean and Chapter as an official charge. Henceforth the Receiver paid it to the choir yearly at Michaelmas.

But Dr. Brunsell did not cease to be a source of trouble. This very contumacious prebendary had given another cause of offence. Adjacent to his official residence in the college were three dwelling houses which belonged to his prebend. Dr. Brunsell had treated them as if they were his personal property. He had presumed upon his own authority to sub-let them. When the Dean and Chapter heard of this transaction, they drew up an order affirming their "utter dislike of ye said demise as being against ye customs and statutes of our Church, ye order of ye Visitor at our last Visitation, and common justice and good reason. And therefore it is further consented and appointed yt ye Treasurer and Overseer of ye Church-work be strictly forbidden to allow any bills or charges whatsoever given in to them for repairs of any part or parcell of the Premises (so unworthily demised) till ye said lease be declared void and of none effect."

This stalwart declaration was made at a meeting of the Chapter which Dr. Brunsell did not attend. Had he been present, there would surely have been an exhibition of unchristian passion. But in his absence, his brethren were very brave. They called to mind another score which they had against him, and issued a further order:—

"Whereas it appears by ye late Dean's papers, by Mr. Griffith's letter to Dr. Womack, and ye certaine remembrance of severall of ye present Society, yt Dr. Brunsell doth withhold £10 of ye fine agreed to be paid for Mepall, which £10 Dr. Brunsell denies to pay to ye Dean and Chapter: and whereas ye said £10 hath been called for by ye late Dean's Executor: it is hereby consented and ordered that ye Receiver doe demand ye payment of ye said sume, and in case of refusall, that ye said Receiver doe keep back £10 out of ye stipend or any of ye profits of his prebend for satisfaction of ye said debt."

Copies of these orders were ordered to be sent to Dr. Brunsell by the Chapter Clerk. In due course they arrived at Stretham Rectory, which undoubtedly became for a while as

discomfortable as the neighbourhood of an erupting volcano. Squire Western at the Upton inn may have been less terrible than Dr. Brunsell when upon an April morn he opened the Chapter Clerk's missive and read the censures which had been passed upon him. History has left that swelling scene unrecorded. We can only piece together the course of events by means of a reticent and businesslike order-book, which makes no pretence to be a narrative. Apparently Dr. Brunsell wrote an indignant denial of the validity and legality of his condemnation. He based his argument on the fact that he himself had not been summoned to attend the Chapter-meeting at which his conduct had been condemned.

Was Dr. Brunsell being quite candid? Had the Chapter Clerk blundered? Had the summons miscarried? To such questions confident replies cannot be returned. Suffice it to say that the Dean and Chapter felt themselves impelled to hold a meeting on June 14th, 1678, the sole purpose of which was to re-affirm what had been done at the meeting in April. There were present the very reverend the Dean with the reverend Prebendaries Womack, Brunsell, and Harrison. Another Prebendary, Dr. Beaumont, though not personally present, had made Dr. Harrison his proxy. Perhaps because the situation was expected to develop acrimony, the Registrar seems to have been thoughtfully excluded. Consequently Dean Spencer himself wrote out the question of the day and his own reply:—

“Whether ye orders made by ye Dean and Chapter April 3, 1678, stand firm now and shall stand in force or no for ye time to come.”

I answer Yes.

J. SPENCER, Dean.

Dr. Harrison signed next, affirming for himself and Dr. Beaumont that the orders of the April Chapter meeting were in force. Then it was the turn of Dr. Brunsell who, in his pose of an injured innocent man and his best hand-writing, wrote:—

“I know of no Chapter summoned or duly called on the 3rd of April last, nor doe I know what orders were

then made, being denied a copy of all of them, except two or three concerning myself which I doe believe to have been made without any authority from our Statutes, and therefore think they ought not to be reputed to be of any force.”

H. BRUNSELL.

Meanwhile the tall unsmiling Dr. Womack had been grimly awaiting his turn. Now he seized the order book, perhaps with a rough and unceremonious grasp. Indeed, the rumpled appearance of the page upon which this stormy meeting is recorded suggests that the book may have been banged and beaten by angry hands and tossed irreverently from end to end of the oaken table. Dr. Womack's grasp now closed upon the mishandled volume, and in characters which still bear witness, even though two and a half centuries have passed, to the violent mood in which they were splashed upon the paper, he wrote:—

“I doe declare it my opinion that the orders above related to were made by sufficient and due Authority and therefore are and ought to be in full force.”

LAUR. WOMACK.

So ended the Brunsell affair. The protagonist died a few months later. His excessive individualism had rendered him unsuitable to play his part in corporate action. And when a corporate body is developing its corporate sense, as was the Ely Chapter in the time of Dean Spencer, trouble is bound to be engendered by the Brunsell tribe and others of that kidney. This petty little struggle had been a battle for corporate loyalty and responsibility. As such it was worth fighting and worth winning.

The growth of corporate feeling was demonstrated again when an order was put forward to secure better attendance at the meetings of the Chapter. It was felt that decisions taken at a thinly-attended Chapter, however adequate their legality, had not the moral force which belonged to decisions taken in a full house. For the encouragement of those who were

diligent in attendance, it was now ordered that allowances for expenses should be made. Forty shillings was to be allowed to the dean, and twenty shillings to each prebendary.

An important event of the Spencer decanate was the inauguration of the Cathedral Library. Dean Mapletoft's bequest of £100 and some books set the project in motion. Soon the Chapter, thankfully accepting the Mapletoft gift, was instructing Dr. Womack to write a grateful letter to the executors. Then consideration was given to the housing of the intended Library. A room was selected in the south transept. There, with subsequent extensions, the Library has ever since remained. At the same time an order was made for the purchase of books to the value of £20. Mr. Thomas Hitch, minor canon and sacrist, was appointed to be "Keeper of ye Church Library." He was to take care "to see the Library swept out and the Books rubbed or cleaned over, as often as he shall judge it necessary." No mention is made at this date of a salary for the Librarian. His reward was that free ingress to the fields of literature which the Library supplied and his official position facilitated. It was ordered that "he be allowed a particular Priviledge to take out any book from thence (for 3 weeks time and no longer) to his chamber, he entering the name thereof and the time of its taking out in a small Book to be provided to lye in the Library for that purpose."

In the following year Dr. John Moore became a prebendary of Ely. Later in life he was to become bishop of the diocese. Already he was known as a bibliophile. Naughty stories went round of the rather shady tricks he played upon unsuspecting owners whose rare books he coveted. However, he was undoubtedly a connoisseur, and the Chapter made use of his knowledge. A minute of the General Chapter held on June 14, 1681, records that:—

"Dr. Moore be desired to buy the Biblioth. Patrum and the Councils of the best edition for our Church Library."

The stately volumes which he purchased remain in the Library to this day. Another early benefactor of the Library was Dr. Holder. He who had done so much in the past for Ely Cathedral now added a donation of £20 for the purchase of books.

About this time the Dean and Chapter had to decide a question of the internal arrangement of the cathedral. Bishop Gunning had a bee in his bonnet, or perhaps one should say an æsthetic urge, to change the position of the choir stalls. Hitherto they had kept the place which the monks had selected. It lay situate beneath the lantern in the central octagon. Bishop Gunning hankered to move the choir eastward into the presbytery, hoping thus to achieve an extended vista and to transform the encumbered octagon into a vast desert of empty space. His idea was very much in the taste of the age. Wren was following it in his designs for the new St. Paul's. But the Ely Chapter would have none of it. They decreed that the choir should remain situated where the monks had put it. But they were willing to have it repaved, and Bishop Gunning's bequest of £400 was used to pay the cost. Black and white marble was the material chosen. It remained for the "restorers" of the eighteenth century to move the choir stalls eastward and to destroy the ancient stone screen or pulpitum.

Another decorative work of this period was a new font. This was made possible by the munificence of Dean Spencer. It was a curious little classical model, lavishly encrusted with cherubs, and must have looked odd and out of place in the austere surroundings of a Norman nave. The new font gave reason for a new scale of fees for baptisms therein. They were kept within the letter of Simony, but left the sacrament somewhat expensive of attainment.

	£	s.	d.
To the Sacrist for dooing ye Office ...	0	0	0
To the Register for his ffee ...	0	2	6
To the Subsacrist that assists as Clerk	0	1	0
To the Subsacrist that fetches ye Water	0	1	0
To the Church Sweeper ...	0	0	6

At the beginning of his decanate Dean Spencer was concerned with provisioning and cooking. The assembling of the dean and prebendaries for a Chapter meeting involved their feeding. There was an official called the Church Caterer. Apparently he was not as efficient as Dean Spencer could wish. An order had to be made to oblige him to attend at all the General Chapters in order to buy provisions for the Chapter dinners. But an indifferent cook can spoil the best efforts of the caterer, and Dean Spencer was far from satisfied with the cooking of his Ely dinners. The fruit of his dissatisfaction was an order that the cook of Bennet College in Cambridge should be employed to dress the Chapter dinners. Dean Spencer knew what he was doing. Bennet College was his own college. So he knew the cook's skill.

The charity of the Dean and Chapter was turning now into channels other than doles of bread. We read of a yearly sum of £20 laid out for the apprenticing of poor Ely boys to honest and sufficient tradesmen or seamen. No doubt many Ely boys looked seawards for their start in life. Lynn and the open sea were nearly thirty miles distant, but the river afforded such easy communication that Ely itself was nautical and ranked as an inland port. In the apportionment of the money allowed for apprenticeship, the Dean and Chapter gave a preference to their former choristers. When a boy's voice became unserviceable to the choir, his case came up for consideration. Not all were apprenticed. Some were sent to pursue their education at Cambridge.

Poor students at Cambridge, not necessarily ex-choristers, were occasionally helped from Chapter funds. Sometimes the money was entrusted to the students' tutor, sometimes it went directly to the student. Five pounds was the usual sum.

Other claims upon Chapter liberality were those of public charity. In November, 1679, consideration was given to a letter from the Bishop of Ely asking for a subscription towards the building of "Paul's church in London." It was agreed that the Dean and Chapter should contribute £100, presumably

as individuals, and that £50 should be contributed from their corporate fund.

In 1686, soon after the date of the Edict of Nantes, an order was made for the payment of £50 towards the relief of the poor French protestants. Four years later the invasion of Ireland by James II brought trouble upon the protestants there. The sum of £30 was voted towards their relief.

Dean Spencer's decanate closed in 1693. It had lasted sixteen years. The great scholar had shown himself a wise administrator. In his time much was done to put the finances of the Chapter into order and to get the business of the church managed with more strictness and economy. Care was taken for the proper performance of the services. The church was kept decently clean. The repaving of the choir and of the aisles and porches was an important work of internal improvement. Amongst the prebendaries of his time were not only men who made a pretty big figure in the great world—such as Holder, Moore and Womack — but also that martyr of conscience the pious and learned Francis Roper, who gave up his prebend rather than break his allegiance to King James. Amongst the minor canons was Samuel Bentham. As Registrar he took charge of the legal business of the Chapter for many years. The organist during the greater part of this decanate was James Hawkins. At Ely he laboured to put in order the music library and composed a quantity of anthems and services. Outside Ely he was known to Dr. Tudway, Professor of Music at Cambridge, and Humfry Wanley, Librarian to Lord Harley, as a learned and judicious authority in matters of musical history and research. Amongst the lower grades of cathedral labourers were some who were giving faithful service. Mentions of John Knowles's trustworthiness and diligence found their way more than once into the Chapter records. He was the church sweeper, but he rose to be a verger before he died. The Dean and Chapter were not ungrateful to him. An order dated June 14, 1691, declared that:—

“ John Knowles have some gratuity given him for his

pains extraordinary in sweeping ye Isles and Porches which are newly paved."

No doubt John Knowles took pride in the new pavement and gave himself additional work to keep it nice and clean. He had a son, Thomas Knowles, who took holy orders, wrote many books, and eventually became a prebendary of the cathedral in which his father had been a verger. Had John Knowles been able to foresee his son's future elevation, with what pride would the prospect have filled him!

Dean Spencer died in 1693. The font which was his gift has gone. A few articles of plate, engraved with his arms, appear upon the table at Chapter dinners to keep his name in remembrance.

R. H. GIBBON.

ART. VI.—THE LIMITS OF THE CHURCH.

It is very difficult to give an exact and firm definition of a "sect" or "schism" (I distinguish the "theological definition" from the simple "canonical description"), since a *sect* in the church is always something contradictory and unnatural, a paradox and an enigma. For the church *is unity* and the whole of her being is in this unity and union, of Christ and in Christ. "For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body" (I Cor. xii, 13), and the prototype of this unity is the consubstantial Trinity. The measure of this unity is *catholicity* or *communality* (*sobornost*), when the impenetrability of personal consciousness is softened and even removed in complete unity of thought and soul and the multitude of them that believe are of one heart and soul (*cf.* Acts iv, 32). A sect on the other hand is separation, solitariness, the loss and denial of communality. The sectarian spirit is the direct opposite of the church spirit . . .

The question of the nature and meaning of divisions and sects in the church was put in all its sharpness as early as the ancient baptismal disputes of the third century. At that time St. Cyprian of Carthage developed with fearless consistency a doctrine of a complete absence of grace in *every* sect, precisely *as* a sect. The whole meaning and the whole logical stress of his reasoning lay in the conviction that *the sacraments are established in the church*. That is to say, they are effected and can be effected *only in the church*, in communion and in communality. Therefore every violation of communality and unity in itself leads immediately beyond the last barrier into some decisive *outside*. To St. Cyprian every schism was a *departure out of the church*, out of that sanctified and holy land, where alone rises the baptismal spring, the

waters of salvation, *quia una est aqua in ecclesia sancta* (St. Cypr. epist. lxxi, 2). The teaching of St. Cyprian as to the gracelessness of sects is only the opposite side of his teaching about unity and communality. This is not the place or the moment to recollect and relate Cyprian's deductions and proofs. Each of us remembers and knows them, is bound to know them, is bound to remember them. They have not lost their force to this day. The historical influence of Cyprian was continued and powerful. Strictly speaking, in its theological premisses the teaching of St. Cyprian has never been disproved. Even Augustine was not so very far from Cyprian. He argued with the Donatists, not with Cyprian himself, and he did not confute Cyprian; indeed, his argument was more about practical measures and conclusions. In his reasoning about the unity of the church, about the unity of love, as the necessary and decisive condition of the saving power of the sacraments, Augustine really but repeats Cyprian in new words.

But the *practical* conclusions of Cyprian have not been accepted and supported by the consciousness of the church. And one asks how this was possible, if his premisses have been neither disputed nor set aside. There is no need to enter into the details of the church's canonical relations with sectarians and heretics; it is an imprecise and an involved enough story. It is sufficient to state that there are occasions when by the very form of her activity the church gives one to understand that the sacraments of sectarians and even of heretics are valid, that the sacraments can be celebrated *outside the strict canonical limits of the church*. The church customarily receives adherents from sects and even from heresies *not by the way of baptism*, obviously meaning or supposing that they have already been actually baptised in their sects and heresies. In many cases the church receives adherents even *without chrism* and clerks sometimes also *in their existing orders*, which must all the more be understood and explained as recognising the validity or reality of the corresponding rites performed over them "outside the church." But, if sacra-

ments are performed, it can only be by virtue of the Holy Spirit. Canonical rules establish or reveal a certain mystical paradox. In the form of her activity the church bears witness to the extension of her mystical territory even beyond the canonical threshold; the "outside world" does not begin immediately. St. Cyprian was right; the sacraments are accomplished only in the church. But this *in* he defined hastily and too narrowly. Must we not come rather to the opposite conclusion? *Where the sacraments are accomplished, there is the church.* St. Cyprian started from the silent supposition that *the canonical and charismatic limits of the church invariably coincide.* And it is this unproven identification that has not been confirmed by the communal consciousness. As a mystical organism, as the sacramental Body of Christ, the church cannot be adequately described in canonical terms or categories alone. It is impossible to state or discern the true limits of the church simply by canonical signs or marks. Very often the canonical boundary determines also the charismatic boundary; what is bound on earth is bound by an indissoluble knot in heaven. But not always. Still more often, not immediately. In her sacramental, mysterious being the church surpasses canonical measurements. For that reason a canonical cleavage does not immediately signify mystical impoverishment and desolation. All that Cyprian said about the unity of the church and the sacraments can be and must be accepted. But it is not necessary with him to draw the final boundary around the body of the church by canonical points alone.

This raises a general question and doubt. Are these canonical rules and acts subject to theological generalisation? Is it possible to impute to them theological or dogmatic motives and grounds? Or do they rather represent only pastoral discretion and forbearance? Must we not understand the canonical mode of action rather as a forbearing silence concerning gracelessness than as a recognition of the reality or validity of schismatic rites? Is it then quite prudent to cite or introduce canonical facts into a theological argument?

This objection is connected with the theory of what is called "economy."¹ In general ecclesiastical usage *οικονομία* is a term of very many meanings. In its broadest sense "economy" embraces and signifies the whole work of salvation (cf. Coloss. i, 25; Ephes. i, 10; 3, 2, 9). The Vulgate usually translates it by *dispensatio*.² In canonical language "economy" has not become a technical term. It is rather a descriptive word, a kind of general characteristic; *οικονομία* is opposed to *ἀκρίβεια* as a kind of relaxation of church discipline, an exemption or exception from the "strict rule" (*ius strictum*) or from the general rule. The governing motive of "economy" is precisely "philanthropy," pastoral discretion, a pedagogical calculation — the deduction is always from working utility. "Economy" is a pedagogical rather than a canonical principle; it is the pastoral corrective of the canonical consciousness. "Economy" can be and should be employed by each individual pastor in his parish, still more by a bishop or council of bishops. For "economy" is pastorship and pastorship is "economy." In this is the whole strength and vitality of the

¹ The doctrine of ecclesiastical "economy" is particularly developed in Greek theology. I mention only: Χρ. Ἀνδρουτσος, *Δογματικὴ τῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Ἀνατολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας*, ἐν ἈΘ. 1907, σελ. 306 κτλ.; K. I. Δυοβουνιότης, *τὰ Μυστήρια τῆς Ἀνατολικῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας*, ἐν ἈΘ. 1913, σελ. 162 κτλ.; *eiusdem*, *The Principle of Economy*, *Ch. Quart. R.*, No. 231, April 1933; cf. F. Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought*, pp. 292 ff.; I. Spacil, S.J., *Doctrina Theologiae Orientis separati de sacramento baptismi*, *Orientalia Christ.* VI, 4, Rome 1926. In Russian theology few have held such a point of view. Cf. the correspondence of the Metropolitan Antony with R. Gardiner in the *Journal "Faith and Reason,"* 1915, 4, 17; 1916, 8-9, 12; and particularly the article of A. Ilarion, *The Unity of the Church and the World Conference of Christianity*, *Theological Messenger*, Jan. 1917; also J. A. Douglas, *The Relations of the Anglican Church with the Eastern Orthodox*, London 1921, op. 51ff.; *The Orthodox Principle of Economy and its Exercise*, *Christian East*, XIII, 3-7, 1932; and *Economic Intercommunion in the Report of the Committee to consider the findings of the Lausanne Conference*, 1930.

² Cf. A. d'Alès, *Le mot οἰκονομία dans la langue théologique de St. Irénée*, *Revue des études grecques*, XXXII, 1919, p. 1-9.

"economical" principle—and also its limitation. Not every question can be put and answered in the form of "economy."

One must ask, therefore, whether it is possible to put the question concerning sectarians and heretics as a question only of "economy." Certainly, in so far as it is a question of winning lost souls for Catholic truth, of the way to bring them "to the reason of truth," every course of action *must* be "economical," that is, pastoral, compassionate, loving. The pastor must leave the ninety and nine and seek the lost sheep. But for that reason the greater is the need for complete sincerity and directness. Not only is this unequivocal accuracy, strictness and clarity, in fact, ἀκρίβεια, required in the sphere of dogma; how otherwise can unity of mind be obtained? Accuracy and clarity are before all things necessary in mystical diagnosis, and, precisely for this reason, the question of the rites of sectarians and heretics must be put and decided in the form of the strictest ἀκρίβεια. For there is here not so much a *quaestio iuris* as a *quaestio facti*, further, the question of mystical fact, of sacramental reality. It is not a matter of "recognition" so much as of diagnosis; it is necessary to *identify* and to *discern*.

Least of all is "economy" in this question compatible with the radical standpoint of St. Cyprian. If beyond the canonical limits of the church the wilderness without grace begins immediately, if in general schismatics have not been baptised and still abide in the darkness before baptism, perfect clarity, strictness and insistence are still more indispensable in the acts and judgements of the church. Here no "forbearance" is appropriate or even possible; no concessions are permissible. Is it in fact conceivable that the church should receive these or those sectarians or heretics into her own body *not by way of baptism simply in order thereby* to make their decisive step easy? At all events this would be a very rash and dangerous complaisance. Rather, it would be a connivance with human weakness, self-love and lack of faith, a connivance all the more dangerous in that it creates every appearance of

recognition by the church that schismatic sacraments and rites are valid, and that, not only in the reception of schismatics or people from outside, but in the consciousness of the majority in the church and even of the rulers of the church. Moreover, this mode of action is applied because it creates this appearance. If in fact the church were fully convinced that in the sects and heresies baptism is *not* accomplished, to what end would she reunite schismatics without baptism? Surely not in order simply to save them by this step from false shame in the open confession that they have not been baptised. Can such a motive be considered honourable, convincing and of good repute? Can it benefit the newcomers to reunite them through ambiguity and suppression? To the just doubt whether it would be impossible by analogy to unite to the church *without baptism* Jews and Moslems "by economy," the Metropolitan Antony replied with complete candour: "Ah, but all such neophytes and even those baptised in the name of Montanus and Priscilla themselves would not claim to enter the church without immersion and the utterance of the words, 'In the name of the Father,' etc. Such a claim could only be advanced through a confused understanding of the church's grace by those sectarians and schismatics whose baptism, worship and hierarchical system differ in little externally from those of the church. It would be very insulting to them on their turning to the church to have to sit on the same seat with heathens and Jews. For that reason the church, indulging their weakness, has not performed over them the external act of baptism but has given them this grace in the second sacrament" (*Faith and Reason*, 1916, 8-9, pp. 887-8). I transcribe this utterance in sorrowful perplexity. From the Metropolitan Antony's argument common sense would draw precisely the opposite conclusion. In order to lead weak and unreasoning "neophytes" to the "clear understanding of the church's grace" which they lack, it would be all the more necessary and appropriate to *perform over them the external act of baptism*, instead of giving them and many others by a feigned accommodation to their "susceptibilities" not only an

excuse but a ground to continue deceiving themselves with the equivocal fact that their "baptism, worship and hierarchical system *differ in little externally from those of the church.*" One may ask who gave the church this right not merely to change, but simply to abolish the *external act of baptism*, performing it in such cases only mentally, by implication or intention—at the celebration of the "second sacrament"—over the unbaptised. Admittedly, in special and exceptional cases the "external act," the "form," may be indeed abolished; such is the martyr's baptism in blood or even the so-called *baptisma flaminis*. But that is admissible only *in casu necessitatis*. Moreover, there can hardly be any analogy here with the *systematic* connivance in another's sensitiveness and self-deception. If "economy" is pastoral discretion conducive to the advantage and salvation of human souls, then in such a case one could only speak of "economy inside-out." It would be a deliberate retrogression into equivocation and obscurity, and for the sake of external success, since the internal enchurchment of "neophytes" cannot occur with such a concealment. It is scarcely possible to impute to the church such a perverse and crafty intention. And, in any case, the practical result of this "economy" must be considered utterly unexpected. In the church herself, the conviction has arisen among the majority that sacraments are performed even among schismatics, that even in the sects there is a valid, although forbidden, hierarchy. The true intention of the church in her acts and rules appears to be too difficult to discern and discriminate. From this side the "economical" explanation of these rules cannot be regarded as plausible.

The "economical" explanation raises even greater difficulties from the side of its general theological premisses. One can scarcely ascribe to the church the power and the right, as it were, to convert the has-not-been into the has-been, to change the meaningless into the valid, as Professor Diovuniotis expresses it (*Ch. Qu. R.* No. 231, p. 97), "in the order of economy." This would give a particular sharpness to the question whether it is possible to receive schismatic clergy

"in their existing orders." In the Russian Church adherents from Roman Catholicism or from the Nestorians, etc., are received into communion "through recantation of heresy," that is, in the sacrament of penitence. Clerks are given absolution by a bishop and thereby is removed the inhibition lying on a schismatic cleric. One asks whether it is conceivable that in this delivery and absolution from sin there is also accomplished and acquired silently—and even secretly—baptism, confirmation, ordination as deacon or priest, sometimes consecration, and that *without any "form"* or clear and distinctive "external act," which might enable us to notice and consider precisely what sacraments are being performed. Here is a double equivocation, from the standpoint of motive and from the standpoint of the fact itself. Can one, in short, celebrate a sacrament by virtue of "intention" alone, without visible act? Of course not. Not because to the "form" belongs some self-sufficient or "magic" action, but precisely because in the celebration of a sacrament the "external act" and the pouring-forth of grace are in substance *indivisible and inseparable*. Certainly, the church is the store of grace and to her is given power to preserve and teach these gifts of grace. The church is *ὁ ταμιεύχος τῆς χάριτος*, as the Greek theologians say. But the power of the church does not extend to the very foundations of Christian existence. It is impossible to think that the church has the right "in the order of economy" to admit to the priestly function *without ordination* the professed clergy of schismatic confessions, even of those that have not preserved the "apostolic succession," remedying not only defects but just complete gracelessness in the order only of power, intention and recognition, and that unspoken. In such an interpretation the church's whole sacramental system in general appears too soft and elastic. Khomyakov also was not sufficiently careful, when in defending the new Greek practice of receiving reunited Latins through baptism he wrote to Palmer that "all sacraments are completed only in the bosom of the true church and it matters not whether they be completed in one form or another. Reconciliation (with the

church) renovates the sacraments or completes them, giving a full and orthodox meaning to the rite that was before either insufficient or heterodox, and the repetition of the preceding sacraments is virtually contained in the rite or fact of reconciliation. Therefore, the visible repetition of Baptism or Confirmation, though unnecessary, cannot be considered as erroneous, and establishes only a ritual difference without any difference of opinion" (Russia and the English Church, ch. vi, p. 62). Here the thought divides. The "repetition" of a sacrament is not only superfluous but impermissible. If there was not sacrament but there was previously performed an imperfect, heretical rite, then the sacrament must be *accomplished for the first time*, and, moreover, with complete sincerity and obviousness. In any case the Catholic sacraments are not only rites and it is not possible to treat of the "external" aspect of sacramental celebration with such disciplinary relativism. The "economical" interpretation of the canons might be convincing and probable only in the presence of direct and perfectly clear proofs, whereas it is customarily supported by indirect data and most of all by indirect intentions and conclusions. The "economical" interpretation is not the teaching of the church. It is only a private "theological opinion," very late and very controversial, having arisen in a period of theological confusion and decadence in a hasty endeavour to dissociate oneself as sharply as possible from Roman theology.

Roman theology admits and acknowledges that there remains in sects a valid hierarchy and even in a certain sense is preserved the "apostolic succession," so that under certain conditions sacraments may be accomplished and actually are accomplished among schismatics and even among heretics. The basic premisses of this sacramental theology have already been established with sufficient definition by St. Augustine and the Orthodox theologian has every reason to take into account the theology of Augustine in his doctrinal synthesis. The first thing in Augustine to attract attention is his organic relation of the question about the validity of sacraments to the general

doctrine concerning the church. The actuality of the sacraments celebrated by schismatics signifies for Augustine the continuance of their links with the church. He directly affirms that in the sacraments of sectarians *the church is active*; some she engenders *of herself*, others she *engenders outside*, of her maid-servant, and schismatic baptism is valid for this very reason, that it is performed by the church (see *S. August. de bapt.* I, 15, 23). What is valid in the sects is that which is in them *from* the church, which in their hands remains as the portion and the sacred core of the church, through which they are *with* the church. *In quibusdam rebus nobiscum sunt.* The unity of the church is based on a twofold bond—the “unity of the Spirit” and the “union of peace” (*cf.* Ephes. iv, 3). In sects and divisions the “union of peace” is broken and torn apart, but in the sacraments the “unity of the Spirit” is not terminated. This is the unique paradox of sectarian existence; the sect remains united with the church in the grace of the sacraments and this becomes a condemnation once love and communal mutuality have withered. With this is connected St. Augustine’s second basic distinction, the distinction between the “validity” or “actuality,” the reality, of the sacraments and their “efficacy.” The sacraments of schismatics are *valid*, that is, they genuinely *are* sacraments. But they are *not efficacious* (*non-efficacia*) by virtue of the sect itself, of division. For in sects and divisions love withers and without love salvation is impossible. In salvation there are two sides: the objective action of grace and the subjective effort or fidelity. The Holy and sanctifying Spirit breathes yet in the sects, but in the stubbornness and powerlessness of schism healing is not accomplished. It is untrue to say that in schismatic rites nothing generally is accomplished, for, if they must be considered only empty acts and words, deprived of grace, by the same token not only are they empty but are converted into a profanation, a sinister counterfeit. If the rites of schismatics are not sacraments, they are a blasphemous caricature. In that case neither “economical” suppression of facts nor “economical” glossing of sin is possible. The

sacramental rite cannot be only a rite, empty but innocent. The sacrament is accomplished in reality. But it is impossible to say also that in the sects the sacraments *are of avail*. The sacraments are not "magic" acts; indeed the Eucharist may also be taken "unto judgement and condemnation." But this does not refute the reality or "validity" of the Eucharist itself. The same may be said of baptism; baptismal grace must be renewed in unceasing effort and service, otherwise it becomes "inefficacious." From this point of view St. Gregory of Nyssa attacked with great energy the practice of postponing baptism to the hour of death or at least to advanced years, in order to avoid pollution of the baptismal robes. He transfers the emphasis. Baptism is not only the end of sinful existence but rather the beginning of everything. Baptismal grace is not only remission of sins but a gift or surety of effort. The name is entered in the army list but the honour of the soldier is in his service, not in his calling alone. What does baptism mean without spiritual deeds? Augustine wishes to say the same thing in his distinction between "character" and "grace." In any case there rests on everyone baptised a "sign" or "seal," even if he falls away and departs, and each will be tried concerning this "sign" or surety in the Day of Judgement. The baptised are distinguished from the unbaptised, even when baptismal grace has not flowered in their works and deeds, even when they have corrupted and wasted their whole life. That is the ineffaceable consequence of the Divine touch. This clear distinction between the two inseparable factors of sacramental existence, the Divine grace and human love, are characteristic of the whole sacramental theology of St. Augustine. But the sacrament is accomplished by grace and not by love. Yet man is saved in freedom and not in compulsion, and for that reason grace somehow does not burn with a life-giving flame outside communality and love.

One thing remains obscure. How does the activity of the Spirit continue beyond the canonical border of the church? What is the validity of sacraments without communion, of stolen sacraments, sacraments in the hands of usurpers? Recent

Roman theology answers that question by the doctrine of the validity of sacraments *ex opere operato*, as distinct from validity *ex opere operantis* (*sc. ministri*). In St. Augustine this distinction does not exist. But he understood the validity of the sacraments outside canonical unity in the same sense. In fact *opus operatum* signifies pre-eminently the independence of the sacrament from the personal action of the minister. The church performs the sacrament and in her Christ the high priest. The sacraments are performed by the prayer and activity of the church, *ex opere orantis et operantis ecclesiae*. In *such* a sense must the doctrine of validity *ex opere operato* be accepted. For Augustine it was not so important that the sacraments of schismatics are "unlawful" or "illicit" (*illicita*); much more important is the fact that the schism is a dissipation of love. But the love of God overlaps and surmounts the failure of love in man. In the sects themselves and even among heretics the church continues to perform her saving and sanctifying work. It may not follow, perhaps, that we should say, the schismatics are *still in the church*; at all events this would not be very precise and sounds equivocal. It would be truer to say, the church continues to work in the schisms in expectation of the mysterious hour when the stubborn heart will be melted in the warmth of "preparatory grace," when will burst into flame and burn the will and thirst for communality and unity. The "validity" of the sacraments among schismatics is the mysterious guarantee of their return to Catholic plenitude and unity.

The sacramental theology of St. Augustine was not received by the Eastern Church in antiquity, it also was not received by Byzantine theology, but not because they saw in it or suspected something alien or superfluous; Augustine was in general not very well known in the East. In modern times the doctrine of the sacraments has been not infrequently expounded in the Orthodox East and in Russia on a Roman model and there has not yet been a creative appropriation of Augustine's conception. Contemporary Orthodox theology must express and explain the traditional canonical practice of

the church in relation to heretics and schismatics on the basis of those general premisses which have been established by Augustine.

It is necessary to hold firmly in mind that in asserting the "validity" of the sacraments and of the hierarchy itself in the sects, St. Augustine in no way relaxed or removed the boundary dividing *sect* and *communality*. This is not so much a canonical as a spiritual boundary, *communal love in the church or separatism and alienation in the schisms*. This for Augustine was the boundary of salvation, since, indeed, grace operates but outside communality does not save. (It is appropriate to note that here too Augustine closely follows Cyprian who asserted that except in the church martyrdom itself for Christ does not avail.) For this reason despite all the "reality" and "validity" of the schismatic hierarchy it is impossible to speak in a strict sense of the retention of the "apostolic succession" beyond the limits of canonical communality. This question has been investigated with exhaustive fullness and great insight in the remarkable article of the late C. G. Turner, *The Apostolic Succession in Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, edited by H. B. Swete (1918). And from this it indubitably follows that the so-called "branch-church" theory cannot be accepted. This theory depicts the cleavage of the Christian world too complacently and comfortably. The onlooker perhaps will not immediately discern the "schismatic" branches from the "Catholic" trunk. In its substance, however, "schism" is not *only a branch*. It is also the *will for schism*. It is the mysterious and even enigmatic sphere beyond the canonical limits of the church, where the sacraments still are celebrated, where hearts as often flame and burn in faith, in love, in works. It is necessary to admit this, but it is also necessary to remember that *the limit is real*, that *there is no union*. Khomyakov, it seems, was speaking of this when he said: "inasmuch as the earthly and visible church

is not the fullness and completeness of the whole church which the Lord has appointed to appear at the final judgement of all creation, she acts and knows only within her own limits; and (according to the words of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, I Cor. v, 12) does not judge the rest of mankind, and only looks upon those as excluded, that is to say, not belonging to her, who have excluded themselves. The rest of mankind, whether alien from the church, or united to her by ties which God has not willed to reveal to her, she leaves to the judgement of the great day" (*Russia and the English Church*, ch. xxiii, p. 194). In the same sense the Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow decided to speak of churches "not purely true." "Mark you, I do not presume to call false any church, believing *that Jesus is the Christ*. The Christian Church can only be *either purely true*, confessing the true and saving Divine teaching without the false admixtures and pernicious opinions of men, *or not purely true*, mixing with the true and saving teaching of faith in Christ the false and pernicious opinions of men" (*Conversation between the seeker and the believer concerning the orthodoxy of the Eastern Greco-Russian Church*, Moscow, 1833, pp. 27-29). "You expect now that I should give judgement concerning the other half of present Christianity," the Metropolitan Philaret said in the concluding conversation, "but I just simply look upon them; in part I see how the head and Lord of the church heals the many deep wounds of the old serpent in all the parts and limbs of this body, applying now gentle, now strong, remedies, even fire and iron, in order to soften hardness, to draw out poison, to clean the wounds, to separate out malignant growths, to restore spirit and life in the half-dead and numbed structures. In such wise I attest my faith that in the end the power of God patently will triumph over human weakness, good over evil, unity over division, life over death" (p. 135). This is a beginning only, a general characteristic; not everything in it is clearly and fully said. But the question is truly put. There

are many bonds still not broken, whereby the schisms are held together in a certain unity. Our whole attention and our whole will must be gathered together and directed to removing the stubbornness of dissension. "We seek not conquest," says St. Gregory Nazianzen, "but the return of brethren, the separation from whom is tearing us."¹

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¹ See also the recently published collection of essays, *Christian Reunion. The Oecumenical Problem in the Orthodox Consciousness*. Paris, 1933, and particularly the essay by Rev. Fr. Sergius Bulgakov, *At Jacob's Well, Concerning the Real Unity of the Divided Church in Faith, Prayer and Sacraments*. See also my article, *The Problems of Christian Reunion*, in the journal *Put*, No. 37, Feb. 1933. (Both in Russian.)

ART. VII.—SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE.

E. W. BARNES, Sc.D., D.D., LL.D., F.R.S., Bishop of Birmingham: *Scientific Theory and Religion*. The World Described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation. The Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen, 1927-1929. (Cambridge University Press). 1933. Price, 25s.

THE fact that our inherited beliefs about the character of the Universe have been profoundly modified by the growth of the sciences in the last three centuries has by this time become a commonplace. The physics, the chemistry, the biology, the anthropology, the psychology, of our ancestors even of the quite recent past all seem to us to-day to be incredibly naive. Discovery has succeeded discovery, and this at such a pace that at any rate in the more recent stages of scientific development hardly has a generation had time to comprehend a theory before it has been antiquated. Moreover if this development be considered as a whole, there has been no retrogression. The progress of science has been a series of advances towards an ever fuller knowledge of its subject matter; and if one theory has had to give way to another, there has not taken place, except in rare instances, a reversion to beliefs which had been discarded, but a recognition of a truth which would not have been discovered but for the theory which had just been superseded.

If serious interest in these new discoveries were confined to the experts in science, and the rest of us were expected merely to acquiesce in a set of data which had no further claim upon our attention, the world of theology might be content to go on substantially unaffected by these changes. Such indifference, however, has ceased to be possible. The new discoveries have penetrated deeply into popular imagination and popular thought, and their immediate bearing upon the traditional doctrines of religion has been almost universally recognised. It has further become widely perceived that

certain dogmas which were for ages thought unquestionable have been thrown into the melting pot, and in many cases there has resulted in consequence an abandonment of religious belief altogether.

But probably still more significant in its bearings upon religion than the growth of scientific knowledge has been the growth of the scientific mentality. If the classics still maintain their place unchallenged in many of the Public Schools, this is certainly not the case in those schools in which the masses of the population are educated. Perhaps the experience of the present writer is sufficiently recent and representative of what takes place outside the Public Schools to be worth quoting as an illustration. At the school at which he was educated, there were between 500 and 600 boys altogether, and almost automatically we were sent in year by year for the Cambridge Local Examinations. The *acme* of "general education" was to pass the Cambridge Senior and normally a candidate of average intelligence would acquit himself satisfactorily in this examination at the age of 14 or 15. From that time onwards he would almost invariably specialize in either science or mathematics—in the great majority of cases in the former. The classics—and in fact all the humanistic subjects—would be dropped. If he happened to need either "Smalls" or "Littlego"—the date in question was just before these examinations ceased to be compulsory—he would cram up Greek in his spare time in his last year. This task was consistently regarded as a great nuisance; but there was a technique of instruction whereby the average number of two or three candidates who needed this tiresome subject could be brought up to this standard in the course of twelve months. Otherwise the study of Greek was unheard of in the School.

Those who have been educated along other lines will probably say "How shocking!" We certainly did not think of the system in this way. The sciences interested us and fascinated us, and probably few of those who underwent this training felt then—or have felt subsequently—that their time would have been more profitably employed on a study of the classics. The effect, however, of such a system of instruction

—and this is the important point—is that while it leads the natural sciences to acquire an enormous prestige, it encourages a corresponding attitude of depreciation towards the study of all “humane learning.” The past is of little account compared with the present. The student recognises that the school textbooks of science which were in use twenty years earlier are no longer reliable for his own generation, but have become antiquated. History presents us only with a set of outgrown beliefs. Whatever convictions the scholar might bring to the school from outside, the whole trend of such education is to create the impression that it is only through the study of the natural sciences that we can learn about the structure and the character of the Universe.

In some such *milieu* as this a vast proportion of our young people are educated to-day. The result has been the creation of an entirely new type of mentality. This mentality has very little in common with that of the theologian who has been nurtured within the historic English theological tradition. The extent of this divergence will be recognised when the range of subjects taught in the higher forms of many secondary schools is compared with those comprised in the syllabus of such an examination as the General Ordination Examination. The theological student whose interests were limited by the field of this examination would have practically no common ground with the studies familiar to large numbers of his fellow-countrymen. And it may be suspected that if theological studies to-day fail to secure the attention of the wider world, this is not because they fail to reach a relatively high standard; for they do. The reason is to be sought elsewhere. It is due primarily to the fact that our current theological discussions deal with subjects which have little in common with the realms of knowledge understood by those who have passed through our modern educational mill.

II.

In view of this situation, the publication of such a work as Dr. Barnes’ Gifford Lectures must be heartily welcomed. Addressed to “educated men and women, who have no tech-

nical knowledge of science or philosophy" (p. 6), these lectures seek to give an account of "the World described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation" (sub-title). The twenty lectures which constitute the stately volume of nearly 700 large pages treat of a vast range of subjects. After a short introductory lecture and a lecture on the more elementary properties of matter, Lectures 3 and 4 follow with an account of the non-Euclidean Geometries. Lectures 5 and 6 deal respectively with the Special and General Theories of Relativity. Lecture 7 is on the Constitution of Matter; 8 on Entropy and Radiation; 9 on the Quantum Theory and X-Rays. The next two lectures deal with Astronomy. Lecture 12 examines the bearing of Geological research on the origins of life on this planet. Lectures 13 to 15 are on the subject of Evolution—in plants, animals, and man respectively. Lecture 16 is on Primitive Man. Here the purely scientific lectures end. Lecture 17—on "Scientific Theory and the 'Real' World"—treats of questions of epistemology. The last three lectures deal specifically with religious topics—the Belief in the Existence of God (18), Religious Experience (19), and Immortality (20).

The mere enumeration of the contents of these lectures will indicate the breadth of their scope. In order to discover it fully the reader need only glance through the list of sections in the Table of Contents. Here he will find an elaborate analysis of the whole work, which is an admirable example of scientific method. That the Bishop of Birmingham had gifts of exposition such as this treatise reveals, most of his readers will have had no grounds for anticipating. For this volume is practically his Lordship's maiden tribute to the realm of books. (It is hardly possible to regard his volume *Should such a Faith Offend?* as a serious work, being mainly a collection of papers of a controversial character which are happily now almost forgotten.) We are aware of no other single work which covers with competence such a vast range of the world of science on anything like this scale.

Nevertheless, the majority of those to whom these lectures are addressed must be prepared to find them—in parts, at any

rate—heavy reading. While the Bishop makes every attempt at lucidity, he never “writes down” to his readers. Where he finds a subject interesting, he pursues its treatment into realms which are far beyond those accessible to “educated men and women who have no technical knowledge.” To understand the greater part of the lecture on Riemann’s theory of space, a knowledge of mathematics at least equal to that required by a final Honours University Student in Mathematics is necessary. Probably in this and many other cases an ingression into the realms of higher mathematics was unavoidable; for the Riemannian theory of space cannot be adequately treated apart from the use of tensors, and as Bertrand Russell once remarked characteristically “those philosophers who have not thought it worth while to learn the calculus cannot hope to understand [the method of tensors]” (p. 64). In other cases Dr. Barnes, had he chosen, could have reduced the amount of technical mathematics in his lectures, e.g. in his treatment of diffraction by a space lattice in §§ 22of. We are glad, however, that he has not thought fit to do so. The reader soon finds when he is getting out of his depth. And if occasionally most of us have to turn over two or three pages of formulæ and “take them as read,” we are none the worse for the intellectual humiliation involved. There is none of the obscurity which is so often the veil—and sometimes even in Gifford Lectures—for poverty of thought or haziness of conception. The Bishop of Birmingham is evidently trying to make difficult matters as clear as possible, and he has eminently succeeded as far as his subject matter would allow him.

It is, we believe, Lectures 2-15, wherein the author presents us with such an admirable survey of the present state of scientific investigation that the great value of the book lies. In actual extent they cover over four-fifths of the whole. Nevertheless, the presentation of an epitome of modern science, however able and however lucid, can hardly be regarded as the end either of a Gifford Lecturer or an Anglican prelate. And Dr. Barnes has made it quite clear that the main purpose of his lectures is not merely scientific instruction. He conceives them as a vehicle for the expression of a philosophy of

life, and of the relationship of that philosophy of life to current scientific theory. Incidental remarks—and, more impressive still, a consistently elevated tone—even in those lectures dealing professedly merely with modern science, reveal at every turn the religious design of the lecturer. It is within the concluding four lectures that these convictions find developed expression.

Unfortunately these four lectures are much the least satisfactory part of the work. They are in fact a singular illustration of the epigram—whatever be its truth in general—that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct. There are many places where, not Dr. Barnes' beliefs, but his reasons for them, seem open to serious criticism; and in all of these lectures we have frequently felt a general looseness in the texture of their arguments.

This comes out particularly in Lecture 17. Here Dr. Barnes tells us that the epistemological theory which he holds is "Moderate Realism." This is an eminently sane position; and like other of Dr. Barnes' theories—*Homerus enim aliquando dormitat*—has affinities with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. The vast scientific erudition of St. Albertus Magnus, combined with the influence of Aristotle, led St. Thomas Aquinas to hold that all knowledge must set out from empirical reality. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*. As is well known, it was primarily on this ground that St. Thomas was led to reject the Ontological Argument for God's existence. Incidentally, the remark on p. 458 that "the process of arguing *in vacuo* . . . was the typical vice of medieval scholasticism" is quite untrue of the Golden Age of medieval philosophy. Their *data* may not have been our *data*; yet from what they believed to be *data* all the great Aristotelians set out. But to return to Dr. Barnes' "Moderate Realism." The exposition of it contains so many inconsistencies that we wonder whether Dr. Barnes was at all clear in his own mind what position he wished to set forth when he embarked upon this chapter. After all, James Ward, Hastings Rashdall, and the Dean of St. Paul's have not all said quite the same thing. Surely a Realism which holds that the whole created Universe exists only in the Mind of God (p. 563) must

be a very moderate realism indeed. Yet in the following paragraph, this doctrine is qualified by the assertion: "I do not think that we can rightly say that God is the only reality"; and Dr. Barnes then adds that he assumes "that the world has a certain measure of independence given to it by God." It is difficult to know where to begin criticism in the face of such a series of apparently mutually irreconcilable assertions.

III.

There is a similar disparity between Dr. Barnes' beliefs and Dr. Barnes' exposition of them when he comes to examine the nature of Scientific Theory. Here again his whole underlying philosophy—and indeed the only justification for a Gifford Lecturer choosing such a subject as Dr. Barnes has chosen—is that Natural Science is one of the "Pathways to Reality." This philosophy is clearly expressed in the opening lecture. "No adequate theology," we are told, "can be limited to human spiritual experience. Man is the outcome of Nature's processes. No one of his faculties is entirely independent of his ancestry and environment. Without exaggeration we can assert that man's spiritual experience is as unreal as a dream, unless the God to whom it leads him is also the God whose nature is shewn in the Universe as a whole. The right starting point for theology, as Inge has well said, 'is to examine the conception of the world as known to science'" (p. 5). Unless, indeed, the study of the world of Nature tells us something about the structure of Ultimate Reality, those lectures which form the bulk of the course are useless except as an intellectual pastime.

Nevertheless, when Dr. Barnes proceeds to examine the structure of scientific theory, he makes some assertions which cut right across this view of the character of science. We venture to suspect that he has been misled by the influence of such theoreticians of science, as Mach, Karl Pearson, and those French writers whose history was closely connected with that of the Modernist Movement. Thus a whole section—significantly entitled "Phenomenalism" (§ 441)—is devoted to

showing that scientific theory tells us nothing about the nature of Reality. "No scientific theory will enable us to say, for example . . . that Bohr's or some alternative theory of the atom is 'true'" (p. 575). Again, it is asserted that the fundamental laws of physics, e.g. the Law of Gravitation, are only "elaborately disguised identities."¹ Or again, we are warned not to forget "that the only foundations for a belief in God worth preserving must be discovered, not in inanimate nature, but in that moral order, emergent through animate nature, from which man's spiritual longings have been derived" (p. 180).

Dr. Barnes, of course, does not really believe such assertions as these. His truer view is that which finds expression on page 589 where he speaks of the Laws of Nature as God's Laws. He has far too great a confidence in the import of science to suppose that it seeks merely to deduce identities. We believe, moreover, we can recall utterances from the episcopal see of Birmingham which implied that science could take us a very long way indeed into the heart of reality—into regions whither perhaps most of us would hesitate to pursue it. We cannot but think that the value, as well as the consistency, of the philosophical portion of these lectures would have been considerably enhanced had Dr. Barnes presented us with an extended discussion on the character of scientific theory, such as is to be found in writers like Mach, Duhem, Rey, and Meyerson.

IV.

In view of Dr. Barnes' general approach to the problem of Reality, the reader will naturally turn with great interest to the section in which he treats of the Cosmological Argument. This Argument has for long been the *Gottesbeweis* which has commended itself preeminently to the natural scientist. In its long history, it has assumed several different forms, much the

¹ This particular view is, of course, widely held by contemporary physicists. But the very fact that it implies that cosmic space is Riemannian proves the Law of Gravitation to be more than an identity. No mere identity would enable us to differentiate between Riemannian and Euclidean space.

most influential being that from the Principle of Causation; in this form it was defended, after careful analysis, by St. Thomas Aquinas. Dr. Barnes finds this form of it open to two serious objections. The first objection is that the idea of a First Cause is incompatible with the principle from which the argument is deduced, namely the *invariable* sequence of cause and effect. The second objection—which his Lordship formulates in the words of William James—is that “causation is indeed too obscure a principle to bear the weight of the whole structure of theology.”

But while Dr. Barnes rejects the traditional form of the Cosmological Argument, he believes that recent physical theory allows of its reformulation in a way which is not open to these objections. This modern science achieves by means of speculations based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics. These speculations—we must quote Dr. Barnes’ own words—“seem to re-establish the cosmological argument with the utmost directness and simplicity. The organization of the energy of the cosmos is always diminishing. Such degeneration of energy is the source of all that makes our physical existence not merely pleasant but possible. As a result of it there will finally be in the cosmos no organized energy capable of doing work. In the beginning there must have been a maximum organization of energy; and if the cosmos is finite, that beginning must itself have been remote from us by a measurable interval of time. In fact, there was a time when God wound up the clock and a time will come when it will stop if he does not wind it up again. Against this thermodynamical argument we can bring no valid objection” (pp. 595f.). And then Dr. Barnes comments: “But it is characteristic of the temper of our era that few theologians of eminence are willing to sponsor it as it stands” (p. 596).

That the Bishop of Birmingham should be impressed by an argument deduced from the facts of comparatively recent physical discovery is natural. That it was unknown to the Angelic Doctor may perhaps in Dr. Barnes’ estimation be a further point in its favour. We believe, however, that it is

quite untrue to say that the criticisms to which the Cosmological Argument in its traditional form was open are obviated in this new account of it. In fact, there are two exactly corresponding objections to the two which Dr. Barnes urges against the Aristotelian form of the argument. First, the principle on which the new argument rests is that "the organization of the energy of the cosmos is *always* diminishing." But the argument assumes that from this "invariable" law—i.e., from the *unceasing* ("always"!) increase of Entropy—it is possible to regress to a time when the winding up began. There is exactly the same objection to passing from the time series to a point outside it as in the Aquinate form of the argument; and any "logical flaw" that can be found in the traditional form of the argument is an equally valid objection to that propounded by Dr. Barnes. And to the other objection the reply is still more obvious. If Causation is too obscure a principle for the purpose, far more so is the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

In point of fact, the Cosmological Argument has been formulated in several different ways. As Dr. R. L. Patterson in his excellent study of the philosophy of St. Thomas¹ has recently pointed out, all the Angelic Doctor's famous five proofs are different variations on the same theme. Dr. Barnes has added yet another variation on the same theme, and for this reason it may be welcomed. Perhaps none of the forms of the argument possess that absolute irrefutability which St. Thomas ascribed to it and which the Dogmatic Constitution *De Fide Catholica* of 1870 practically requires every Roman Catholic to accept. Nevertheless its different forms have enormous weight as converging probabilities; and that yet another convergent line of approach may be derived from recent scientific theory is a further strengthening of this historic argument *ex contingentia mundi*. There is no form of the argument, not even Dr. Barnes', to which "we can bring no valid objection" whatever. But in each of its forms it is impressive and of great subsidiary testimony.

¹ *The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas.*

V.

Consequently, while we are very much indebted to Dr. Barnes for his book—which (if an expression of personal experience be allowed) is by far the most interesting work we have read for a long time—and while we feel in general agreement with the philosophy which underlies his treatment of his subject, we must confess that we find the exposition of his philosophy (far more, be it noted, than the philosophy itself) in the concluding chapters in many places unsatisfactory. Catchwords notoriously play a great part in the physical sciences; they are a valuable device which enable a set of phenomena to be subsumed under such a title as the Compton Effect or the Greenhouse Effect. But such catchwords have their dangers, and particularly so when they are introduced into the realm of philosophy. And unless we are mistaken, they have played too large a part in Dr. Barnes' theorizings. Thus the words "Substance" and "Supernatural" are, for Dr. Barnes, expressive of concepts which have at all costs to be banned from philosophy. It is said that Leibniz's rejection of the Cartesian view of substance was largely determined by the fact that it could not be brought into harmony with either Transubstantiation or Consubstantiation, and we have a suspicion that Dr. Barnes' own attitude to the problem of substance is not uninfluenced by theological considerations, though perhaps by less eirenic motives than those of Leibniz. And, again, Dr. Barnes occasionally (rarely, it is true) takes refuge in jargon, from which it seems impossible to deduce any meaning at all. On page 565 we are told "God's omnipotence is not power to change the impossible into the possible." Even Barth might have some difficulty in surpassing such a sentence as this!

VI.

A study of these lectures reveals something of the contribution which the study of the natural sciences may be expected to make to the study of theology. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the possibility of assistance and

indebtedness is all on one side. On the contrary, we believe that the advance of science may derive considerable help from the side of theology. One of the most striking results of recent physical theory is that its exponents, willy nilly, have been drawn increasingly further into the realm of metaphysics. Problems such as those raised by the Quantum Theory and the Principle of Indeterminacy, and, in a less degree, by the Theory of Relativity, defy adequate discussion without ingression into the sphere of philosophy. Reality is a united whole, and its various constituent parts cannot be treated in isolation. Each sphere in its degree influences every other sphere. Until the physicists become possessed of an adequate metaphysic, they can hardly hope to make their theories consistent.

Now Christian theology claims to possess such a Metaphysic. Amidst the welter of modern forms of scepticism, the Christian Church contends almost alone for the essential rationality of the Universe. Her conviction that God is Reason, with its implication that the Universe shares in his rationality, are presuppositions of her doctrines of Creation and of the Incarnation. *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est.* And again, *Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.* And yet again, *De plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus.* Teaching such as this may be rejected. But once it is granted—and the Christian theologian can rightly challenge those who reject it to produce a more satisfying and a more adequate alternative—it will obviously have its contribution to make to the interpretation of the structure of physical reality. If the Laws of Nature are really God's laws, then they must be mutually consistent. Those categories which determine the realm of natural science must reflect God's Rationality. That the concept of time used by the "Relativist" should conflict with that used by the Biologist and indeed by the scientist in general, and that (in Sir William Bragg's impressive language) it should be necessary to use the Classical Theory of Physics on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and the Quantum Theory on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, are impasses

in which no physicist who believed in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation could rest content. Until science becomes again convinced of the essential rationality of the Universe, she may be willing to leave these contradictions unresolved. The increasing tendency among physicists to accept theories of science which deny that its discoveries have any bearing on truth and to maintain that its results are merely "descriptive" and not "explanatory" is an indication that many of them are heading for intellectual suicide. On the other hand, if theology can once again make her voice heard and convince the modern physicists that she possesses a metaphysic which if true deeply concerns them, she may yet succeed in exercising, as she has done more than once in the past, a corrective and constructive influence upon the course of Natural Science. Physical theory is clearly in need of reconstruction; and it is, of course, in the province of the scientist, and not of the theologian or the philosopher, that the task of reconstruction lies. But the physicist can learn from the Christian theologian and the Christian philosopher that wherever contradictions are to be found, he has an index that truth has not yet been attained.

F. L. CROSS.

REVIEWS

The Formation of the Gospel Tradition. By VINCENT TAYLOR, PH.D., D.D. (LOND.). (London: Macmillan). 1933. 7s. 6d. net.

It is greatly to be wished that someone would "humanize" the story of Gospel origins. We are so accustomed to the technical vocabulary of "sources," each designated by its symbol, M, or L or Q (or, worse still, S¹ S² and the like); of their "conflation" and "editing" and "compression": that we are apt to forget that we are really concerned with the most vivid and fascinating of intellectual activities—the telling of stories. What, for example, is the romance behind the material sometimes called L—the "special source" of St. Luke's Gospel? May it not really represent a shabby and travel-stained portfolio, into which the evangelist over a period of many years stuffed scraps of papyrus or of parchment on which he had hastily jotted down anecdotes and sayings told him by older members of the Christian community? Those who accept the "proto-Luke" hypothesis say facetly that the author "combined L and Q into a single document"—but how do we picture this happening? Was his copy of Q (assuming for the moment that Q was a single source) a finished product in roll-form? How long did it take him to "combine" the two—was it done in a single vacation snatched from his other employments, or by fits and starts over a long period? Did he do it by writing on a roll to a fixed programme, or on slips which could easily be re-arranged as new material accrued? When we go further back still the questions become even more intriguing. If St. Mark does indeed record the teaching which he heard from the lips of St. Peter, did he take it down *verbatim* as delivered, or was this also transmitted haphazard to odd sheets at odd moments without much effort to reproduce the *ipsissima verba* of the apostle?

It is probable that few of these questions will ever be answered. But they are not on that account otiose, and the processes of early Christian bookmaking, even on the technical side, deserve more investigation than they have received. We

know that both St. Matthew and St. Luke "edited" the second gospel with a good deal of freedom, though it probably came into their possession with some measure of attestation as a trustworthy document; if, then, much of their material were not so attested, they may very well have treated it in a far more cavalier fashion. Similarly, if their material equipment were such as to make both intentional rearrangement and accidental disarrangement easy, there is far more likelihood that the finished gospel would differ in important respects from its archetypes, than if the arrangement of the subject matter could not easily be affected once it had been committed to writing. The recently developed "Form-criticism" of the gospels has addressed itself not so much to these questions as to an allied but even more recondite problem—the history of the gospel story before it ever came to be written down at all; but it has quite properly "controlled" its investigations by what can actually be learnt of the use made by the first and third evangelists of their sources. If *they* were relatively untrammelled in their use of the second gospel, how much more untrammelled must the itinerant preacher have been in his use of material received by him only from another itinerant preacher like himself? The process may well have been akin to what takes place when a talented narrator retails a fairy story to children—there is the quick interchange of question and answer between speaker and audience; the momentary flashes of invention which beget new characters, situations, and repartees; the corroborative detail intended to give verisimilitude to the narrative, and so forth. All this must be allowed for in estimating the distance which separates the first written narratives from the original facts.

"Form-criticism" has attempted to provide the prolegomena to the problem we have outlined. By comparing the gospel records with contemporary Jewish and Hellenistic aretalogy and apophthegmata it has shown, with a good deal of success, that the separate sections into which the synoptic narrative can be divided conform to certain general principles of story-telling of which examples can be found to an unlimited extent elsewhere. In the valuable book before us, Dr. Taylor has surveyed the ground once more, and accepts this conclusion without hesitation. But what is to be inferred from it? The left wing of the "form critics"

suggests that even the earliest extant gospel narratives are proved by this analysis to have gone very far astray from the original facts; Dr. Taylor contests quite rightly that nothing of the kind is proved or indeed even made probable. The stories have assumed a conventional form, perhaps: but it was a convention in each case specially appropriate to the type of story it embodied. At best there may be an element of stereotyping, but nothing more than that need be inferred. In this respect his exposition leaves nothing to be desired, and provides a worthy sequel to Dr. Easton's well-known *Gospel before the Gospels*, which is mainly directed to considering the degree to which later doctrinal interests (as distinct from literary formalism) may have affected the Synoptic material.

Dr. Taylor's positive contribution to the question is on the whole less satisfying than his exposure of the *non-sequitur* of the form-critics' argument. He attempts at various points to prove that in general the narrative stands in very close relation to the original facts. Here, we think, he betrays the fact that he has not allowed sufficiently for the human equation; he has neglected the nursery tale analogy. He can treat the vividness of a narrative, or its amount of detail (pp. 122, 155), as evidence that it "stands near the records of eye-witnesses"—a criterion which would make Falstaff's "seven men in buckram" the true account of his assailants at Gadshill, and (as anyone who censored letters from the front during the war will remember) would set the stamp of authenticity upon many stories of grim encounter which emanated only from the imagination of men in billets many miles behind the firing line. Nor, we think, does he reckon with the extraordinarily rapid fashion in which stories seem almost to invent and propagate themselves, collecting their own eye-witnesses as they go along. Were it possible, a scientific enquiry into the genesis and life history of the legend of the Russian battalions which passed through England at the beginning of the war would throw a flood of light on to Dr. Taylor's problem. With such an example before our eyes, we can see that, given at most twenty-four hours' start, any story or saying which has the wind of popular interest behind it can launch out upon a career unlimited in its possibilities of elaboration and distortion; and that even so slightly handi-

capped, the controlling hand of truth will find it hard to overtake the legend.

Dr. Taylor, however, maintains as a scientific principle that the further a story gets in time from the "records of eye-witnesses" the shorter it becomes—"the tendency of such transmission is definitely in the direction of abbreviation." The longer a miracle story, for example, is, the nearer it is to the record of eye-witnesses, whilst "the shorter and more conventional stories have passed through many hands before they were committed to writing" (pp. 124, 150). By instituting a series of experiments along the lines of the old game of "Russian scandal"—i.e., by observing the morphological development of a story during three stages of transmission—Dr. Taylor finds himself able to speak of this "remarkable tendency" as a "conclusion." In all deference it may be suggested that experiments conducted under such laboratory conditions, with all the successive narrators alive to the problem involved, are of so artificial a character that the conclusions they provide cannot be valued very highly. The all-important factor which dominated the transmission of the original synoptic stories—the need for capturing and retaining the interest of audiences partly critical, partly hostile, partly lukewarm and partly enthusiastic to the point of credulity—is lacking. As against such experiments we must set the fact which every nursery talemonger knows—that story-telling in its natural environment is an affair of constant elaboration and accretion, and that the oftener a story is told the longer and more detailed it grows. Abbreviation only comes in when interest begins to flag.

The great merit of Dr. Taylor's book, apart from the fact that it gives a lucid and readable account of recent Continental work on gospel-criticism, is to draw attention to the extraordinary sobriety and restraint of the early Christian traditions. In this they differ *toto caelo* from the flamboyant hagiographies to which it is often sought to affiliate them. Some quite exceptional spirit of discipline prevented the narrators from giving their imagination rein. Dr. Taylor seems to hesitate as to the cause of this remarkable phenomenon. Sometimes he almost suggests that the story-form got fixed at a period so near to the record of eye-witnesses that there was no time for the growth of parasitic

legendary accretions. Sometimes he endows the primitive community with an historical sense such as the world has rarely seen until modern times. If we submit that it may have been a more generalised influence than either of these—indeed, simply that tendency to “sobriety” or “moderation” in all things which St. Paul so commended—this is not to admit any greater degree of uncertainty as to the historicity of the narrative than Dr. Taylor himself allows. Where imagination was so drastically curbed as, judged by the analogies which offer such a pointed contrast, it must have been here, what likelihood is there of any far-reaching want of authenticity? In emphasising this fact as he does, Dr. Taylor has rendered a service of first importance to New Testament criticism.

K. E. KIRK.

What it Means to be a Christian. By A. C. HEADLAM, C.H., D.D., Bishop of Gloucester. (Faber and Faber). 6s.

IN these days of composite volumes it is too seldom that learned and representative Christians undertake to set out for us a survey of the whole field of their theological interests; and when they do so, the result is usually too individual to be generally useful or too technical to be generally understood. Dr. Headlam indicates that the present volume is to be followed by a treatment on a much fuller scale—all students of religion will hope for a speedy fulfilment of his intention; and he consequently limits his scope here by two practical considerations. He writes for the “average educated man,” and therefore refuses to be led into the intricacies dear to the student of the history of dogma: and he seeks to emphasise the fundamentals of the faith on which Christians are generally agreed. In both respects he is uniquely qualified. Few theologians are so capable of plain and simple language, so competent to avoid minor and fascinating details, and to keep a sense of proportion; and none have a wider knowledge of the actual beliefs and personnel of other churches. The book is manifestly the work of a life-long student; yet scholarship is never obtruded; technical jargon is rigidly avoided; and in controversial issues the bishop takes his readers into his confidence by a frank avowal of his personal opinion. Similarly,

the contents constantly remind us that he not only knows the Anglican position in theory and practice, but from his intimate acquaintance with the Orthodox and with protestant denominations appreciates the points at which contact or controversy arises and can thus express his own views in relation to those with whom he is working towards reunion. Both in its intellectual interests and in its tone and temper the book is marked by a generosity which some of us have not always recognised in Dr. Headlam's utterances when he had occasion to find fault with us.

The treatment throughout, though not formally systematic, is severely objective. It is a summary or brief manual of Christian belief in relation to God, to one's neighbour and to the Church. In spite of its occasional avowals of personal conviction it is an exposition rather than a confession. The evidence of experience, the unfolding of the inner relationship between worship and conduct or between life "in Christ" and its expression in the Church, is wholly absent. Indeed to one who owes his first understanding of Christianity to "Sanday and Headlam" on the *Romans* it is strange to find the bishop saying nothing of the great Pauline doctrines of life *ἐν χρίστῳ*, of the union of believers in Christ with one another, of the building up of the body of Christ, and of the consequent ethic of love and personal relationships. Christ is in this book essentially the teacher, the revealer, the example—not as to St. Paul the risen Lord with whom and in whom the disciple lives.

The first section of the book is a brief and masterly survey of the Christian doctrine of the Godhead, so clear and positive that the reader hardly realises how skilfully the whole field has been covered. The student will recognize that in Christology the bishop is inclined to Apollinarianism, and that in his Trinitarian doctrine he is certainly more tritheistic than Athanasius. It is to be hoped that in his forthcoming book he will do more justice to the real difficulties that beset a doctrine of impersonal humanity, and that he will expound more fully his view of the Godhead as three persons united by their mutual love. In the present volume it is evident that any detailed justification of his position would have defeated his intentions of clearness and brevity.

The second section, confined to a single chapter on the Christian life, is much the least satisfactory part of the book. No doubt in a theme so vast it is only possible to express a dogmatic verdict: no doubt the warning against identifying Christianity with particular political parties or economic programmes is as necessary as it is courageous. But in his treatment of social problems it is difficult not to feel a real want of sympathy and indeed of understanding of the present situation. It is surely inconsistent to argue that Christians must impress their religious convictions upon India or Japan, but must not seek to impress them upon their own parliament or city council; that they must work for the welfare of their neighbours, but not if it involves the denunciation of bad laws or of economic exploitation; that they must ask themselves "what Christ would have done under the circumstances" and yet must accept the inevitability of war and the "Christian duty of giving up life if a man's country is attacked" (p. 151). In this field Dr. Headlam's outlook is that of an individualism that has long since become an anachronism, and was, as most of us believe, never fully consistent with Christian obligation; and in this section of his book he simply ignores the vital issues. For it is precisely in facing the perplexities of the conflict of loyalties that the average educated man needs help. If he is a Christian, he is also a citizen, an investor, a partner in industry; and he cannot with honesty leave his religion out of account when he is concerned with political, economic and industrial affairs.

The third section of the book will seem to most readers the best and the most important. If the bishop detests the intrusion of Christianity into secular politics, he intrudes it ruthlessly and with a robust and sympathetic common sense into the politics of the churches. His whole treatment of the intensely controversial issues surrounding the doctrines of the church and the sacraments is not only lucid and comprehensive, but it is singularly sensitive in its touch, wise in its forbearance, and judicious in its conclusions. Many, perhaps most, of us who have given thought to the problems of reunion, will find points on which we should disagree with him: some special conviction of our own may seem to have too brief notice: some cherished hope may seem to be too cursorily dismissed. But as a statement of a practicable and reasonable

attitude and therefore as a basis on which to build, there has been nothing more significant. It will not only explain to us the outlook from which our leading representative approaches the problems of denominational contacts: it will also arouse a much-needed confidence that the present discussions and debates are likely to be more fruitful than has sometimes appeared possible. The bishop has given us a plain statement of the principles and hopes which actuate his policy: by doing so he will win the support of very many who have been prone to misunderstanding or to despair.

CHARLES E. RAVEN.

Christian Marriage: An Historical and Doctrinal Study. By
GEORGE HAYWARD JOYCE, S.J. (Sheed and Ward). 1933.

It can be said at once that this book provides the most complete and satisfying treatment of its subject which has yet appeared in the English language. Mr. O. D. Watkins's *Holy Matrimony* alone suggests itself as worthy of comparison in its careful and exhaustive survey of the relevant material. But Father Joyce's study has besides an architectural breadth and dignity peculiarly its own. In its primary intention a theological treatise with strictly defined subject matter, it is also an impressive account of the erection of the structure which we know as Western civilisation on the ground-plan of Christian marriage. Only indeed in his preface does Professor Joyce lay special stress upon this wider historical significance of his subject, but it clearly pervades and controls his whole treatment of it. His book is a real work of art through this intimate blending of its doctrinal and historical elements. It is not merely that the doctrine is revealed, in its combined simplicity and amplitude, through the accidents of its historical growth. It is further that the history of the doctrine becomes the stuff out of which, under the very eye of the reader as it were, the moral unity of Christendom is gradually formed. If that unity has survived till almost our own times, it was because, in spite of the very considerable modifications in the traditional conception of marriage attendant upon the Reformation, it was still regarded as a Divine institution subject to the decrees of positive Divine law. The differences between Catholic and Reformed were henceforward as to the interpretation of that law. The moral

unity of Christendom was decisively threatened only when the State claimed to regulate the domain of marriage in a virtual independence of Divine law, however interpreted. The full extent of the change therein involved becomes apparent in a saying of Napoleon's, characterised by his customary brutal frankness: "Toute influence qui ne vient pas due gouvernement est un crime en politique."

Like most other Christian doctrines, the doctrine of marriage received its perfected form in the mediæval period. But even in that perfected form its substance is so simple and its outlines so severe that it can be very briefly formulated. It is a sacramental and therefore indissoluble contract formed by the mutual free consent of two persons capable of making such a contract, i.e., of two baptised persons, male and female. Its specific primary purpose is the formation and education of the Christian family, and its secondary purpose the mutual help and support which the partners to the contract pledge themselves to give each to the other. But this conception, simple as it is, was a matter of growth. It grew out of the fusion of two elements, Revelation and the Law of Nature as conceived by the mediæval theologians. They held that by the Law of Nature, which was the Divine Law originally implanted in the hearts of all men, it was sufficiently known to all that the bond between man and woman which had as its purpose the procreation and nurture of children possessed a specially sacred character which required that it should be permanent and therefore in principle incapable of being dissolved. But this Law of Nature had been graciously supplemented by a special Divine Revelation. The revealed teaching about marriage consisted of the story of its Divine institution in the book of Genesis and of our Lord's use of that narrative to enforce more decisively the indissolubility of the marriage bond. "What then God hath joined together let no man put asunder." To this were to be added the permission of divorce in the Deuteronomic Law and our Lord's answer to the questioning of the Pharisees with regard to it, and the teaching of St. Paul both as to the general character of marriage (which served as foundation for its later inclusion as one of the Christian Sacraments) and on points of detail arising out of the experiences of the earliest Christian community. There is hardly a feature of this revealed doctrine which was not the

subject of varying interpretation both among the early doctors of the Church and by later theologians. It was inevitable that this variety should be most apparent in the interpretation to be given to the exceptive clause, *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, in St. Matthew's account of our Lord's answer to the Pharisees. It is hardly in the same sense that we can speak of variety of interpretation in the case of St. Paul's description of marriage, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, as a great mystery. Here the recognition of the fully sacramental character of marriage was a matter of slow growth necessarily dependent on the equally gradual development of the conception of sacraments generally as not merely symbols but instruments also of Divine grace. Father Joyce's contention that, since Christian marriage is according to St. Paul a union similar to that between Christ and His Church that union must be effected by means of grace, is no doubt perfectly just. And the fact that he can point to early authorities who speak, however incidentally, of its being so effected may seem to imply that the fully sacramental character of marriage was actually recognised in the earliest Christian ages. But the further fact that St. Augustine finds in the comparison of the marriage-bond with the union betwixt Christ and His Church no more than a "sacred symbolism" would seem on the other hand to indicate that when earlier writers like Origen and Tertullian speak of the "grace" of marriage they are not using the word with the precision which it acquired in later sacramental theology. Even when at last the Master of the Sentences has defined the number of the sacraments and included matrimony among them, he expressly makes it an exception to the general rule that sacraments confer grace. Its effect is remedial only, and if it ranks as a sacrament it is in virtue of its being a sacred symbol of Divine appointment. There is no clearer instance of a theological development which has also meant a real deepening of religious insight than this development of the doctrine of marriage. If marriage is to be accounted a sacrament at all, it is surely necessary to conceive of the grace which accompanies it as being positive and fruitful and not merely negative and remedial. But it still remains necessary to insist that the higher view was securely achieved only as the result of a long process of development.

The interpretation of the exceptive clause in its bearing

upon the absolutely indissoluble character of marriage would seem on the other hand to have involved from the first a real variety of opinion. Without subscribing wholeheartedly to Father Joyce's view that there was a general consensus of opinion throughout the first four centuries that the clause "except for impurity" did not provide for permission to remarry, it is impossible to deny that that interpretation was most widely prevalent. Yet even one single clear instance of the contrary interpretation like that of Ambrosiaster, more especially as that unknown writer spoke to succeeding generations with all the authority attaching to the honoured name of St. Ambrose, makes it extremely unlikely that such an interpretation was singular and altogether wanting in authority. And it may be added that not everyone will be satisfied with Father Joyce's benign interpretation of St. Basil. There would still seem to be something to be said for at least a modified form of the older view that the famous "exception" was differently interpreted by East and West. Thus crudely stated it may be untrue. But if the rival interpretations did not from the first exist side by side, it becomes exceedingly difficult to account for the ready acceptance by the Eastern Church of the provisions of the code of Justinian, or indeed for the formulation of such provisions by that most Christian Emperor if they were regarded as having no warranty in the revealed Word.

But however this may be, Father Joyce has treated this question and all the other questions arising out of the long struggle of the church to control the law of marriage as her own peculiar domain with an admirable breadth and fairness. His exposition of points of view differing from his own, whether Eastern, Anglican, Lutheran, or Calvinist, is always eminently objective and adequate; his discussion of them is also marked by at least such sympathy as strict justice requires. The impression left by this patient and exhaustive study is that of a sustained effort of the Christian Church in all its actual divisions to establish and preserve the family as the foundation of society in closest possible accord with the revealed will of God. That the methods adopted to achieve that end in the Mother Church of the West have been most fully accordant with the Christian conception of marriage is of course Father Joyce's belief, a belief too which he commends to others with

much force and persuasiveness. But he also recognises that up till almost our own day the Christian ideal did, with whatever relaxations, govern with a general sufficiency the temper and action of the separated Christian churches. Now however not only is the church's exclusive legislative authority in the sphere of marriage almost universally challenged, but—what is of a much more sinister significance—both the authority of Revelation and any interpretation of the Law of Nature which would be at all accordant with it are widely repudiated. It is the existence of these circumstances that makes this careful and impartial study both timely and valuable. Father Joyce disclaims apologetic intention in the writing of it. But a monumental statement of a great ideal in its actual life-history is perhaps the most powerful and persuasive form of apologetic which is possible to-day. It is well that men should have revealed to them occasionally the true greatness of something which they are in danger of losing. And it has to be added that a professed apologetic in this matter has become incalculably more difficult in that it must come to grips with a vastly changed conception of what is implied in the Law of Nature. There lies our present *petra scandati*.

A. L. LILLEY.

The Place of Minds in the World. By SIR WILLIAM MITCHELL, K.C.M.G. (London: Macmillan). 1933. 12s. 6d. net.

THIS book contains the first series of Sir William Mitchell's Gifford Lectures which were delivered in the years 1924 to 1926. We are promised a second volume on the subject of the "power of minds." We opened the volume with keen expectation, for the title promised a discussion of the most difficult and pressing problem of philosophy, and Sir William Mitchell's earlier writings had shown his wide learning and powers of analysis. We must confess that we have been disappointed. Sir William was never easy to read, but he has allowed himself to develop eccentricities of style which give quite unnecessary trouble to the innocent reader. Some philosophers wrap themselves in a mantle of obscurity by the use of technical terms; our present author is not guilty of this, but succeeds in being difficult while using, for the most part, no unfamiliar phrases. This is a pity because he has something to say which

could have been expressed much more clearly. The world as conceived by common-sense and by a great many philosophers includes more than one "gulf," to use Sir William's word; it is only a unity by courtesy. We have the familiar distinction between subject and object, the difference between mind and nature, and again the clash between ideal and real. One of the aims of this book is to bridge these gulfs, or rather to show that they exist only in thought. It would be impossible to sum up the complex argument which is developed by Sir William, even if we were sufficiently sure that we had grasped it. The most interesting of his contentions is the criticism of analogy as a means of knowing and the thesis that analysis leads us deeper into reality. He will not allow that the world with which science deals is "abstract" or that it is created by the human mind. The two methods by which the "gulf" between mind and nature has been filled have been either to hold that mind is a "part of nature" or that nature is created by mind. The author will, in a sense, agree that mind is a part of nature, but by "nature" he would mean the whole and not any aspect of the whole. He could agree too, in some sense, that mind is present throughout, and that without mind there is no nature; but he could not agree that the objects of nature are "mental." Two principles have supreme importance for him. First, that the mind is not "in the head" but wherever its objects are, and secondly that the objects of mind are independent of mind. We found the chapter on "the practical gulf" the most interesting as well as the most intelligible. It would be unfair to Sir William not to recognise that in spite, or because of, his queer style, he sometimes strikes out a memorable phrase. There are several in this chapter on "the practical gulf." The following perhaps gives as shortly as could be one of the fundamental thoughts of the book. "As the simplest question for knowing is how a sensation has truth, the simplest for doing is how a liking has right."

W. R. MATTHEWS.

The Religious Philosophy of Baron von Hügel. By L. V. LESTER-GARLAND. (Dent). 5s. net.

BRIEF though this volume is, it gives as concise and lucid an outline as its unusually recalcitrant subject-matter permits.

For the sphere of research, to which von Hügel chose to devote his life, is at best obscure and difficult to interpret simply because of its insuppressible richness and complexity; while at the same time the range and profundity of his thought, his massive style, and indeed the mature stage at which his first work appeared, have long combined to present an almost impenetrable barrier to many eager readers. They will doubtless welcome this valuable selection of the principal salients of the perplexing spiritual territory, prefaced as it is by a short biographical sketch which in itself does much to explain the emergence of the well known obstacles. We must regard all these, however, not as the artificial products of a philosopher's caprice, but as perfectly natural and inevitable. For to von Hügel "the pursuit of religious truth is a long and arduous quest, an endless adventure into the regions of the absolute"; and Mr. Lester-Garland's emphasis on "the rock-like quality in his work" well indicates both its strenuousness and its permanence.

The governing principle of von Hügel's thought, then, is "the objective existence of God"; but this must still further be viewed as the supreme "intimation" of a universal objectivity. This is quite logically united to an unqualified Realism which was, at that time, much less generally accepted than it is to-day. Nor is this merely an academic issue fit only for the narrow domain of the lecture room or study. On the contrary, "if there is no trans-human Reality there is no Religion"; and thus subjectivism is explicitly excluded, except of course as a subordinate feature inseparable from the psychophysical conditions of human experience. At the same moment absolute agnosticism, and still more scepticism, are repudiated. For while "trans-human Reality" inevitably involves an ineradicable transcendence, this by no means implies that Reality and God are "inaccessible to human apprehension"; and in this connection we may note the fact, unfortunately too often ignored, that "the intimations of Religion are ultimately metaphysical intimations."

In developing this quite sound objective Realism, however, I think it was regrettable that its author contrasted it with an "Idealism" that was virtually, if not nominally, subjectivism. There are of course several forms of subjective Idealism, although it is very curious that great thinkers who were charged

with this most emphatically denied the accusation. But be this as it may, to identify Idealism with subjectivism in this manner is to ignore that perennial objective Idealism which still links modern thought with its Platonic origins, as Dr. Muirhead and Professor Urban have so clearly and ably argued recently. It is true that von Hügel found one of his firmest allies in Plato's Realism; but confusing, or even hair-splitting, as it may at first sight appear, this is only another aspect of the highest, and at the present moment increasingly influential, type of Idealism proper. His adoption of this standpoint, further, appears to lay von Hügel's whole theory of knowledge open to serious criticism. It is plainly impossible to undertake any adequate discussion here; but I cannot help thinking that it is extremely unsatisfactory, or indeed even fatal, to be compelled to base "the objective existence of what is real, and the possibility of knowledge of it," upon "trust or faith." Undeniably, these fulfil an indispensable function in all our experience; but they can never be self-validating, and therefore cannot possess that absolute foundational status upon which von Hügel, together with many other writers, insisted.

I believe also that he carried too far what he described as the "clear-cut distinction between two kinds of knowledge, one of which deals with abstract ideas and the other with concrete facts." Far from being "clear-cut," this distinction arises only when we consider such violently contrasted subjects as pure mathematics on the one hand and, let us say, the law relating to wills on the other. In one sense, certainly, the first is "abstract" and the second "concrete." Yet it is by no means difficult to trace an unbroken continuity from one to the other by way of the applied mathematics of natural selection, genetics and populations. Now in principle this is always the case, so that the supposedly "clear-cut distinction" becomes nothing more than a matter of convenience. Similarly with the antithesis between "experience" and "knowledge." We may agree that "there is no way to the knowledge of facts but by the interpretation of experience"; but this very process itself makes "knowledge" an indestructible element within "experience" taken in its entirety, as it always ought to be; only under this form, in fact, can "experience" be genuinely human. It is thus fatally misleading to set up any realm of "experience," whether moral

or æsthetic or religious, as distinct from, or even as opposed to, "knowledge" as such. On the contrary, man's experience is one continuous whole which incorporates knowledge exactly as it does art and religion. In this way knowledge, thought and reason become aspects of the entirety of experience which modify and permeate religion most intimately, and to which therefore due emphasis must be given if we desire to avoid distorting the situation from the outset.

Apart from his treatment of Idealism, however, von Hügel undoubtedly anticipated the current powerful tendency towards Realism. Similarly with his insistence upon Personality, since this concept also has steadily become increasingly prominent in recent years. But again his own position seems somewhat extreme, because he regarded any "religion without a personal God" as scarcely genuine; Buddhism and Confucianism, for instance; while he appears to have ignored Hegel's emphasis on divine personality. On the other hand, his handling of the familiar objections, based on limitation and anthropomorphism, cannot be improved; the advance of personality consists in the overcoming and removal of limitations, and every sane anthropomorphism implies that humanity is essentially theomorphic. Contrasted with this, the admission that "the philosophy of religion has no answer to give" to the problem of evil may be an impressive instance of making trust, faith or assurance our ultimate basis. For this involves a further issue when we recall the author's steadfast adherence to Roman Catholicism—that of legitimate authority. The dilemma is patent. No matter how intense and sincere they may be, are not faith and trust, taken purely in themselves, fatally vitiated by subjectivism? and can this be avoided even if we succeed in pooling our convictions, as it were, so as to make them universal? somewhat as early man's "assurance" of the flatness of the earth was unquestioned. It is of the utmost significance, so far as von Hügel's general standpoint is concerned, that the universality he desired and maintained can be acquired only when we possess that very abstract and formal knowledge which he so severely criticised. In simpler terms, there is universal agreement among normal minds on such simple theoretical matters as the multiplication table or elementary geometry; on almost all other important issues, obviously, this fortunate harmony remains an impossible ideal.

If, then, it is ever to be actualised, and if authority is ever to become unimpeachable, we must advance beyond assurance and trust, as such, even when, as for von Hügel, these incorporate "the standardised experience of other men and knowledge acquired in the past." Plainly, to appeal to "other men" and to "the past" merely inaugurates an infinite regression, and yields no more than an illusory, though certainly attractive, solution. Authority becomes more and more venerable; but it also runs the risk of being formal and conventional, and too apt to be thrust from its insecure base by some new fact, or even by some apparently "abstract" theory.

J. E. TURNER.

The Cambridge Medieval History. Vol. VII. *Decline of Empire and Papacy.* (Cambridge University Press). 1932. 50s. net.

THE seventh volume of the Cambridge Medieval History opens with a prefatory note of editorial bereavement and the surviving editors, Dr. Previt -Orton and Dr. Z. N. Brooke, are expressing the common regret of all students who knew the work of their senior colleague, Dr. J. R. Tanner at the loss to scholarship sustained as the result of his death as well as by that of Mr. Edward Armstrong, Professor Blok and now, it must unhappily be added, by that of Professor W. T. Waugh which has taken place since the volume was published.

The period with which the contributors are mainly concerned in these 26 chapters is the fourteenth century, though some of them necessarily take their point of departure farther back, and some like Professor Paul Martin in his account of the Swiss Confederation in the Middle Ages, A. Weiner in describing the Hansa, and Professor Boswell on the Teutonic Order, stretch far into the following century, while Professor J. E. Lloyd's subject is boldly announced as "Wales, 1066 to 1485," Prince Mirsky's as "Russia, 1015-1462," and Professor Eileen Power's as "Peasant Life and Rural Conditions (c. 1100 to c. 1500)." It is not a period which is easily handled and Dr. Previt -Orton in an Introduction which exhibits the value of the method adopted and also, some may presume to think, occasionally evidence of its

dangers, had at once a lighter and more difficult task than many of his collaborators. Perhaps it is the pungency of some of his observations rather than theirs which stimulates the doubt if the scheme of the series is working out quite as Professor Bury planned it with this volume as "Decline of Empire and Papacy" to be followed by a final one on the "Growth of the Western Kingdoms." It is hardly fair to quote a single sentence from what all who read it, whether or not they agree with it, will justly concede to be a brilliant performance as a whole; but so far as it is true to say that "the century ends with Church and Feudalism and the accepted philosophy of life standing where they did" the title becomes hard to justify as a label. And the question whether or not it is true raises issues of far-reaching importance.

A pathetic interest attaches to the late Mr. Armstrong's opening chapter on "Italy in the time of Dante," and there will probably be few of its readers who will not wish that it had been longer and had extended further. It would be absurd to pretend that it is the best thing that he ever composed, and there are judgements and epithets that he would have enjoyed being challenged to justify. But it is so much more like history than the laborious and only too successful efforts of some others to leave nothing out, and the characteristic dictum that "no reasonable man would read the story of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries without his Dante within reach" is a salutary reminder, if it does not seem to have met with universal recognition by his fellow-contributors. But readers will compare with interest and even occasionally with amusement the account of the Italian situation in the days of Henry VII as it is presented by Mr. Armstrong and by Professor Blok in a chapter on "Germany, 1273-1313" which was finished by Professor Waugh. But there were greater issues than the dubious fortunes of the Iron Crown of Lombardy, and Professor Waugh starts some very interesting trains of thought in his opening sections when he says first that "Although the forty years between 1273 and 1313 are among the most bewildering and dreary in her history, they were more fateful for Germany than many a period crowded with heroic figures and thrilling events. In the first place they started her on a political path which she was to follow until the nineteenth century" and later adds: "The

Empire, then, was to continue to mean something. But these forty years decided that it was not to mean much"—a judgment which, at least as stated, goes considerably beyond anything that is justified in his later chapters on Lewis the Bavarian and Charles IV or Dr. Krafta's study of Bohemia in the fourteenth century which furnishes in many points a useful complement. It is of course a platitude to say that much depends upon the point of view, and interest is added to this volume probably without ultimate disadvantage by the fact that it contains specimens of most of the contemporary fashions in historical writing. Not that particular writers always present themselves in the costume that was expected. Professor G. Mollat on "The Popes of Avignon and the Great Schism" will disappoint some of those familiar with his work without making them ungrateful for what they find, though it may be admitted that a sentence like "In France, above all, most benefices were ruined or destroyed by the Grand Companies" sounded perhaps a little different in French. Of the effect of method on treatment anyone may find an illuminating example in the observation in regard to Philip V of France in Professor Hilda Johnstone's chapter entitled "France: the Last Capetians": "He was, in fact, exactly the sort of king to win the admiration of the modern historian of administrative and constitutional development, while to the war-like feudalism of his own day, or to the conventionally-minded contemporary chronicler bent on praising the conventionally correct, he was a disappointing figure." Administrative and constitutional development were perhaps hardly the aspects which primarily suggest themselves for consideration in a century during which, as Dr. Previté-Orton says, with an elegant meiosis, "the universal disaster of the Black Death and the more local horrors of the Hundred Years' War, and finally the spectacular scandal of the Great Schism, all these could not fail of effect on men's minds." But in this as in her other interesting and serviceable chapter, "England: Edward I and Edward II," Professor Johnstone finds place for several passages and even pages on the subject which it is to be hoped that she may some day have opportunity to expand, for if she speaks too irreverently of "fads of office custom" she at any rate sees reasons why things did not happen to follow the neatly devised schemes of the constitutional

theorists; and the fact that Professor McIlwain devotes a whole chapter to "Medieval Estates" as befits the "Eaton Professor of the Science of Government in Harvard University" only emphasizes the difficulty, since the fifty pages allowed would scarcely have been adequate for England alone and he ranges all over Europe through many centuries. Nevertheless, it is a brilliant piece of writing, with some trenchant criticism of a useful kind, and an account of the Cortes of Catalonia which will be attractive to many besides students of the works of Professor R. B. Merriman which are too seldom to be found in English libraries.

The story of France during the Hundred Years' War (to 1380) with a continuation "France: Armagnacs and Burgundians (1380-1422)" are entrusted to Professor Coville; "England under Edward III and Richard II" to Mr. B. L. Manning, who also contributes a separate chapter on Wyclif with a valuable bibliography. In different ways all these chapters, like Professor Johnstone's also, invite consideration of the question if the modern prejudice against the biographical treatment of history cannot be carried too far. In the few cases where they allow themselves pen portraits the writers make us wish for more: where they abstain, at times it would seem almost deliberately, one is left to wonder if that be not the reason why the narrative at times becomes a little flat, with consequent injustice to the generally high quality of the work, which every reader of the volume will recognize with increasing appreciation. The reader may agree or disagree with Mr. Manning's estimate of John of Gaunt or with less hesitation of Richard II, but he would certainly have been sorry had either been omitted. Yet when we come to consider what impression is left of the *vita et mores* of the Black Prince it is hard to recall a single phrase, and Professor Lloyd makes Giraldus Cambrensis a more vivid figure. The account of Wales to which we have referred, Dr. Orpen's chapter on "Ireland to 1315," and Professor Sanford Terry's "Scotland to 1328" are all examples of careful compression, and if each is shorter than Dr. Altamira's "Spain, 1252-1410," or Prince Mirsky's readable summary of Russian history, allowance must be made for the method of treatment. There is less sense of compression perhaps in Dr. Power's 35 vivid pages on Peasant Life and Rural Conditions during four centuries because she

seems to have determined that whatever professional students might say by way of agreement or disagreement as to her treatment of the manorial system the chapter as a whole should be one that general students could read with enjoyment; and in this she has certainly succeeded. It is unfortunate that neither in her chapter, to which it might be thought specially to belong, nor elsewhere in the volume does the subject of the Black Death receive really adequate treatment. Indeed, it might well have been allowed a chapter to itself.

Dr. Roth on "The Jews in the Middle Ages," Mr. Tilley on "The Early Renaissance," and Mrs. Stuart Moore (Evelyn Underhill) on "Medieval Mysticism" have all been given congenial subjects and all provide material which it is interesting to compare with the verdicts of other writers elsewhere in the book. Perhaps this is especially the case with the estimates of Petrarch. Dr. Roth's chapter would have been better if it had been allowed to cover a shorter period in more detail, but this is compensated for to some extent by his large and extremely useful bibliography. This may be said without disparagement of the other bibliographies, the total length of which amounts to 160 pages. Like the separate portfolios of maps they are indeed among the most useful adjuncts of a great undertaking for which all students of medieval history owe a debt of gratitude to editors and contributors which is not less genuinely felt because sometimes accompanied by a mixture of appreciative criticism and critical appreciation.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England. By G. R. OWST.
(Cambridge University Press). pp. 616. 30s. net.

It is six years since Dr. Owst published his valuable book, *Preaching in Medieval England*, and now he continues his work in the present volume, in which he gives us the rich harvest of his further labours in a practically unknown part of English literature.

It is not strange that the medieval sermon should have been neglected by the ordinary reader, for whether it be in Latin or the vernacular, it presents difficulties which only the resolute student can overcome. But it is deplorable that it

should have been ignored by the professed student of literature, and by the historian, because medieval preaching affords a key which will unlock the door of many unexplained mysteries, and which can throw a searchlight on what otherwise seems hopelessly dark and confused. Yet it would seem obvious that during those centuries when books were scarce, and most people could not read, when the Church was at its height of power, the sermon must have exercised an enormous influence over the life and thought of the times. It had few or no rivals, until itself called into being the miracle and morality plays. People came to hear the sermon, not only to be instructed in the Faith, but to be told of nearly all things that are of importance in the State, the parish, and the individual life. In the sermon also was to be found the thrill which is now given by the drama; the news now to be found in the papers; satire, and humour and even facetious jests were not wanting; so that whatever criticism may be passed on the medieval preachers, they cannot be accused, as preachers are so often accused at the present day, of standing aloof from contemporary life.

A knowledge of medieval sermon literature then shews us the influence which moulded the thought and style of writers like Chaucer, Langland and Gower. Critics have, owing to their wilful ignorance of this literature, treated these writers, either as geniuses who owe nothing to anyone but themselves, or have hunted the Continent far and wide to find the sources of their inspiration. Meanwhile the explanation lay ready to their hand. Dr. Owst shews us in this volume that the ideas, the imagery, the satire, the jests, of these writers, can nearly all be found in one form or another in the contemporary sermon. They used material lying at their door, and worked it up to their own purposes. This is no slur upon their genius. The genius has always been a great borrower, only the dull writer is self-supporting. There is no need to state, as Miss Grace Hadow does, that Chaucer inaugurated a new development in literature, *The Study of the Commonplace*, when as Dr. Owst points out the sermon of Chaucer's day was an organ of a virile, picturesque speech, and a keen critical view of society—a medium for vivid illustration, lively anecdote, homely portraiture, witty and ruthless satire.

It is not Dr. Owst's aim to deal in this volume with the doctrinal side of medieval preaching, though he will do so, we

are assured, in a later volume. Here he brushes it aside with what may seem to some of us, rather undue contempt. "On its purely doctrinal side the English pulpit of the waning middle ages has little inspiration to offer. Its influence here, therefore, upon the rising generation, was almost invariably morbid."

But if we grant that many of the preachers were too engrossed in futile disputation, and more anxious to score off an opponent than to help the weak, and if also they relied too much upon denunciation, and too little on the message of joy and hope, still there must have been a good deal that was doctrinally valuable in the better preachers such as Brunton. They had been well grounded in the Schoolmen and the modern world has discovered that after all St. Thomas Aquinas was no mean thinker. However, this is a side issue as far as the present work is concerned. Dr. Owst has here set out to shew how the medieval sermon reflects the life of its time, in all its phases; how it moulded contemporary and future literature, and how it paved the way for the Elizabethan drama. He has achieved his task with brilliancy and assurance.

It would be impossible to follow in detail the author as he describes to us the various aspects of the medieval sermon—its treatment of Scripture, its vivid dramatisation of the stories of the Saints, its allegory and symbolism, and above all its satire against the abuses of contemporary life where the weakness and corruption of the Church and of the social order in all its grades are unsparingly revealed, and mercilessly pilloried. The explanation of the preacher's method and of the various oratorical weapons he used for his purpose may we think be found in the nature of the audiences he had to address. As a rule his hearers, whether rich or poor, high or low, would be ignorant, rude, and difficult to impress. A highly polished and learned discourse might astound a congregation who did not understand it, but it would not attract for any length of time. To hold an audience easily distracted from the effort of listening, there was need of vivid dramatic effect, homely illustration from ordinary life, terror and denunciation of an unsparing kind; only by such means could influence be maintained and interest kept alive.

This no doubt was the reason why allegory was so constantly used in the interpretation of the Scriptures. To tear

a text from its context, and to subject it to a variety of fantastic explanations does not seem to modern ears very edifying. We should not care to listen to much of this kind. "By the five loaves, doctors understand the five Books of Moses, which are aptly compared to a barley loaf; for a barley loaf on its outside is tough in part, and harsh, yet within it is full of the purest flour." But we can still find arresting the symbolism of the ship, sometimes the Church, sometimes the good man, sometimes the State. In this latter form it is reproduced in every detail, from the contemporary sermon, in the poem on the death of Edward III. Even more vivid and interesting are the different uses made of the word castle—originating in the text "Intravit Jesus in Castellum." "There springs at an early date the idea of the Blessed Virgin as a Castle into which the Saviour entered at his Incarnation, a feudal stronghold protecting him from the devil in an otherwise defenceless world."

But the castle also represented Heaven, the stronghold of the devil, and most dramatically of all, the soul of man. The feudal castle dominating the countryside, inspiring fear and awe in those who dwelt around it, was so familiar an object to the people of England, that the congregations would readily understand its use by the preacher as a religious allegory, whether of good or evil. "In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries such symbolic castles were clearly nothing less than a commonplace of the pulpit. Here then we have before us at last the true prototype not only of Langland's *Toure of Truth and Castel of Care*, but further amongst Miracle and Morality plays of Maudleyn Castel in the Digby Mysteries and the Castell of Perseverance itself." In post-reformation times we find the idea again in Bunyan's *Holy War*; it dies a languid death in the eighteenth century in Thompson's *Castle of Indolence*.

The preacher did not rely upon allegory as his only oratorical weapon; he sought to impress his hearers in other ways, which also influenced the secular literature of the times. One of his most successful devices was the personification of vices and virtues. To speak of Justice and Faith as mere abstractions is dull enough; to represent them as living beings is quite another matter; and we find that the characters in the Morality plays, Knowledge, Good Deeds, Discretion, have

stepped straight from the pulpit into the scenes of "Everyman." To make the characters of the Bible and the Saints more real, the preacher did not hesitate to embroider his theme with all manner of details drawn from contemporary life. Dr. Owst points out how the preachers were wont to feudalize scenes and characters of the Sacred Text. "With a deft touch here and there they bring them up to date." Jezebel's portrait is of a tyrannic medieval queen, the Magi are university masters of distant Persia; Potiphar is the master of the king's knights, the High Priest the bishop of the Jew's law, and Moses a great and curious philosopher, trying to solve the mystery of the Burning Bush.

Nor did the preacher confine this method to his treatment of Biblical characters or the Saints; he carried it into the spirit world. Angels must it would seem of necessity, remain more or less conventionally dignified, stately and aloof; but it is otherwise with devils. As these go about the world they are depicted as grimly humorous if malicious beings. "The preachers themselves tell us how the fiends will pull faces at the Church folk they love to torment, grin and mock at the dying, laugh at a colleague's discomfiture when he falls into the mud from off a lady's skirts and even to cause laughter in a gospeller when another of their number inadvertently is seen to bump his head against a wall." That such illustrations raised a laugh, who can doubt? The devils of the preacher re-appear in the miracle plays, and they come before us in another form in the Puck and Ariel of Shakespeare, for though they are called Fairies, their impish tricks are the current coin of the merry medieval devil.

But probably the realistic method of the preacher was never used with more effect than when the scenes of the Passion, the terrors of the Judgment day were enrolled before the congregation, with every detail of horror dwelt upon and emphasised. These details to us seem frankly horrible, to a less delicate generation they were obviously alive, inspiring and arresting. Certainly these pulpit pictures had an immense effect; and their details are reproduced with remarkable fidelity in many of the miracle plays.

Nor, in an age when life was short and uncertain, menaced at every point by disease and violence, was it likely that the preacher would neglect to turn his realism to good account in

his descriptions of the tragedy and horror of man's final end. Death in many medieval sermons is dramatically personified—one preacher speaks of death as "God's bailiff" who shall come to arrest men "as one who taketh no heed of prayer or of gift and granteth no respite," and again as "one who judgeth and slayeth us all." If death is personified as a relentless and remorseless enemy of men, the results of death are dwelt upon with an equal insistence which may horrify and disgust. The degradation of corruption followed in the case of the wicked by all the torment of judgment and everlasting punishment, is described again and again in the medieval sermon. It appears in the Morality plays and lingers still in the pages of the Elizabethan dramatist, so that Hamlet toying with a skull and commenting on death's corruption, is not so much a child of the Renaissance, as one who looks back for inspiration to the middle ages.

The larger portion of Dr. Owst's book deals with the preaching of Satire and Complaint, and this will probably prove the most interesting of all to the student of social history, and also to the general reader, because of the vivid picture it gives us of life in the middle ages, in all its phases, religious, economic, moral and social, and because it shews us how wide was the preacher's vision and how fearless his outlook upon life. The preacher comes before us here as the stern critic of the ills of the State; no one is spared the lash of his tongue, and no defect escapes his eye. From the king to the serf; from the bishop to the humblest lay brother, all are passed in review, and judged and condemned according to their works. It may astonish us that the orthodox were as bitter in their abuse of ecclesiastical corruption as the Lollards themselves, and that their criticisms were voiced not in secret in Synods, but in the pulpits of the cathedrals and parish churches, and in the market place itself. Certainly the preachers shot their bolt further than they knew. By their diatribes they made possible the Reformation and brought about the crash they would have deplored if they had lived to see it. So too these attacks upon the feudal lords so raised public feeling, that it became easy for the Tudor monarchy to destroy a class that had become as odious as it was dangerous. And yet they had no wish for revolution. They regarded the State with its various classes as the creation of God, but what

they did desire was that each class should do its duty, and that they should be bound together by common consideration and charity, one for the other. The same idea is taken over by Langland, he has no idea of destroying the present condition of the State, but only wishes to abolish the abuses which spoil contemporary life, and press with special harshness on the poorer classes.

How far did the denunciation of the preacher influence his congregations? This we cannot tell. Certainly the same black pictures are drawn in succeeding ages, of the cruelty and violence, lust and drunkenness, extravagance and vanity, which are thundered against as the sins of society, and not only of society in its limited sense, but of all sections of the community. We can reconstruct for ourselves from these pages the life of the middle ages; we can pass from the castle to the hovel, from the merchant's office to the tavern, from the convent to the haunts of sin, and learn something of each in turn. And as we find the same accusations repeated again and again, we may come to the conclusion that then, as now, people had no objection to hearing their sins denounced, if they had secretly made up their minds not to abandon them. This may be a serious defect in medieval preaching; that it relied too much on rebuke, and too little on encouragement; and that by its unceasing denunciation of sin, it may have fostered a kind of perverted vanity in the sinner.

But at all events if the picture seems unduly black it must have been more than partly true; for we find its blackest features reproduced in the secular literature of the times. The satire of the preacher comes to us again in more artistic form in the pages of Chaucer, Langland, Gower, and other well-known writers. However the wisdom of the preacher may be questioned, his courage certainly cannot be doubted. It is not only that he does not spare the Church or the highest in the land, but also because while he comes forward as the champion of the poor, he does not scruple to shew up their vices—greed, lust, intemperance and dishonesty. The modern popular preacher is so apt to wallow at the feet of democracy, that it is refreshing to look back on those who could chasten as well as love.

This is an important book, important for the student of history because it makes the middle ages live again, and

valuable for those who study literary sources and origins, because it shews that many accepted theories will have to be abandoned, and that we must re-interpret Chaucer, Langland, and Gower and even Bunyan in the light of our new knowledge of the medieval pulpit. Dr. Owst has dealt with a mass of material before which the stoutest might quail, but he has arranged it for his purpose with the mastery of an artist. Many scholars can with patience collect a vast array of facts, but they lack the power of presenting the results of their toil in an acceptable form. Dr. Owst is undoubtedly a specialist, but he is also an enthusiast who can by reason of his charming style and unfailing sense of proportion make it a delight for those less gifted than himself to share the result of his labours.

S. ADDLESHAW.

The Drama of the Mediæval Church. By KARL YOUNG.
(Humphrey Milford). 2 vols. 63s.

THIS book provides at last a completely documented study of one source of the modern European drama. It is the culmination of many years of work on the part of its author, who is already known as the foremost authority in his chosen field. He sets in array before us some hundreds of texts, re-edited from the original manuscripts in libraries all over Europe, covering the whole development of the Church drama from those "sequences" which we still keep as embellishments of the Mass on great Festivals to the play with characters impersonated and accessories complete.

These texts, upon which Mr. Young asks us to "centre our attention," are arranged in the most admirable way. It is necessary that some definition of drama be assumed as a test of development, and Mr. Young believes that the essence of drama is impersonation, in the full sense of a conscious attempt to "pretend to be the person whose words he (the actor) is speaking, and whose actions he is imitating." On this basis, texts are chosen in the order in which they exhibit the tendency towards impersonation. The reader thus has at his command at once a *corpus* of Church drama and a self-explanatory picture of its growth. This is not to belittle Mr. Young's comments on each text, which are of proper value.

The reader is struck by the fact that the collection forms a whole complete in itself. Mr. Young points out that, "with a readiness which is perhaps unparalleled, the Latin drama of the Church lends itself to a treatment in isolation." These plays, "worshipfully performed by ecclesiastics within the church walls," arose out of the liturgy itself, and maintained their independence of secular influences almost completely until their destruction by the Reformers. Whatever was their part in begetting the secular drama or the laymen's Mystery Cycles, they held themselves sedulously aloof from contact with these, and preserved a life essentially ecclesiastical until the enemies of all ceremony compassed their doom.

Mr. Young's scholarly work allows us to see not only his specimens but also their parentage; for he is not content, like most dramatic historians, to begin with the *Quem Quaeritis* trope. Rightly, he insists that we cannot appreciate the plays without a full knowledge of the liturgy whence they arose; and he accordingly gives an exposition, masterly in its stark brevity, of the Mass and the Canonical Hours. He bids us recognise, however, that the term "dramatic" should not be applied to anything in the liturgy, particularly to the sacrifice of the Mass itself, for "the central act is designed not to represent or portray or merely commemorate the Crucifixion, but to repeat it." And again, "the celebrant remains merely the celebrant, and does not undertake to play the part of his Lord." This, he holds, is true of all worshippers in a liturgical office; and hence he finds that even the special liturgies of Holy Week, with their strong mimetic tendency, are not drama.

We now have a basis for understanding the tropes which, under the smile of authority, embellish the liturgy of every great feast in the ninth century, and grow into plays within a hundred years. The seed of drama is only found in a few of the multitude of tropes that were written; of these few the most famous is *Quem Quaeritis*, which, beginning as a simple Verse and Respond, gradually becomes split up among different singers for the different characters (the Angels at the Tomb and the Marys), is then elaborated by the addition of Peter and John, and finally acted by persons wearing the clothes and imitating the behaviour of its characters. This little play becomes a full Easter Play, and in one case at least, that of

Benedicktbeuern in Bavaria, a Passion Play is evolved to match it. Here we may see what the Oberammergauers had to inspire them in fulfilling their vow in 1633.

The whole of the first volume of Mr. Young's book is taken up by texts showing in the most minute detail this development of the Easter Play; and it is indeed fascinating to follow. In the second, he does the like, first for Christmas, which in the ecclesiastical drama was much less prolific than Easter (a contrast to modern practice), and then for the various other subjects treated. These are of the Old Testament as well as the New, and some concern legends of Saint Nicholas, whose connection with the Feast of Fools and the Boy Bishop is examined. The Christmas plays grow, as did the Easter ones, from a trope made presumably in imitation of the *Quem Quaeritis*; the Shepherds are the subject of this and are first treated. An Epiphany play of the Magi begins simultaneously to develop, bringing in the raging Herod, who is the best figure of fun in the secular Mysteries, and even in church attains to an exaggeration bordering closely on the comic. These two plays are added together to make the *Officium Stellae*, and further accretions are *Ordo Rachelis*, wherein the Innocents are massacred to the accompaniment of laments from the veritable Rachel (so concretely runs the mediæval mind), and the *Processio Prophetarum*. The latter, whose development is traced from a pseudo-Augustinian sermon used as a lection at Christmas offices, shows a selection of prophets, from various sources both Jewish and pagan, testifying to the Messiahship of Christ. Some of its characters acquire surrounding incident, as for instance Balaam and his ass (who comes in probably from the Feast of Fools); and this may be the inspiration for the cycle-plan later adopted by secular writers.

The miscellaneous selection of other plays contains some good things, notably the *Raising of Lazarus* by Hilarius, a wandering scholar, which in its half-Latin, half-French laments, gives an excellent example of how the vernacular crept into the drama:

Mors execrabilis!
Mors detestabilis!
Mors mihi flebilis!
Lase, catiui!

Des que mis frere est morz,
Porque sue uiue?

The book may be said to settle once for all the problem raised in so acute a form last year by Dr. Cargill's *Drama and Liturgy*, reviewed in these pages. It will be remembered that he was at pains to prove that the so-called liturgical drama was in no sense the ancestor of the outdoor Mystery Plays and therefore did not lay the foundations of our modern drama. His division between the developed tropes, which he characterised as "purely lyrical," and the plays of the cycles, was generally recognised to be much too harsh; his book served rather to stimulate thought on the problem than to solve it; but Mr. Young has now presented us with a balanced picture of the whole history of our dramatic origins in the Church. We may summarise his conclusions thus:

The liturgy of the Mass and the Canonical Hours is not drama but worship. From the ninth century onwards, pious poets added to the service-books of certain monastic churches embellishments for the chief festivals, designed for the music of the final 'a' of alleluias, called tropes. These were at first as purely lyrical as the service itself; but as they became more elaborate, and were removed from a place within the service to a position of possible independence between the offices, the dialogue which they contained was distributed to different persons, and provision was made for impersonation in a gradually increasing degree. So within three centuries a complete drama was developed, always "worshipfully performed" and always taking place as part of the round of services for the day in the church. Even the highly wrought plays of Hilarius have their place thus appointed, which proves that they are given in the church and by its ministers.

That these plays served, in whole or in part, as models for the secular versions of the sacred stories can be seen by a comparison of the Christmas play in the "Shrewsbury Fragments" with the York cycle play; the wording is clearly borrowed. But that what was made for the church was ever allowed to be transferred to the street is, from the evidence in Mr. Young's book, at least extremely unlikely. The Church drama was strictly guarded, and remained a separate art-form till its destruction.

Mr. Young's grasp of his material might be a model for any scholar. Seldom has so large a body of evidence been so well marshalled. Add to this the caution of a wise mind, and the style of a charming one, and an idea is gained of this monumental, yet entirely readable book. All students of his subject owe Mr. Young the deepest gratitude.

He appeals in his preface for some fellow-expert to complete his work by editing the music, which in many MSS. is preserved with the plays. All who wish to understand them will reinforce this plea. For it is scarcely possible for any of us to get a true impression of the plays without their own music; they were almost entirely sung, and often to music of great beauty. This alters their whole character. If we could perform them in their own manner, the future development of modern religious drama would receive a direction which it badly needs; for these worshipful plays, the growth of centuries of faith within the churches, are surely the best model for the distinctively church plays which the religious drama movement of to-day is demanding. Meanwhile, this movement will find much of practical use to itself in Mr. Young's fine book.

E. MARTIN BROWNE.

Northern Catholicism: Studies in the Oxford Centenary and Parallel Movements. Edited by N. P. WILLIAMS and C. HARRIS. (S.P.C.K.). 7s. 6d. 1933.

PROFESSOR WILLIAMS'S Editorial Foreword to this volume of *Studies in Northern Catholicism* explains the circumstances of its metamorphosis from a domestic survey of the Oxford Movement in the Anglican Communion to the more comprehensive scale of a synoptic view of the several tendencies towards a Catholic revival in other European churches, alike Reformed and Unreformed, in consequence of the establishment of intercommunion between the English church and the Old Catholic churches of the Continent. The expansion of purpose has added very considerably to the value and interest of the resultant book, and has produced further a result perhaps not intended by the editors, namely the impression of the greater solidity, influence, and traditional ancestry of the High Church Revival in the Church of England than in other

churches. Despite the attractive presentation of the Catholic tendencies in German Lutheranism by Professor Heiler, and in the Dutch Reformed Church by Dr. Oberman, the extremely limited appeal which they have as yet made to the majority of adherents of these churches is strikingly emphasised; whilst the search for similar ideals in the Scottish Church and in the Methodist Church necessitates a latitudinarian interpretation of the word "catholic" in order to garner such results as their authors present. Dr. Flew's conclusion that the original Methodist separation was due to the circumstance that "the price of loyalty to the Established Church was the spiritual starvation of multitudes of Methodists" by their repulsion from the sacraments of that church, needs to be qualified by divers other historical facts if it is to be accepted as adequate to the explanation of such a result. It should be mentioned that from 1755 onwards a series of incidents wherein lay preachers arrogated to themselves the authority to celebrate the Holy Communion, though rebuked by John Wesley, were an indication both of the ultimate severance and of the circumstance that many of his followers preferred their own sacraments to those of the church. Nor should it be forgotten that Wesley himself believed in and practised Presbyterian ordination, nor that, however great his own sentimental attachment to the English church may have been, he had singularly little success in teaching the principles of churchmanship to his converts. Notwithstanding minor points of criticism, the addition of articles dealing with other churches presents a contribution of real importance, both intrinsically and for the better understanding of the Oxford Movement.

If the reader shares the reviewer's persuasion of the greater strength and volume of the Anglo-Catholic revival, he will turn with more interest to the several descriptions of its characteristics as seen in the churches constituting the Anglican Communion. In relation to England proper, Drs. Clarke and Sparrow Simpson abbreviate what they have written elsewhere more fully concerning the historical development of the movement. Dr. Hardy's essay on the Protestant Episcopal Church in America marshals a set of facts of interest which have not been so conveniently summarised before. Other writers follow with estimates of various aspects of the High Church influence, moral, pastoral, monastic, social, and æsthetic;

amongst which may be mentioned more particularly Mr. Gaselee's article on the æsthetic side which fulfils its author's declaration that he has written "a deliberate under-statement" of his case; and a chaste essay by the Dean of Chichester on Œcumenical Ideals. But the most arresting chapter (apart from that contributed by Dr. Williams) is that of the Dean of Rochester, who analyses with the penetration of a critical friend the deficiencies of the clergy of this tradition in their pastoral and parochial office. The importance of Dr. Underhill's essay is altogether disproportionate to its brevity; and it is greatly to be desired that it should be read, pondered, and studied by all members of the Anglo-Catholic movement. It may suffice to say, perhaps, that if what the Dean of Rochester reprobates were corrected and what he advocates fulfilled, the revival would evoke a response from unexpected quarters and would command the allegiance of a surprising number of churchmen who at present are unable to accord an unequivocal assent. Nor may the advisability, if not the duty, of essaying this task be ignored by all who desire the influence of High Church principles to permeate the entire Church of England, and not merely to constitute the sectarian profession of a party. Upon the ability and readiness of Anglo-Catholics to follow the advice of Dr. Underhill will depend the future history and importance of the tradition of their adoption.

The importance of Dr. Williams's contribution is not concealed by any attempt at brevity or compression; for of the total corpus of five-and-a-half-hundred pages of the volume, his survey of the theology of the Catholic Revival embraces just over one hundred, one-fifth of the space of the book. Nor is his essay lacking in the characteristic qualities of style and thought native to the author's genius. If the reader elects to follow the plan of the present reviewer, and to read, first the chapters relating to other churches, next those dealing with the Anglican Communion, and finally to turn to Dr. Williams's contribution, he will find himself situate upon a point of vantage from which to determine both the importance of the Catholic Revival, and the weight of this interpretation of its theological basis. The purpose of the essay is to turn the flank of Roman and Protestant controversialists by establishing a conception of authority, which is neither one-sided in its reliance on the Scriptures alone, nor contrariwise by its

postulate of an infallible authority in the church. Dr. Williams contends for a standard of authority, based upon the twin sources of Scripture and Tradition, but in neither case rising higher than probability. In the course of his argument he offers sundry sparkling and amusing *obiter dicta* upon persons and events, which a reviewer would fain quote, but may not yield to the temptation. In order to escape from the artificiality of interpreting the appeal to primitive antiquity as terminating with the Council of Chalcedon, or the end of the sixth century, the period is extended to 1054, that of the Undivided Church before the schism between East and West. In appearance this extension is impressive, for the appeal to a millenium of Catholic unity bears upon its face the aspect of authority. But it is doubtful whether the admission of the period from the sixth to the eleventh centuries really adds to the strength of the argument. Both in Eastern and Western Europe there was an epoch of much confusion; and in the West particularly the chaos consequent upon the break-up of the Roman Empire and the establishment of the barbarian kingdoms afforded little opportunity for intellectual reflection on, or contribution to, the classic Christian theology. Even the transient efflorescence of the Carolingian renaissance left little mark; and unfortunately the choice of the date 1054 excludes the medieval renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Dr. Williams sits loosely however to the authority of tradition: "It must always be remembered that the appeal to antiquity is not claimed to be more than a working canon, a rule of thumb"; and again, the Vincentian rule "like the appeal to the undivided church, is a rule of thumb, for the use of the charcoal-burner and his pastors and masters." These qualifications allow the author to interpret the centuries of his reference with considerable freedom, and the strength and weakness of his position are illustrated by his doctrine of the church. Of the traditional four notes of the church he selects apostolicity as the truest criterion, and arrives at a conception of the church as that of a great church "surrounded by a belt or borderland of churches of less perfect orthodoxy, out of visible communion with it, but nevertheless one with it in respect of the institutional structure to which we have been led to attach so much importance; the city of God upon earth would seem to have been (and therefore to be always potentially

capable of being) surrounded by a *pomærium*, or fringe of suburbs, which are distinguishable from the city itself and yet not altogether disjoined from it—it may even be said, in some sense one with it.” The advantages of this elasticity are obvious: but does the conception stretch sufficiently? Since the further breach in the Western Church made by the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century, the proportion of suburbs to the great church has grown very greatly, and the rejection of episcopacy spread more widely. And, whilst it is evident that the preponderance of numbers is no test of truth, yet in repairing the broken unity of Christendom, allowance must necessarily be made for the churches lacking episcopacy which yet, as Dr. Williams admits, are “sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ.” It may be wished that Canon Williams had extended his discussion beyond an approval of the initial sentence of the Lambeth “Appeal to all Christian People” in 1920; and had considered the problem of non-episcopal ministries both in England and abroad in relation to his interpretation of the first millenium of Christian history. Attention should be given to his contention that “the controversy is not one between episcopacy as such on the one side and presbyterianism as such on the other; it is rather between the principle of transmission, which underlies both catholic episcopalianism and high-church presbyterianism and what may be called the principle of non-transmission or of *ad hoc* appointment which is characteristic of Independency or Congregationalism.”

This goes far; but even the Congregationalist theory of church order is that authority is from above, from Christ, but mediated through the congregation, and transmitted therefore by its commission. In relation to the ancient Monophysites and Nestorians, Dr. Williams argues that if they “possess a real baptism and eucharist” (which he believes to be the case) “then they, or at least some of them, must possess a real union with Christ; and what more has the Great Church to offer?” To those who are persuaded of the reality of the eucharist of the Congregationalist Christian, the same inference follows; and the attempt to drive a coach and four through the ecclesiastical history of the period before 1054 in order to embrace the Non-Episcopal churches within the *pomærium* is an exercise of ingenuity which fails of convic-

tion. Dr. Williams would reply that such a standpoint is a contemning of antiquity; but it is only so when an artificial attempt is made to treat the first Christian millennium as the norm and touchstone for all succeeding epochs. One may wish that the writer had pushed his argument further in regard to the Ministries and Sacraments of Non-Episcopal churches; for by its verdict thereon the appeal to the Undivided Church must also pass judgment on its own value.

In applying his conception of authority as a blend of Scripture and tradition, Dr. Williams writes instructively on the practice of the Invocation of the Saints. Here again he does not altogether grapple with the fundamental difficulty which prevents many churchmen from taking the step from comprecation to invocation; namely the impossibility of believing that through invocation any grace may be bestowed upon the person praying which would not have been bestowed in equal proportion in response to prayer addressed directly to God the Father through Jesus Christ and in the power of the Holy Spirit. More serious is the fact that the writer deals with the *pomæria* of theology rather than with certain essentials much called in question to-day. To what extent, for example, does the acceptance of Dr. Williams's canon of authority require a literal assent to and interpretation of, the clauses in the Creed relating to the Virgin Birth and Physical Resurrection of Christ? It is not clear whether he stands with Bishop Gore or with the school of Knox and Vidler. Yet such problems are vital, and inescapable. In a former discussion (with Dr. Sanday) of *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*, Dr. Williams confessed that "if at any future time an ostrakon or a papyrus leaf is unearthed at Nazareth which proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that Jesus was the son of Joseph, . . . he would frankly admit that catholic Christianity had tumbled down with a crash, and he would proceed to look round for some other theory of the universe." It is pertinent to ask if Northern Catholicism stands or falls upon acceptance of the Virgin Birth?

That such questions are not impertinent may be argued from the fact of the comprehensive character of the Church of England. If Dr. Williams's companion in the survey of the problem of authority had been a well-informed English churchman rather than a Japanese visitor, he might perhaps

have asked other questions to which other answers would have been given. He might have enquired of the attitude and relations of the Anglo-Catholic movement to the other traditions of theology and devotion within the *Ecclesia Anglicana*. It is significant perhaps that the Anglican authors of *Northern Catholicism* tend to assume an identification of the Anglo-Catholic movement with the Church of England; though an editorial footnote carefully qualifies the assertion of a foreign contributor, that the articles of the Synod of Dort "were not drawn up without the advice and agreement of certain Anglican divines who were sent to take part in the synod by James I," by the observation that "except by the Puritan divines, these Articles were not favourably received in England and that no attempt was made to secure their official adoption by the Anglican Church." The proper distinction here made between the dominant Puritan party and the official attitude of the Church of England may be applied with equal pertinence to the relationship between the Anglo-Catholic movement and the contemporary church. Despite obvious affinities with other churches, as well Episcopal as non-Episcopal, the *Ecclesia Anglicana* since its Reformation has developed along lines in many ways peculiar to itself and has fashioned a tradition of faith and practice characterised by independent features. Its outstanding particularity, that of comprehensiveness, is universally recognised. But, to take a less-known though important example, Archbishop John Sharp, the confessor of Queen Anne and a high churchman of undoubted probity, so interpreted the relations of the English Church to Christians of non-Episcopal churches both at home and abroad, or to declare his own readiness when abroad to communicate with the Calvinist and Lutheran churches of Europe, and in England to recommend Ralph Thoresby of Leeds, albeit a Dissenter and unconfirmed, to communicate monthly at the parish church whilst attending a dissenting chapel on other Sundays. Herein Sharp represented, not personal idiosyncrasy, but Caroline high church tradition. Against such Anglican customs no appeal to the history of the first Christian millennium may be allowed; and in such cases the essential weakness of such an appeal to a period, severed artificially from succeeding centuries, is evident.

Notwithstanding detailed points of criticism or query, the issue of *Northern Catholicism* constitutes a valuable contribution to the cause of unity within the Anglican Church. Dr. Williams's essay is a courageous and constructive attempt to set the feet of his brethren, "the charcoal burner and his pastors and teachers," along the first stages of the road towards a truly liberal Catholicism. Nor in this relation may the significance of the Dean of Rochester's essay be overestimated. Belief and practice being essentially one, and the unity between the *lex orandi* and the *lex credendi* being evident, the contribution of Dr. Underhill may certainly be placed side by side with that of Dr. Williams in importance. Despite the contrast between the brevity of one and the length of the other, they are essentially one in spirit and of equal value. Directed by the advice of such counsellors, the theologians and priests of the Anglo-Catholic movement may make a contribution of permanent and imperishable value to the religious and theological tradition of the Anglican Communion. This may be a consolatory compensation for the lapse of the new Germany from the Tacitean attachment to constitutional authority predicated of it in Dr. Williams's Preface.

NORMAN SYKES.

Church and People. A History of the Church of England from William Wilberforce to *Lux Mundi*. 1789-1889. By S. C. CARPENTER. (S.P.C.K.).

THE Master of the Temple is to be congratulated heartily upon the publication of his history of the English church during the nineteenth century. His volume is far the best of the numerous historical surveys evoked by the Centenary celebration of the Oxford Movement. Indeed it will be as indispensable for the study of the nineteenth century as are the studies of Abbey and Overton for the eighteenth century. Mr. Carpenter has produced a work of notable sympathy and understanding. It is proper to relate its appearance to the centenary events of this year, for the author writes from the standpoint of a disciple of the Tractarian revival, and depicts the ecclesiastical events of his period in reference to that movement. But this does not mean that, after the pattern of so many centenary

publications, his book is a *livre de circonstance*. On the contrary no feature of his pages is more noteworthy and more admirable than his sympathetic interpretation of other traditions of churchmanship than the Tractarian, especially his just estimate of the real services to the church of Blomfield and other authors of the moderate reforms of the Ecclesiastical Commission. In the catholicity of his sympathies and the sobriety of his judgment the Master stands alone among historians of the Oxford Movement; particular examples of which may be seen in the balance and penetration of his appreciation of Thomas Arnold and Dean Stanley.

It is hardly necessary to state that Mr. Carpenter is well-informed, and treads with sure step amidst a great variety of subjects. He is singularly adept in delineating the social conditions and problems of the nineteenth century and in relating thereto the ecclesiastical events of which he writes. Perhaps his best chapters are those dealing with the movement of thought, though the present reader has found every chapter to contain something of instruction and profit. It is difficult to do justice in a review to the many-sided characteristics of Mr. Carpenter's survey, which embraces such themes as education, theology, the organisation of dioceses and parishes, social problems, and the missionary expansion of the church. The final verdict upon his book must certainly be one of appreciation and praise alike of his knowledge and his sympathetic interpretation of the several schools of churchmanship, albeit he writes always from the standpoint of the Tractarian revival.

Perhaps the keynote to his position may be given in his own words: "If Stubbs is right in saying that 'the whole of the constitutional history of England is little more than a commentary on Magna Carta,' as much can be said of the Oxford Movement and the English church history of 1833-1933" (p. 113). The comparison is indeed apt; for since Stubbs' day the critical studies of historians have established a view of the Great Charter as essentially a feudal and reactionary document in its contemporary setting, designed to defend feudal privileges against the Crown, rather than a foreshadowing of democratic principles, but a document which has exercised so profound an influence on English history by reason of the novel interpretations placed upon it by later

generations, from the men of the seventeenth century downwards. The fitness of this analogy to the Oxford Movement is well brought out by Mr. Carpenter's volume, and this skilful exegesis is one of its chief merits. In its attitude towards theological liberalism the Anglo-Catholic movement has disavowed entirely the standpoint of the Tractarian leaders; in its social sympathies it has been affected more profoundly by the school of Maurice and Kingsley than by any of its authentic disciples; and in the fracture of the alliance with political toryism characteristic of its Oxford founders, it has shewn an even more marked elasticity. The contemporary Anglo-Catholic movement, frankly modernist in theology and zealous in all works of social amelioration has indeed travelled far from its origins. Even in the chief doctrine of the Tractarians, that of the church with its corollaries of apostolic succession and episcopacy, few Anglo-Catholic scholars of to-day would echo the harsh words of Keble's Assize sermon concerning non-episcopal churches. The branch-theory of the Catholic church has broken down; and the times are propitious for the heirs of the Tractarians to advance to a more adequate theory of the church, in which, as Mr. Carpenter testifies, they will have something to learn from Thomas Arnold and more from the Lambeth Conference appeal of 1920.

It may be pertinent to observe that Mr. Carpenter has judged rightly in beginning his volume with 1789, for the outbreak of the French Revolution marked the end of the solid conservatism of the eighteenth century, and the tumultuous beginning of its successor. It is regrettable therefore that he has failed to see in Bishop Richard Watson anything more than the traditional absentee prelate (though the stories of his negligence are not altogether in accordance with fact), since the real cause of the unpopularity of that bishop lay in his insistence alike to ministers of state and primates upon the necessity of administrative and financial reform in the ecclesiastical constitution. Watson realised clearly that clerical residence could not be enforced without a redistribution of revenues; and if his episcopal superiors or the political ministers had been sufficiently courageous to give ear to his demands, the Church of England would have been better able to cope with the

manifold problems awaiting solution at the end of the Napoleonic wars.

The chief criticism engendered by Mr. Carpenter's book is the doubt whether the depreciation of the eighteenth century English church is either accurate history or sound controversial tactics. Thus he quotes the neglect of the diocese of Norwich in consequence of the prolonged episcopate of Bathurst as evidence of the state of the pre-Tractarian church. Precisely the same evidence may be alleged against the Caroline church from the episcopate of Barlow at Lincoln from 1675-92, since that prelate never visited his diocese in person nor saw his cathedral church during his tenure of the see; or against the bishops of Anne's reign from the protracted negligence of Cumberland at Peterborough from 1691-1718. The successors of both these bishops, Tenison at Lincoln and White Kennett at Peterborough had to grapple with vast arrears of confirmations and other duties. The question at issue is whether Bathurst, Barlow, and Cumberland were typical, or exceptional, of their generation; and unless Mr. Carpenter is able to produce convincing evidence that Bathurst is typical and that Barlow and Cumberland were not, the quotation of this item of his episcopate is bad history and controversy. A like criticism may be offered of his citation as typical of the confirmation standards of the day, of the examples of Sparke of Ely in 1833. Again the present writer is persuaded that this was an exception, as indeed Mr. Carpenter cautiously admits. Further the complaints of the confusion and chaos prevalent at confirmations had been part of the stock-in-trade of the seventeenth century Puritans, who objected to the practice of the Caroline high church bishops on exactly the same grounds as Ollard, and Mr. Carpenter quoting him, criticise the pre-Tractarian episcopate. Charles II indeed had promised the revival of bishops suffragan to remedy this evil, but the Anglican prelates shewed little zeal for the performance of the promise. It is singular also that in his judicious estimate of the services of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce to the church, Mr. Carpenter does not draw the obvious comparison with Gilbert Burnet of Sarum, who anticipated in the previous century practically all the improved methods of embertide conferences with ordinands, and of confirmations of the laity, in addition to the establishment at his own cost of a

theological college at Salisbury. But Burnet was too zealous for the high church and tory clergy of his day; and the moral of his efforts was plainly that neither zeal nor negligence are the peculiar province of any one school in the church. Other minor points, illustrating the same standpoint, are the ascription of the suppression of Convocation in 1717 to Walpole, who was not even a member of the ministry of state which counselled the prorogation; and the omission to mention the precedent suppression from 1664 to 1689 during the heyday of Caroline high churchmanship. Further it is quite unhistorical to suggest that the refusal of the Walpole and Newcastle to allow the establishment of an Anglican episcopate in America was due to "the idea that a bishop was a member of the House of Lords, who travelled in a coach and would be quite out of place in remote and semi-barbarous colonies" (p. 460). The refusal was due to the opposition of the colonists, for the establishment of episcopacy would have been far more potent than the Stamp Act to provoke rebellion, as contemporary evidence plainly shews; and the reason for this opposition lay nowhere else than in the fact that the scheme for the planting of an episcopate originated with Laud, whose desire to maintain a supervision over the fugitives who had fled from his régime in England, was remembered by the colonists, who were resolved henceforth to resist all attempts to plant the ecclesiastical discipline amongst them. The real cause of the failure of all efforts towards the creation of an American episcopate lay in the identification of the project in the minds of the colonists with Archbishop Laud's original proposal. The whig statesmen of the succeeding century had to decide whether the execution of the design was worth the hazard of the rebellion, which contemporaries believed would be its inevitable sequence.

The mention of these minor points should not exaggerate their importance, nor obscure the outstanding merits of the volume. It is only because Mr. Carpenter has achieved so fair and just a standard of judgment in relation to the men and movements of the nineteenth century that the reader would wish the same virtues to appear in relation to the eighteenth. For the rest, the Master of the Temple shares the disciple's conviction of the finality of the Oxford and Anglo-Catholic movements within the Church, testing other traditions by their

relations thereto and believing that it lies within the genius of the Catholic tradition to absorb into itself their best elements. Such has been the optimistic belief in their own dominance of the previous ecclesiastical movements within the Reformed English Church: so did the Calvinists of Elizabeth's day interpret their relations to the Arminian school; so did the Caroline high churchmen of Charles I and II regard the Puritans and Latitudinarians who were destined to be their supplanters; and so did the men of Latitude esteem the Evangelical and High Church traditions which in turn were to have their day of predominance. Perhaps the most valuable feature of Mr. Carpenter's book, as it is certainly not the least interesting, is the gift of interpretation and synthesis which enables him to emphasise those elements of the Tractarian revival which have made an abiding contribution to the fullness of the heritage of the English Church, and which will continue when other movements have usurped its place as the dominant influence upon the contemporary ecclesiastical society.

NORMAN SYKES.

A Survey of Mystical Symbolism. By MARY ANITA EWER. pp. 234. (S.P.C.K.). 3s. net.

As an exponent of mysticism Miss Ewer is the polar opposite of Dom Louis Savinien, who long ago wrote that mysticism does not exist outside the Roman Catholic Church; she differs very widely from the more inclusive view of Abbot Butler, who, in a well known passage of *Western Mysticism*, shut out from it every sort of activity, from magic and all its dark allies, through Christian science and every phase of human spun theory to mere sentimental dreaminess and vague hypothesis. He refused to admit "seeing God in nature," rigorously confining his subject matter to

"the experimental perception of God's presence and being," and especially "union with God"—a union that is not merely psychological, in conforming the will to God's will, but it may be said, ontological of the soul with God, spirit with spirit.

Since he deals almost entirely with union, it is not surprising that he leaves aside the question, which some would ask, can

natural beauty be an element in illumination, in Cardinal Bellarmine's sense?—

a man may by the works of God, that is by creatures, ascend unto the knowledge and love of God.

Exclusive stress on the mystical goal, union (not uncommon just now) may sometimes lead to neglect or obscuring of the mystical process, through purgation and illumination.

Miss Ewer claims that she and C. Jinarajadasa (*The Nature of Mysticism*, Madras, 1917), are alone in including under "the hydra-headed thing called mysticism," such widely sundered "experiences" as what she calls "R.C. sainthood," mystery religions, Hinduism and Islamism, on and on through endless man-made systems to Quietism and Quakerism, never forgetting the more intellectual, from Platonism to Taoism, all forms of occultism, "nature worship," the Kabbala, and so forth: indeed "a concatenation accordingly"!

These, with two minor exceptions, she declares to be related because they indicate "conscious relationship between the person and some greater unity," or, as she expresses it elsewhere, because a "thread of unity is present and . . . it can be seen with clarity if one looks in the right place." On p. 188, she furnishes a diagram, calling it "a square" (which mathematically it chances not to be) wherein all these disparate entities are shewn together. This is to gain "clearness," though it does not necessarily carry conviction. The two exceptions are, in her own words,

two evil siblings of mysticism . . . a certain form of insanity and self-seeking magic.

Schizo-phrenia she calls this insanity. It does not occur in the "N. E. D.," but the luckless mortal, dubbed a schizo-phrenic, appears, from derivation and context, to mean one split in the wits through fear. Sibling of course is an early English word, a convenient term for one akin, and, though it seems not to occur in middle English, was possibly carried by dialect to America, where it has lived on. These are all trifles compared with her declaration that

the diversity within mysticism is caused first by differences in emphasis in regard to the nature of the greater unity, and second by differences in the type of personal response exhibited by the mystic (p. 16).

Obviously, this reduces mysticism from a two-sided reality to a vague, variant state, depending on human elements; viz., emphasis of belief (or even opinion) and temperamental phases. It cannot e.g. include Dom Butler's claim that

the whole line of great mystics found . . . its simplest and most arresting expression in these words of St. Augustine (*Mens mea pervenit ad Id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus*. (Conf. vii, 23).

Indubitably, St. Augustine was referring to a "fact" outside himself, not merely to "emphasis" or human response; and, in Miss Ewer's view, response to what?

Her theory demands much space for adequate exposition, and possibly seems less comprehensible because she only allows it part of a ten-page introduction, with an appendix later on; then she turns to her main subject, confusingly called mystical symbolism—as brief and complete a contradiction in terms as ingenuity could devise. Mysticism, if any quite plain statement about it is possible, is immediate contact; symbolism, the representation of one thing by another, is essentially mediate. Her later chapters however suggest that her title misleads, her apparent purpose being to consider the *expression*—symbolical of necessity to her—of mystical experience by those having it. Two extracts may be the clearest way of indicating the gulf between her and traditional mystics. She writes:

Is there or is there not, in this or that inner stimulus, a sufficient basis for some degree of evaluation of my relationship to the divine? . . . It is through inner stimuli which occasionally rise to the intensity which causes the mystic, of whatever school, to exclaim, This experience is ineffable! and to speak about it in symbolic language for the benefit of his fellow mystics and the bewilderment of the literal minded. Not the value-judgment, but the inner stimulus is the centre of distinctively mystic experience (p. 22).

In the great xxviiith chapter of her *Life*, St. Teresa wrote:

On the festival of glorious St. Peter, being in prayer, I saw, or rather—for I saw nothing with my body's eyes or my soul's—I felt Jesus Christ close to me; I saw it was he who was speaking to me . . . Though it cost me much, I went at once to tell my confessor. He asked me, In what

form I saw him? I said I did not see him. "How then," he replied, "could you know it was Jesus Christ?" I said I did not know how; the thing was evident. I resorted to various comparisons; but, to my mind, not one can be found that has any relation to a vision of this kind. Such is the fundamental gap between so great and profoundly experienced a saint's direct simplicity, and the philosophically garbed emptiness of these so-called "evaluations." With her apt wit, and almost as if she foresaw to-day and its fashions, St. Teresa added:

There is nothing surprising in the fact that poor ignorant women like me lack words for expressing these things; doubtless the learned can give information about them more easily.

John of the Cross was learned enough; yet he, in the second book of *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, classified and expounded these tremendous experiences without any recourse to technical obscure terms. However, as Miss Ewer announces that she

entertains no vain hopes of presenting mystic union and its symbolisms in a language "understood of the people,"

no one need complain, save perhaps because she waited to say so until she was more than half-way through her book. Earlier warning might save some readers' time.

With a simpler title, such as *Symbolism and Spiritual Life*, the book's contents could have been more correctly guessed. However, as a study of some ways and uses of symbolism it is, at times, interesting, and, owing to the author's wide reading, informative to the unliterary. In its less psychological moments, it can even be "understood of the people."

She supplies an inadequate index to subject matter, none to authors. A selected biography, of eighteen pages, may be useful, but is no substitute for an index, in a book which refers to such a mixed multitude of writers.

GERALDINE HODGSON.

SHORT NOTICES

Calvinism and Evangelism in England, especially among the Baptists. By W. T. WHITLY. (The Kingsgate Press). 1s. 6d.

IN a modest pamphlet Dr. Whitly carefully collects the connexion between Calvinism and Evangelism, and collects them from the angle of the Baptist body. We are not much concerned with the moral he draws in his modern approach to the problem on the lines of to-day. We are, however, very much concerned with the out-of-the-way facts which he contrives to garner, and these facts provide stimulus and suggestion for the student of ecclesiastical affairs.

R.H.M.

The Life of John Colet. By Sir J. A. R. MARRIOTT. (Methuen). 6s.

THE late J. H. Lupton practically bestowed a lifetime on his investigation of the career of Colet and of the treatises which he published. These treatises Lupton accurately edited, and thus placed them in the hands of all who care to grasp the true significance of one of the most remarkable sons of the Church of England at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Lupton's editions and his fine biography of Colet are out of print, and hard to procure, and accordingly we welcome the workmanlike survey of the great Dean of St. Paul's which Sir J. A. R. Marriott has supplied. He is an historian of tried merit, and the life of John Colet is clearly a congenial subject to him. The man as well as the ecclesiastical statesman stands out clearly against the background of the very difficult transition period in which his lot was cast. It is nothing short of amazing to note how modern-minded the Dean was. His review of the Mosaic account of the Creation at times takes us aback by the modernity of its outlook. For he compels us to realise that the view of the Creation as a six days' work was largely, if not entirely, the outcome of Milton's "Paradise Lost." This biography ends with a balanced outlook on the large place occupied by Dean Colet in the pages of history.

R.H.M.

The Roman Church and the Church of England. By R. H. MALDEN. (Oxford University Press). 3s. 6d.

THE motto of a character in "Alice in Wonderland" is that what I say three times is true, and this apparently is the motto of the Church of Rome. What it says three times is true, no matter

how inconveniently facts conflict with the thrice-repeated declaration. There is room, then, for the modest treatise which the new Dean of Wells publishes. In his account of the rise of the Papal power, the attitude of England towards the Papacy, the rise of the Reformation, and Anglican ideals, he travels along a well-beaten track. Notwithstanding, he has things to say, and he says them with pith and point, and we can, therefore, recommend his book to all who care to see in a handy form the attitude of the Church of England towards the Roman communion. To the scholar it is evident how much hard reading and thinking have gone to the making of this lucid piece of work. There is a helpful note on the position of Church and State in England.

R.H.M.

Evangelical Influence in English Life. By the BISHOP OF BARKING. (Macmillan). 5s.

IN such a large subject as the influence of the Evangelicals in English life, Dr. Inskip cannot hope to be more than suggestive, especially when we consider the circumstance that he professes to deal with secular as well as ecclesiastical and to contrive to pack it all into little more than two hundred pages. Notwithstanding, he is markedly suggestive. He sets out, appropriately enough, with the background of evangelical life and tradition, and then he turns to the pages of history to see how far this life and tradition have translated themselves into actuality. Then he lays stress on John Wyclif, who is by no means the morning star of the Reformation that the Bishop imagines. The Reformation itself, religion in the seventeenth century, and the evangelical revival are the inevitable matters upon which he dilates. The abolition of slavery, our debt to Lord Shaftesbury, and the honourable record of the Evangelicals in missionary work overseas all receive due recognition. As this is the centenary of the labours of William Wilberforce, we wish to elaborate one point. It is that singular union of the current of humanitarianism with the current of Evangelicalism which the career of Wilberforce aptly illustrates. Cruelty to man or to animal was not more widespread in Wilberforce's time than in Beccaria's. The conditions over Europe remained pretty much the same, yet mankind suddenly became conscious of conditions that they had not noticed before, and found them intolerable. Evangelicalism can in England claim credit for this changed attitude, yet religion was not the only cause, for in France it was accompanied by a great wave of scepticism advancing to atheism. Nor can it be ascribed to intellectual advance, for many of the objects had nothing to do with knowledge or reason, and the humanitarians

of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were conspicuously inferior to the intellectual giants of the seventeenth century. It is true that the latter part of the eighteenth century was called the Age of Reason, and the men of that day prided themselves on their intellectual superiority ; but at that very time knowledge, once pursued for its own sake, was becoming the handmaid of utility, and the claims of the body were taking the precedence that has been allowed them in increasing measure ever since. The humanitarian movement was a matter of feeling, not of intellectual or spiritual activity.

R.H.M.

A Philosophy of Religion. By AMBROSIUS CZAKO. (Allenson). 5s. net.

IN VIEW of Dr. Micklem's eulogistic Foreword one approaches this book with unusually keen expectations. But I regret my own inability to accept his high estimate. For while the author's intentions and sentiments are excellent, I can find very little of any substantial value. The treatment of all the main issues is deplorably vague and the arguments confused, if not in fact illogically circular ; and to suggest that the work "might almost be called one of the few philosophies of Christianity since the Middle Ages" seems to me to verge upon absurdity. Not, of course, that its brevity in itself is a defect, since it is a depressing reflection that most philosophies would gain by condensation. It is the absence of that clarity of insight and expression, of that mastery of the problems and of some sort at least of solutions, which in this instance contradicts the volume's own Title. There are far too many thoroughly commonplace reflections, such as "it is the task of the philosophy of religion to find and express that which is contained in the religious life," as though one would anticipate an exposition of Relativity ; or that "authority should be made dependent on goodness, not goodness upon authority." The general attitude, similarly, while undeniably personal and sincere, is from the philosophic standpoint—which, it must be remembered, is that adopted by the author himself—extremely narrow. "A religious man" is defined as "a man who cannot live without God" : or alternatively, religion "is moral life on the basis of our dependence on God." That this is an indispensable type of religion, which often attains the highest possible level of development, is unquestionable. But this by no means justifies its selection as a philosophically universal definition. And when we are informed that "Catholic theology finds the distinctive mark of being a Catholic in intellectual assent to the material dogma," while for Protestantism, on the contrary, "the way of expression

is more a moral life than a devotional," one is almost compelled to question the writer's competence to deal with his subject otherwise than as a sincere controversialist, rather than a philosopher who is likely to rival his historic predecessors.

This suspicion is intensified by such dogmatic statements as "the child has no God"; if this is true, why must we "become as little children?" Again, "it is Jesus whom we regard as our Father"; "Jesus was a revolutionary; the Church of authority is opposed to any revolution." Of course there is a kernel of truth here; unfortunately it is concealed within a thick shell of superficiality. Similarly as to personality, which is defined as "a being that is determined both by body and by soul," so that "the survival of personality is unimaginable because it involves the dissolution of bodily reality." It appears difficult to harmonise this with the author's insistence on divine personality, even if we interpret this merely as a "presupposition" or "postulate," in the sense that to regard God as personal "does not mean that we have recognised his essential nature."

Nor has self-contradiction been altogether excluded as it should be in genuinely philosophic discussion. In the first place, "man is not deterred by theoretical difficulties, and is justified in his defiance of consistency." As a defence of intuition or mysticism this is sufficiently familiar. As such, it may even be valid; but it seems impossible to reconcile it with the principle that human "life is rational; it is made such by the belief in God. The religious life of mankind became rational" owing to the influence of Jesus. Surely to be "rational" means confronting and resolving "theoretical difficulties" as consistently as is possible; otherwise the term loses all significance.

I regret that my comments are so adversely critical. But this is simply the outcome of taking the book's Title seriously; and it does not necessarily follow that because a person's own spiritual experience has been strenuous and painful, he is therefore competent to outline a valuable philosophy of religion. Apart from this aspect of the situation, the book forms an interesting discussion of several prominent features of current controversy, and may serve to introduce a writer, already fairly well known on the Continent, to English readers.

J.E.T.

Foundations of the Philosophy of Value. By H. OSBORNE. (Cambridge University Press). 8s. 6d. net.

THIS is an unusually able, though at the same time definitely technical, discussion of a class of problems that recent thought has brought into growing prominence. Mr. Osborne shows an equal mastery of the history of his subject and of the subtleties

of current controversies, to which he contributes effective and original criticism of the principal hypotheses advanced during the last few decades by several leading thinkers. His own views unquestionably deserve the close attention of all readers who are specially interested in Valuation.

The author traces the distinctively modern attitude towards Value back to Kant, as the source of what he happily calls "the maelstrom of current theories"; but in this whirlpool he keeps a cool head and maintains a steady stroke which enable him to avoid its perilous centre. One of his most important initial principles is that "theories of Value carry with them immediate implications about the nature of Reality. They are primarily asseverations about the nature of Reality." If this were more consistently remembered, very much of the abstractness which makes the subject so forbidding would vanish.

One of the most crucial implications of this intimate connection between Value on the one hand, and Reality on the other, is that it ultimately involves absoluteness rather than mere relativity. It is equally significant that "the appeal to direct inspection can give individual certitude but not logical certainty. It has no validity from one mind to another and cannot solve disagreements." As I have repeatedly argued in this *Review*, "logical certainty" is far too frequently suspected, if not indeed positively resented as an alien intruder into the spiritual realm. But as soon as we realise the obvious truth that Value pertains, no matter in what specific form, to all the most important factors in man's experience, it becomes clear that Mr. Osborne's contention means that "logical certainty" ought to sustain all attributions of Value without any exception, whether these are felt to be necessary in art or thought, in morals or religion.

Apart from its more technical aspects, therefore, the most interesting features in this volume are its applications to ethics and religious experience. As regards the first of these, the author holds that "the feeling of obligation is absolute"; and he cogently extends this principle to the sphere of art, since "aesthetic value is the property of being an object for which it is Right that admiring contemplation should be experienced." This standpoint at once excludes subjectivism, so that all "beauty is as independent of appreciation as are colours"—another somewhat unfashionable hypothesis at the moment, as to which I should like to rank myself beside the writer, although we must remain in the minority. He also advances the equally attractive suggestion that "a very strong argument for Theism" may be founded on "an Idealistic theory about Value, if the premise is granted that specifically religious emotions are good."

In this way Mr. Osborne arrives at the principle which I should like to call the all-inclusiveness and dominance of moral experience. "A moral being must possess the power to apprehend true propositions as true, to appreciate and create beautiful objects, to experience emotions such as love and (perhaps) religious emotions." And with this we revert to objectivity combined with absoluteness; "in every ethical situation there is a Right which is not relative to individual beliefs or emotions, and which transcends the actual moral obligation inherent in the situation and is not relative to the conscience and capacities of the agent . . . an objective fact, true of all concrete ethical situations." It is to be hoped that he will be able to discuss the bearing of these conclusions upon still wider aspects of conduct and religion.

J.E.T.

The Third Oecumenical Council and the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome. Faith Press. 1s. (Paper Cover).

IN spite of the widespread recognition of the principle of development by such great scholars as Mgrs. Duchesne and Batiffol, it seems only too clear that Papalism and "development" are uneasy bed-fellows. In the face of history and scientific modern criticism the old fashioned case for Vaticanism can scarcely be supported with sincerity. Yet the admission that development has taken place may seem to allow for the possibility of distortion or exaggeration. Hence modern apology for Papalism tends always to push the full grown Vatican position as far back into history, as a tendentious treatment of the data will allow. The recent encyclical *Lux Veritatis* is an excellent example of this method, and non-papal catholics will be grateful to the Archbishop of Athens for his careful and systematic exposure of its inherent weakness. The encyclical is as much concerned to urge that the Council of Ephesus was a protagonist of Vaticanism as of orthodox Christology. In reply the Archbishop has no difficulty in showing that not even Pope Celestine, himself, still less the Council had any notion of a Papacy, such as the Roman Church recognises to-day. As a critique of modern Roman apologetics the essay has a value out of all proportion to its length. Its price should make it accessible to a large number of English readers.

T.G.J.

The Other Half. Mainly by H. A. WILSON, Vicar of St. Augustine's, Haggerston; Author of *Ez.* (W. Knott & Son, Ltd.) 2s. 6d. net.

Saint Francis of the Hop Fields. By MILES SARGEANT. (Philip Allen). 5s. net.

EACH of these books gives an account of dealing with what used

to be called the Submerged Tenth by a priest who has learned to know his people individually, and handles the problem in terms of human life and not of statistics and returns.

Mr. Sargeant's book is the frankly and unsentimentally told story of the Hertford College Mission to Kentish hop pickers. It will be valuable to those who are engaged in similar work in other fields for its treatment of the right technique of approach to these shy and difficult creatures, in which the writer describes the difficulties and rewards of winning their confidence, the inevitable but often sickening drudgery of the initial stages, and the need for patience and self restraint in passing through the material to the spiritual aspect of mission work. Mr. Sargeant is the right kind of optimist; and only an optimist could have faced the conditions of the first year. He is not afraid or ashamed to record success; and, while he realises that he has as yet gone but a little way, he is justified in feeling that the way was richly worth travelling. For the general reader, who is not specially interested in hop pickers, or perhaps in missions at all, the book has a clear and much needed message of instruction on the life and mind of the Other Half who are so often cruelly or pedantically misrepresented. What Mr. Sargeant has learned and can teach is best summarised in his own words:

What are the people like? They are the most amazing mixture of courage and fear, of comedy and pathos, of patience and hysteria, indeed of almost all the contradictions in human nature I think that the most tragic features of their characters are their infinite patience with the terrible disadvantages under which they live, all of them the result of being exploited for centuries, and the way in which they always expect to be exploited.

That is the problem: how to cure that paralysing expectation, and enable them to lift themselves into a better air by their fine qualities of endurance and cheerfulness. Mr. Sargeant believes that the way is practical Christianity, first in the lives of those who go out to help them, and then in the lives of the hop-pickers themselves: and we may add what he certainly implies, in the individuals and classes who have been for centuries consciously or unconsciously exploiting them.

Readers of the *Church Quarterly Review* should already be familiar with *E2*, "a small book wholly composed of articles, verses, and essays which had appeared in that . . . periodical," the Parish Magazine of St. Augustine's, Haggerston, "and sold on behalf of that terrible Church": and it is much to be hoped that they will welcome, though perhaps with mixed feelings, and buy, its successor *The Other Half*. Mr. Wilson's second venture has all the salient characteristics of *E2* with some-

thing added. Its challenge is still wider and deeper. There is still the intimate appreciation of the tragedy and humour of the lives of the poor in East London which can only be learned by actual contact: the artlessly artful mastery of English, which is not, *pace* Mr. Wilson, the common heritage of Parish Magazines: and the uncompromising claim to full Catholic doctrine and practice and the assertion of its unique spiritual and ethical value. It is this claim and this assertion which are likely, as it seems to us, to produce a violent reaction in some quarters. There is nothing in form, and probably nothing in intention, provocative about the book. It attacks nobody, and simply tells the reader what they do and teach at St. Augustine's. But it is exactly this quietness and confidence in Mr. Wilson, his taking for granted things which are commonly regarded as vexed questions, that will stimulate those who share his convictions, and exasperate those who regard them as dangerous. Mr. Wilson is determined to preach the Faith, the whole Faith, and nothing but the Faith without deduction or compromise; and by his courage and frankness he does the hostile and the half-hearted the great service of compelling them to face the facts and acknowledge or disprove the results of his ministry.

Apart from this main issue *The Other Half* has much to recommend it. The parabolising of Alice in Wonderland is a remarkable *tour de force*; the section on Communion will be a present help to many Priests in their work with Confirmands and others: and these are only two good things taken almost at random from the whole. Everyone should study the prosaic map of East London on the front, and Clare Dawson's charming poetical map on the back of the cover.

J.H.F.P.

The House of the Spirit ; The Contemplative Life for Lay- People.

By F. POHL. pp. 84. (Burns, Oates & Washbourne). 3s. net.

THIS book is of a type none too frequent. It deals with "supernatural sanctity and contemplation," not as these are the lot of priests or the religious, but, so the author insists, as they may be for those who live "in the world." Like *Our Daily Work*, whether or no that be Richard Hermit's, it is addressed to men and women of "active life." Too often, "ordinary people" read great mystical treatises, and then try to apply to life in the world recommendations addressed to members of Orders and others withdrawn from secular life. Even *The Imitation* was not addressed to the laity. But *The House of the Spirit* written throughout in the untechnical language of cultivated and spiritually minded people is meant as guidance for those who cannot withdraw. The title's meaning and the book's subject are simply set out in a paragraph at the beginning:

Those called to live in the House of the Spirit are of two kinds : those who are able to live the solitary life without mixing to any great extent with other people, and those who live in the midst of the wear and tear of business life, social life, family life and so on. The first type is rare, but is assuredly to be found ; the second is not infrequent. It is to these that this book is mainly addressed.

If anyone says that solitary life is obviously impossible in such "wear and tear," let him not suppose the book proposes something fanciful, something never yet achieved. Readers of Dom Jamet's *Marie de l'Incarnation* (the great Ursuline of seventeenth century Canada) will remember that in youth in France, left a widow, and not for some years to be professed, she superintended her brother-in-law's intricate business. He, an artillery officer, but charged with the transport of merchandize throughout the realm of Louis XIII, was often absent ; then she was in charge. She has recorded her experience :

Je me suis trouvéé parmi le bruit des marchands, et cependant mon esprit était abîmé dans cette divine Majesté. . . . Je passais presque les jours entiers dans une écurie qui servait de magasin. . . . Ma compagnie ordinaire était des crocheteurs, des charretiers, et même cinquante ou soixante chevaux dont il fallait que j'eusse le soin. . . . Et cependant tous ces tracas ne me détournaient point de Dieu, mais plutôt je m'y sentais fortifiée, parce que tout était pour la charité et non pour mon profit particulier.

Possibly, we make "business" our too frequent excuse. Anyhow, the underlying assumption of this small book is that the solitary life can be lived in "tous ces tracas," and that not a few are called to it. Doubtless, such a book could have dangers for the undisciplined or sentimentally inclined ; but has it not been well said that a thing which can do no harm can do no good ? Rightly read—and attention may be specially drawn to the middle chapters, VI to XI, and to the paragraph on "perfection" in the IVth—it can hardly fail to shed light in some grey places ; and if there be any who cannot carry it out wholly, they will not read it unrewarded.

It is in fact, and to some must prove, a remarkable, unforgettable book : so short yet so full ; so apt in quiet correction of too common blunders ; so fervent yet, as in the chapter on compensations, packed with common sense ; so real and sincere ; so uncompromising and withal tender and understanding. Here are the stillness of contemplation, the succour of unbreakable patient courage, here, in this present age, distracted as it is by noise and fear : here, in short, is genuine mysticism, unalterable, indestructible down the years.

G.H.

PERIODICALS.

The Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXXIV. No. 135. July, 1933. Milford). F. C. Burkitt: (1) Joseph Armitage Robinson; (2) The New Manichaean Documents; Jackson and Lake 'The Beginnings of Christianity, IV-V.' B. H. Streeter: The Primitive Text of the Acts [Reviews A. C. Clark 'Acts']. G. Dix: Didache and Diatessaron. M. Frost: Notes on the *Te Deum*. L. Prestige: Agen[n]etos and cognate words in Athanasius. A. Souter: A MS. of St. Augustine at Perth, Scotland. P. L. Hedley: 'Diaboulia.' B. T. D. Smith: Taylor 'The Formation of the Gospel Tradition'; Grant 'The Growth of the Gospels.' C. H. Dodd: Kittel 'Theologisches Wörterbuch zum N.T. Lieff. I-VII' (5 pp.). F. R. Tennant: Mensching 'Die Idee der Sünde'; Morgan 'The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine'; D'Arcy 'The Nature of Belief'; Lilley 'Religion and Revelation'; Gibson 'The Philosophy of Descartes.' R. B. Hoyle: Guitton 'Le Temps et l'Eternité chez Plotin et St. Augustin' and 'La Philosophie de Newman.' J. K. Mozley: Hicks 'The Fullness of Sacrifice' (11pp.). H. M. Hughes: Brasnett 'The Suffering of the Impassible God' and 'The Infinity of God.' A. C. Bouquet: Jordan 'Development of Religious Toleration in England'; Arpee 'The Atonement in Experience'; Underhill 'The Golden Sequence.' J. B. Horner: Rhys Davies 'Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students' (4 pp.); Streeter 'The Buddha and the Christ' (5 pp.). E. C. Ratcliff: Villien 'The History and Liturgy of the Sacraments' Ellard 'Ordination Anointings'; King 'Notes on the Catholic Liturgies.' W. S. Porter: 'Antiphonarium Mozarabicum de la Cathedral de Leon' (4 pp.). S. H. Thomson: Warichez 'Les Disputations de Simon de Tournai'; Martin 'Oeuvres de Robert de Melun, I.' A. J. Macdonald: Fournier et Le Bras 'Histoire des Collections Canoniques en Occident, I-II.' L. E. Binns: Laistner 'Thought and Letters in Western Europe, A.D. 500-900'; Stasiewski 'Der hl. Bernardin von Siena.' S. Gaselee: Crum 'A Coptic Dictionary, II-III.' F. Granger: Kenyon 'Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome.' A. Nairne: Lester Garland 'Religious Philosophy of Baron von Hügel.'

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The Journal of Religion (Vol. XIII. No. 3. July, 1933. Chicago University Press). S. Mathews: The Function of the Divinity School. M. Burrows: Jew and Arab in Palestine. D. C. Holton: Konko Kyo. A Modern Japanese Monotheism. C. H. Moehlman: The Origin of the Apostles' Creed. S. B. Freehof: Silverstone 'Aquila and Onkelos.' C. E. Purinton: Scott 'Literature of the N.T.' E. F. Scott: Meinertz 'Einleitung in das N.T., 4te Aufl.' Grant 'Growth of the Gospels'; Goguel 'La Foi à la Resurrection de Jésus dans le Christianisme primitif.' M. E. Andrews: Guntermann 'Die Eschatologie des hl. Paulus'; Fuchs 'Christus u. der Geist bei Paulus.' H. R. Willoughby: Box 'Early Christianity and its Rivals'; Levison 'The Jewish

Background of Christianity.' E. C. Colwell : Lamsa 'My Neighbor Jesus' (very critical). S. J. Case : Lietzmann 'Geschichte der alten Kirche, I.' S. Mathews : McGiffert 'History of Christian Thought, II.' Q. Breen : Church 'The Italian Reformers, 1534-64' (laudatory). J. T. McNeill : Patry 'Philippe du Plessis-Mornay.' A. W. Nagler : Sweet 'Methodism in American History' (favourable). H. Lindley : Wright 'Literary History of the Early Friends, 1650-1725.' W. W. Sweet : Arbough 'Revelation in Mormonism.' W. H. Bernhardt : Schjelderu 'Upeber drei Haupttypen der religiösen Erlebnisformen u. ihre psychologische Grundlage.' W. Pauck : Brunner 'Das Gebot u. die Ordnungen.' E. E. Aubrey : Quick 'The Ground of Faith and the Chaos of Thought.' C. T. Holman : Worcester 'Making Life Better.' R. L. Sutherland : Mays and Nicholson 'The Negro's Church.'

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The Quarterly Review (No. 517. July, 1933. John Murray). I. Cohen: The Jews in Germany. R. S. Conway: Julius Caesar. Man or Superman? The Judicial Bench and Reform. M. Burr: Georgia. W. F. Gray: Wilberforce and the Anti-Slavery Movement. D. Gordon: The Effect of Circumstances upon Habit. F. Darvall: President Roosevelt's Policy. D. V. Duff: The Arabs and the Jewish National Home. Egon Friedell. Sir F. Pollock, Bart.: Talkers I have known. Don Luigi Sturzo: Fascism and Nazism.

Nicolson 'Peacemaking, 1919.' Sheldon 'Transition from Roman Britain to Christian England, A.D. 368-664.' Housman 'The Name and Nature of Poetry.' Owst 'Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England.' Boul'honne 'George Eliot.' Reade 'The Doctor's Life, 1735-40.'

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Polman: Volz 'Drei Schriften gegen Luthers Schmalkaldische Artikel von Cochläus, Witzel u. Hoffmeister.' F. Cabrol: Lowther Clarke and Harris (edd.) 'Liturgy and Worship' (5 pp.). A. Roersch: Tesser 'Petrus Canisius.' L. Willaert: Relf 'Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords [1621, 1625, 1628].' A. van Hove: Gaquière 'Pierre de Marca (1594-1662).' P. Richard: Castagnoli 'Il Cardinale Giulio Alberoni, III'. L. Bellon: Richards 'The Religion of the Baha'is.'

Nouvelle Revue Théologique (Vol. LX. No. 5. May, 1933. Louvain: 11 rue des Recollets). F. M. Braun: La Passion de N.S. Jésus-Christ, d'après S. Jean, II. J. Salsmans: Vocation et Chasteté. J. de Ghellinck: Un Programme de Lectures patristiques, II. J. Calès: Pourquoi les Grecs se convertirent à l'Evangile. J. Pauwels: Exposition et Bénédiction du Saint-Sacrement. Actes du Saint-Siège. J. Creusen: Joyce 'Christian Marriage'; Michaelis 'Freud.' J. Levie: Contenau 'Manuel d'Archéologie orientale, II-III.' P. Grosjean: Hubert 'Les Celtes.'

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (Vol. XIV. No. 2. 1933. Tübingen: Mohr). H. Stephan: Die aktuelle Bedeutung der Anthropologie. Zur Einführung. R. Winkler: Philosophische oder theologische Anthropologie? Versuch eines Gesprächs mit der Philosophie von Jaspers. W. Schultz: Ueber die Ausgabe einer theologischen existentialen Anthropologie. H. E. Eisenhuth: Die Auffassung vom Menschen in Grisebachs Kritischer Ethik. F. W. Schmidt: Das Problem der Anthropologie in der Psychoanalyse Freud. u. der Individualpsychologie Rünkels.

Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift (Vol. XXIII. No. 2. April-June, 1933. Bern: Stämpfli et Cie). R. Keussen: Die Willensfreiheit als religiöses u. philosophisches Grundproblem. Die Gnadenlehre in der orthodoxen morgenländischen Kirche. K. Droese: Die Liturgie der Orthodoxen Armenischen Kirche in Nord-Amerika.

The International Review of Missions (Vol. XXII. No. 87. July, 1933. Milford). J. F. Edwards: Birthpangs of a New Era in India. Lord Noel Buxton: A Century of Emancipation. J. H. Oldham: Prof. Brunner on the Christian Ethic, III. O. von Harling: The Present Situation in Missions to the Jews and its Challenge. A. E. Garvie: The Evangelical Faith and Other Religions. R. E. Hoffman: Changing Medical Work in Persia. E. D. Earthy: An African Tribe in Transition from Paganism to Christianity. W. H. Ford: Conversion and its Recognition in Congo Converts. F. S. Thompson: The Future of Missions. S. A. Morrison: Social Work in the Near East. A. D. Lindsay: 'Extension and Research.' Additional Note on Proposals made by the Commission on Christian Higher Education in India. D. S. Margoliouth: Adams 'Islam and Modernism in Egypt.' C. E. Padwick: Gibb (ed.) 'Whither Islam?' J. H. Reisner: Rural India. M. Schlinck: Two Hundred Years of Moravian Missions. J. S. Hoyland: MacLagan 'The Jesuits and the Great Mogul.' W. Paton: Fleming 'Ventures in Simpler Living' ('really important'). A. Ebisawa: Exling 'Kagawa.'

The Church Overseas (Vol. VI. No. 23. July, 1933. Westminster, S.W.1: Church House). S. Waddy: The Missionary Results of the Oxford Movement. Sir J. Harris: The Church and Slavery. A Great Opportunity. P. Gibson: The Ministry of Women. G. Callaway: The Race Problem in S. Africa and the Average Man. A. E. Scipio and B. Creighton: The Anglo-Indian Community. T. C. Young: Ancestor Worship or Ancestor-Partnership? A. T. Down: Anglican Missionary Societies, I. The S.P.C.K. News from the Dioceses, Quarterly Survey. W. E. Soothill: Buddhism and Christianity. W. W. Cash: Seligman 'Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan.' O. Hardman: Teape 'The Secret Lore of India.' E. F. E. Wigram: 'Bishop Montgomery.' E. Tydeman: Haythornthwaite and Sully 'St. John's College Agra, 1850-1930.' E. W. Smith: Foster 'A Brief Doctrinal Commentary on the Arabic Koran.'

BOOKS RECEIVED.

BIBLICAL.

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2. BARTH, K.—*The Epistle to the Romans*, 547 pp. (Oxford Univ. Press). 21s.
3. KENYON, F. G.—*Recent Developments in the Textual Criticism of the Greek Bible*, 119 pp. (Humphrey Milford). 6s.
4. STOWELL, J. N.—*God's Message : Genesis to Psalms*, 159 pp. (Skeffington). 3s. 6d.
5. RAVEN, C. E. and E.—*The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*, 263 pp. (Cambridge Univ. Press). 4s. 6d.
6. DAVIES, J. B. T.—*The Heart of the Bible*. Vol. II. 256 pp. (Allen and Unwin). 5s.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL.

7. PATTERSON, R. L.—*The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas*, 508 pp. (Allen and Unwin). 21s.
8. WILLIAMS, N. P., AND HARRIS, C.—*Northern Catholicism*. 555 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 7s. 6d. See Review.
9. BERNARDIN, J. B.—*The Intercession of our Lord*, 172 pp. (Columbia Univ. Press). 11s.
10. GLUNZ, H. H.—*History of the Vulgate in England*, 383 pp. (Cambridge Univ. Press). 18s.
11. MEANS, S.—*Faith*, 334 pp. (Macmillan). 12s. 6d.
12. DAWSON, E. A.—*The Atonement*, 145 pp. (Mowbray). 5s.
13. ADDISON, J. T.—*Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of Mankind*, 309 pp. (Allen and Unwin). 8s. 6d.
14. RICHARDSON, R. T.—*The Gospel of Modernism*, 175 pp. (Skeffington). 3s. 6d.
15. HOCART, A. M.—*The Progress of Man*, 316 pp. (Methuen). 7s. 6d.
16. ORCHARD, W. E.—*The Inevitable Cross*, 273 pp. (Putnam). 7s. 6d.
17. INGE, W. R.—*God and the Astronomers*, 308 pp. (Longmans). 12s. 6d.
18. DEWAR, L.—*Imagination and Religion*, 167 pp. (Philip Allen). 3s. 6d.
19. BRADEN, C. S.—*Modern Tendencies in World Religions*, 343 pp. (Allen and Unwin). 10s.

HISTORICAL.

20. MARRIOTT, J. A. R.—*The Life of John Colet*, 207 pp. (Methuen). 6s. See Review.
21. WHITLEY, W. T.—*Calvinism and Evangelism in England*, 46 pp. (Kingsgate Press). 1s. 6d. See Review.
22. MALDEN, R. H.—*The Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England*. (Oxford University Press). 3s. 6d. See Review.
23. CRADOCK, H. C.—*A History of the Ancient Parish of Birkstall*, 320 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 10s. 6d.
24. CARPENTER, S. C.—*Church and People, 1789-1889*, 508 pp. (S.P.C.K.). See Review.
25. CHRYSOSTOM, Abp.—*The Third Oecumenical Council and the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome*, 53 pp. (Faith Press). 1s. See Review.

26. KIDD, B. J.—*The Counter-Reformation*, 271 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 8s. 6d.
 27. COMPER, F. M. M.—*The Life of Richard Rolle*, 340 pp. (Dent). 7s. 6d.
 28. MONAHAN, M.—*The Life and Letters of Janet Erskine Stuart*, 524 pp. (Longmans).
 29. CROSS, F. L., and OLLARD, S. L.—*The Anglo-Catholic Revival in Outline*, 64 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 1s.
 30. STEVENS, C. E.—*Sidonius Apollinaris*, 224 pp. (Clarendon Press). 12s. 6d.
 31. CROSS, F. L.—*Preaching in the Anglo-Catholic Revival*, 75 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 1s.
 32. SPARROW-SIMPSON, W. J.—*The Contribution of Cambridge to the Anglo-Catholic Revival*, 80 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 1s. 6d.
 33. FOAKES-JACKSON, F. J.—*Eusebius Pamphili*, 153 pp. (Heffer). 4s. 6d.
 34. SPINKA, M.—*A History of Christianity in the Balkans*, 202 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 16s.
 35. VAN DER EYNDE, D.—*Les Normes de l'Enseignement Chrétien dans la littérature patristique des trois premiers siècles*. 360 pp. (Gabalda, Paris).

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